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 The heart of my dissertation project is the proposal of a new updating rule for 
responding to learning experiences consisting of continuous streams of evidence. I suggest 
characterizing this kind of learning experience as a continuous stream of stipulated credal 
derivatives, and show that Continuous Probability Kinematics is the uniquely coherent response 
to such a stream which satisfies a continuous analogue of Rigidity – the core property of both 
Bayesian and Jeffrey conditionalization.  
  In the first chapter, I define neighborhood norms of rationality with reference to Kenny 
Easwaran’s definition of neighborhood properties. I summarize and comment on some of the 
key arguments in the dispute between time-slice epistemologists, who argue that there are no 
fundamentally diachronic norms of rationality, and the proponents of diachronic norms. I am 
sympathetic to two of the key motivations often given in support of the synchronist position: 
mentalist internalism and the idea that metaphysical disputes about the identity of persons in 
bizarre puzzle cases should not play a central role in epistemologists’ assessments of the 
rationality of agents. However, I argue that time-slice epistemology cannot adequately address 
the rationality of temporally-extended processes like reasoning and learning. Neighborhood 
norms present a viable third way between these two positions, capturing much of the spirit of 
the previously-discussed synchronist motivations while still providing just enough temporal 
structure to meaningfully guide and evaluate temporally-extended rational processes. 
Continuous Probability Kinematics is an example of one such neighborhood norm.  
 In the second chapter, I develop my updating rule CPK and establish many of its core 
properties. Of special note here are the deep connections to Jeffrey’s Probability Kinematics, as 
well as some key differences. The net result of any CPK updating process will always be 
representable as a Jeffrey shift on the refined partition generated by the propositions that the 




provides an intuitive account of how to combine the effects of learning experiences that are 
each about fundamentally different underlying partitions. In CPK’s formalism, an agent can 
receive simultaneous evidence streams about an arbitrary (finite) number of propositions, 
which can themselves be evidentially related in any way. At any given instant, the result of the 
combination is a simple sum of the effects that learning about the individual propositions 
would have separately.  
 CPK is concerned with a novel kind of learning experience and involves a novel 
characterization of evidence. The third and final chapter of this dissertation is concerned with 
explaining what this characterization of evidence means and with arguing that it can be the 
basis for genuine learning. I begin by characterizing learning experiences in terms of the Value 
of Information, and prove a Value of Information theorem for CPK learning experiences under 
the assumption of a Martingale constraint on the agent’s prior distribution over the signals that 
they might receive. I examine Timothy Williamson’s arguments that evidence must be 
propositional and express my skepticism. I then explore two different routes to model agents 
who update by CPK as if they are learning some propositional content and updating the rest of 
their credences by Bayesian conditionalization on this content. The second of these two routes 
provides a very interesting lens to reexamine the evidential commitments that underwrite 





Neighborhood Norms of Rationality:  
A Third Way Between the Synchronic and the Diachronic 
  
1. Time-Slice Epistemology vs. Diachronic Norms: an Overview of the Criticism  
In this section, I begin by introducing the time-slice position, and presenting some of the 
major synchronist arguments against diachronic norms and for synchronicity. I briefly evaluate 
how persuasive I find these arguments in attacking the viability of diachronic norms. 
 
The Time-Slice Position 
Many common norms of epistemology are diachronic: according to them, what an agent 
should believe at one time depends on facts about the agent at other times. For example, 
Bayesian conditionalization is usually understood as a diachronic norm. Suppose that at 𝑡0 an 
agent has a prior credence function 𝑐0, and then at 𝑡1 the agent learns that some proposition E 
is true. The credence function that Bayesian updating requires the agent to adopt at 𝑡1 is a 
function of the agent’s prior, 𝑐0. 
 Roughly speaking then, the time-slice (or synchronist) position is simply the denial that 
agents are beholden to diachronic norms. Here is Moss (2015)’s statement of time-slice 
epistemology: 
“… at a first pass, we define this theory as the combination of two claims. The 
first claim: what is rationally permissible or obligatory for you at some time is 
entirely determined by what mental states you are in at that time. This 
supervenience claim governs facts about the rationality of your actions, as well 




claim: the fundamental facts about rationality are exhausted by these temporally 
local facts. There may be some fact about whether you are a rational person, for 
instance. But this is a derivative fact, one that just depends on whether your 
actions and opinions are rational for you at those times.” (172) 
Similarly, Hedden (2015) puts the position like this: “how you rationally ought to be at a time 
depends only on your mental states at that time, not on how you (or time-slices psychologically 
continuous with you) were in the past or will be in the future” (7). 
Although these statements of the view seem simple enough, there is a subtlety related 
to what counts as a mental state. Williamson (2000, chapter 1) famously and controversially 
argues that knowledge is not only a genuine mental state, but a more paradigmatic kind of 
mental state than belief. So, consider a Williamsonian view where what your doxastic state at 
any moment in time should be depends on your current evidence, and your current evidence 
consists of all and only the propositions you know. Now consider the following two possible 
worlds. World 1 contains Agent 1 that, at time t, possesses a veridical memory of eating a bagel 
for breakfast that morning. In World 2, there’s some time-slice of the universe, occurring at 
time t’, that’s physically identical to the state of World 1 at t; however, the supposed memory 
of Agent 2 (who is, at t’, physically identical to Agent 1 at t) in World 2 is nothing of the kind – 
the agent didn’t even have breakfast that morning. (This could be for all kinds of reasons: the 
agent didn’t exist prior to time t’; the agent’s memory has been overwritten by some device; 
etc.) Very plausibly, the agent in World 1 knows that she had a bagel for breakfast that 
morning. (In fact, let’s just stipulate that Agent 1 does know this. If there is any possible 
precisification of the case as outlined so far where the reader thinks it’s determinate that Agent 
1 knows she had a bagel for breakfast, feel free to fill in the details.) The agent in World 2 
definitively doesn’t know that she ate a bagel that morning, because she didn’t. A 
Williamsonian view places different demands on the two agents: Agent 1 must adopt the 
doxastic state consistent with some total body of evidence including the fact that she ate a 
bagel, while Agent 2 must not.1 Is such a view really consistent with the time-slice picture?  
 
1 I’ve been deliberately ignoring the following wrinkle: if content externalism is correct, even if Agent 2’s memory 
of eating a bagel were veridical, the obvious propositions that Agent 2 would be in a position to know would not 




 Hedden (2015) seems to think it is: “I have no quarrel with these [Williamsonian] 
epistemologists, and indeed I am sympathetic to their views. … Mentalist Internalists should say 
that whether your perception is reliable, and whether your memory is veridical, should affect 
what you ought to believe now only in virtue of affecting your present mental states. This is 
compatible with the claim that in fact you and the BIV, or you and Swampman,2 are not in the 
same mental states after all” (26). Kelly (2016) argues that classifying Williamsonian views as 
synchronic is suspect:  
“On the view in question, the fact that you are now in a position to justifiably 
believe this proposition is ultimately grounded in a set of facts that includes 
purely historical facts, for example, facts that a certain past learning event 
actually occurred. It is at the very least unclear that such a view should be 
classified as a current time slice account as opposed to an historical theory. 
Contrast the view just described with a different account of memory‐based 
justification. According to this alternative account, you are justified in believing 
that p on the basis of memory when (1) you have a current apparent memory as 
of p, a state that provides prima facie justification for believing p, and (2) you 
currently lack any reason to distrust this apparent memory. Such a view is clearly 
a current time slice view, in a way that the epistemological view described in the 
preceding paragraph is not.” (47-8) 
There are two separate criticisms of classifying Williamsonian views as synchronic that this 
contrast makes apparent. As we will see in the next subsection, one of the most natural ways of 
motivating the synchronist view is by appeal to internalist intuitions. However, agents in the 
skeptical scenarios discussed in the previous paragraphs are in a state that is internally 
 
not going to try to make this precise, but I think it’s obvious that there’s an important epistemic difference beyond 
this mere difference in content: roughly, the proposition about eating a bagel for breakfast that Agent 2 believes is 
structurally analogous (in some ways) to the proposition that agent 1 believes about eating a bagel for breakfast. 
Agent 1 has, and agent 2 lacks, a certain kind of knowledge about her own history; Agent 2 could have had this 
kind of knowledge, even if the propositions in question would be different.  
2 Both the brain in a vat and Swampman are skeptical scenarios somewhat like the one I’ve sketched. However, 
you and a BIV that have the same (apparent) experiences would not be in time-slices of the universe that are 
physically identical. A Swampman (“created when a lightning bolt causes a bunch of molecules to spontaneously 
arrange themselves into a human form” (25), with the same apparent memories as you) case could be an instance 




indistinguishable from the case where their beliefs constitute knowledge. I join Hedden in 
finding this claim very plausible: “what you rationally ought to do or believe should depend on 
what information you have available, rather than simply on how the world in fact is” (11). On 
the understanding of availability of information that I find most intuitive, agents in the skeptical 
and good cases, respectively, have access to the same (or at least, structurally analogous – see 
fn. 1) information. And the supposed difference in mental states that the Williamsonian view 
claims to obtain is fundamentally grounded in an aspect of “how the world is” that the agent 
does not have access to.  
 Leaving internalist motivations aside, the stronger criticism Kelly is making is this: if 
whether an agent knows E at t irreducibly depends on facts about the agent’s history prior to t, 
then having whether the agent’s belief that E counts as knowledge determine whether or not E 
is evidence for the agent amounts to making the agent’s doxastic norms irreducibly depend on 
aspects of the agent’s history that are not really encoded in the agent’s present state. Indeed, 
the decisive facts are not even encoded in the present physical state of the entire universe. 
Here’s an obviously mistaken way of arguing that (ordinarily understood) Bayesian 
conditionalization is a synchronic norm. Let 𝑃𝑟 be the family of propositions of the form: that, at 
𝑡0, the agent’s conditional credence in H on E, 𝑐0(𝐻|𝐸) = 𝑟, 𝑟 ∈ ℝ. Here’s a synchronic version 
of Bayesian conditionalization: (∀ 𝑟 ∈ ℝ) if, at the present moment the agent has just learned 
E, then the agent is required to have credence 𝑟 in H iff 𝑃𝑟 is true at the present moment. Now, 
the 𝑃𝑟 are not even arguably part of an agent’s present mental state, so the time-slice positions 
we have been discussing (Moss’s and Hedden’s) both correctly reject this supposedly 
synchronic norm. But if the property of knowing E at t is grounded partly in non-mental facts 
about the agent at earlier times, it’s not clear to me that it should be any less troubling for the 
synchronist.  
 
Synchronist Arguments Against Diachronic Norms 
In this subsection, I present some of the major arguments that proponents of the time-






Considerations from Personal Identity 
Hedden (2015, Chapters 2-3) presents several puzzle cases for diachronic norms that 
involve ambiguity about whether one time slice is the same person as another time slice. We 
will look at some of these cases in more detail in a moment, but the general thrust of these 
arguments is to attack diachronic norms, like Conditionalization, that are intrapersonal. As it’s 
ordinarily understood, Conditionalization treats time slices of a single agent differently than it 
treats time slices of different agents. When you learn some piece of evidence E, the prior 
conditional credences 𝑐0(𝑥|𝐸) that Conditionalization instructs you to adopt as your current 
credences, 𝑐1(𝑥) = 𝑐0(𝑥|𝐸), are usually understood as your prior conditional credences. Your 
prior, 𝑐0, is treated as relevant to what your current doxastic state should be in a way that 𝑐′0, 
the credence of some other agent at 𝑡0 is not. And if there are multiple time slices that have 
competing claims to being you at 𝑡0, then applying Conditionalization requires you (at 𝑡1)  to 
adjudicate their claims. As we will see, this can sometimes be quite tricky. I now consider two of 
these puzzle cases that Hedden discusses. 
 
The Combined Spectrum 
Parfit (1984, 236) asks us to consider a spectrum of medical procedures that he might 
undergo. On one extreme, no operation occurs – Parfit exits the operating room unchanged. On 
the other, Parfit’s entire body is replaced with an exact cellular replica of the body of Greta 
Garbo as she was at 30 years old. In all of the intermediate cases, some number of Parfit’s cells 
are replaced with Garbo cells, and some are left in place. It’s supposed to be obvious that, on 
the first extreme, the person that exits the operating room is identical to Parfit; and on the 
second extreme, the person that results is certainly not identical to Parfit. In many of the 
intermediate cases, it is supposed to be quite tricky to identify whether the result of the 








“One person (call her ‘Pre’) enters the teletransporter. Her body is scanned. 
Then, at the instant her body is vaporized, the information about her molecular 
state is beamed to two locations, Los Angeles and San Francisco. In each city, a 
molecule-for-molecule duplicate of Pre is created. Call the one in Los Angeles 
‘Lefty’ and the one in San Francisco ‘Righty’. Lefty and Righty are each 
qualitatively just like Pre is before her body is vaporized.” (Hedden 2015, 16)  
Hedden elaborates on Double Transportation, crafting a more explicit challenge to 
Conditionalization. Now, suppose that before entering the teletransporter, Pre has the 
following beliefs. When Lefty and Righty awake to take their first views of the world, they will 
each see the décor of the mad scientist responsible for the teleportation procedure. For each of 
several prominent medical schools, Pre’s credence that the scientist is an alumnus of that 
school conditional on the scientist’s home featuring the colors of said school is very high. Lefty 
sees crimson; should she have high credence that the scientist graduated from Harvard? (32) 
 Hedden’s answer: “If Conditionalization is right, then it depends. If Lefty and Pre are the 
same person, then Conditionalization says that Lefty indeed ought to have high credence that 
the mad scientist is a Harvardian. But if not, Conditionalization is silent, for it is as if Lefty just 
suddenly came into existence” (2015, 32). Hedden goes on to claim that, according to 
Subjective Bayesianism, if Lefty is not the same person as Pre, Lefty is within her epistemic 
rights to choose some prior – that need not be related to Pre’s final credence function before 
death in any important way – and then update accordingly. Although Hedden focuses on 
Conditionalization, the argument should generalize to most diachronic norms that are 
intrapersonal in the sense of taking the agent’s prior doxastic states to play a special role in 
prescribing or justifying the agent’s current doxastic state.  
 
Identity: A Quick Reply on Behalf of the Conditionalizer 
My goal in this paper is not to fully defend diachronic norms as ordinarily understood. 




advantages of both the diachronist and time-slice positions. However, I think the arguments 
from personal identity are not entirely fair to the proponent of diachronic norms.   
 Conditionalization is, fundamentally, a norm about learning experiences. Although there 
is some controversy about whether there are kinds of learning that Conditionalization 
(including Jeffrey updating) is not well-equipped to handle, it is fairly uncontroversial that 
Conditionalization is really not intended to model what an agent should do when they take 
themselves to be undergoing epistemic misfortune: losing evidence, forgetting, having beliefs 
changed in ways they don’t endorse, etc. Parfit’s Combined Spectrum case is not just an 
example of Cronenberg-worthy body horror but is also epistemically horrific. In the 
intermediate cases, it seems unlikely that the resulting chimera will even have anything 
resembling ordinary human thought – assuming it even lives. But if it does, it would be frankly 
astonishing if the resulting credal state wasn’t wildly incoherent; it is the result, after all, of 
mashing together the minds of two different agents. Although much less disturbing than the 
typical Combined Spectrum case (at worst, it only involves a near-instant death), the act of 
being teleported in Double Teletransportation is similar in not being a learning experience of 
any kind. (Both Lefty and Righty undergo learning experiences after waking up, but ordinary 
conditionalization can handle that without any reference to Pre at all.) In fact, it’s stipulated 
that Lefty and Righty are qualitatively identical to Pre. Although this is, perhaps, insufficient 
grounds to establish that Lefty and Righty have the same mental states as Pre3, I am going to 
assert that learning without internal physical change is impossible. This claim should be 
unobjectionable to anyone who is not a fairly strong dualist.  
 So, I claim that the proponent of Conditionalization should respond that her norm is 
silent about the teleporting part of Double Teletransportation, whether Pre is identical to Lefty 
or not; Conditionalization should also rest mute on the entire sequence of the Combined 
Spectrum: the agent should not regard any of the operations as learning experiences. Once 
Lefty awakes with the credence function that she in fact has after the teleportation, she 
undergoes an ordinary learning experience of seeing crimson; Conditionalization then applies 
 
3 E.g., If Williamsonian views about what can count as a mental state are admissible, two agents with the same 




straightforwardly, using her actual prior. (The same is obviously also true of Righty.) And the 
diachronist need not be embarrassed that her diachronic norms only apply in certain situations; 
she never committed to the claim that there are only universal diachronic norms. The (very 
strong) position that the synchronist is arguing for is that there are no fundamental diachronic 
norms at all.4 Although Hedden may be correct that Double Teletransportation is a puzzle for a 
certain variety of Subjective Bayesianism, the problem is not really that Conditionalization is 
diachronic. The real mistake is assuming that (modulo choice of prior, which is permissive), 
conditionalization must identify what credence function it’s rational for the agent to have at 
every moment in time, in response to every possible kind of situation. But there’s just no 
reason to expect conditionalization to be applicable to arbitrary mental changes; I think that 
understanding of Subjective Bayesianism was doomed from the beginning, and it’s not clear 
that any Bayesian has ever held such a position.  
 
Arguments from Mentalist Internalism 
 The second major criticism of diachronic norms is that they fail to make what it would 
be rational for an agent to believe at a time supervene on an agent’s current mental states. 
Hedden (2015) calls this supervenience mentalist internalism. A similar point is also made in 
Moss (2015): “The problematic cases for diachronic norms are exactly those cases where your 
past opinions do not have their usual effects on your current mental states. … Instead of 
restricting diachronic norms to cases where your past credences have their usual effects on 
your current mental states, we should admit that your current mental states are what 
determine whether your current credences are rational” (176). Moss is also explicit that her 
view is intended to be neutral on the stance of epistemic externalism vs internalism (179). Both 
Moss and Hedden give Arntzenius’s Two Paths to Shangri La and ordinary forgetting as 
examples intended to demonstrate that Conditionalization violates this supervenience. Both 
Moss and Hedden are also clear that this is not merely a problem for Conditionalization, but an 
instance of a broader problem: any diachronic norm will sometimes make demands of an agent 
 
4 The word “fundamental” was important – Hedden, for instance, does admit that there may be diachronic norms 




that seem at odds with what is intuitively rational from (in Hedden’s terminology) a mentalist 
internalist perspective.  
 
Two Paths to Shangri La 
“There are two paths to Shangri La, the Path by the Mountains, and the Path by 
the Sea. A fair coin will be tossed by the guardians to determine which path you 
will take: if heads you go by the Mountains, if tails you go by the Sea. If you go by 
the Mountains, nothing strange will happen: while traveling you will see the 
glorious Mountains, and even after you enter Shangri La, you will forever retain 
your memories of that Magnificent Journey. If you go by the Sea, you will revel in 
the Beauty of the Misty Ocean. But, just as you enter Shangri La, your memory of 
this Beauteous Journey will be erased and be replaced by [an apparent] memory 
of the Journey by the Mountains.” (Arntzenius 2003 356) 
Suppose you go by the Mountains. Intuitively, you should be very close to certain that you’re 
taking the Path by the Mountains while you’re actually on it: you see the Mountains, and you 
have no reason to think that anything has gone wrong with your perception at this point. Once 
you enter the city, your memory of traveling by the Mountains remains veridical – but you are 
now in a position where you have no reason to believe this is true. You know that you would 
have qualitatively indistinguishable “memories” as of the same journey if you had taken the 
Path by the Sea. Your memory has lost its evidential import because it now fails to discriminate 
at all between the two cases. It seems that the best you can do is base your current credence in 
the path you took on the fact that the coin was fair: there was chance 1 2⁄  you would take each 
path, and you now have no other evidence (from your perspective) about which path you took. 
“Note the internalist intuition here: that what you ought to believe depends on what your 
evidence is, and your evidence supervenes on your present mental states, which are the same 
no matter which route you took” (Hedden 2015 36).  
 Conditionalization is not well-equipped to deal with this case. My diagnosis is that this is 
because Rigidity, the core property of conditionalization, is a bad fit for the kind of learning 




credences in such a way that your credences conditional on E, 𝑐(⋅ |𝐸), remain constant. There is 
an important sense in which this amounts to maintaining your beliefs about what kind of 
evidence E is for various propositions.5 This is a case where the most natural understanding of 
what the agent has learned is that the evidential import of his evidence has changed: prior to 
entering the city, his memory is very strong evidence about which of the two Paths he took – 
his credence in having gone by the Mountains, conditional on his memory of seeing the 
mountains should be close to 1; after entering, his evidence does not discriminate between the 
two Paths at all – his credence on having gone by the Mountains, conditional on a memory with 
precisely the same propositional content, should now be 1 2⁄ . Rigidity is desirable precisely 
when an agent is learning about some evidence in a way that preserves her beliefs about the 
import of said evidence, which is not an especially natural way of understanding what has 
happened here.  
 Hedden diagnoses the problem slightly differently: “But upon entering Shangri-La, you 
do not gain any new evidence that bears on whether you traveled by the Mountains, and hence 
Conditionalization does not kick in. So, according to Conditionalization, you ought to just retain 
your credence 1 that you traveled by the Mountains. The problem is that you do not learn 
anything new that is evidentially relevant to the question of which route you took” (2015 36). 
However, Hedden’s own proposed solution to the problem is actually inconsistent with this 
claim that passing through the gate is not evidence relevant to which path you took. Hedden 
argues that his norm of Synchronic Conditionalization explains the intuitively correct response 
to entering Shangri La better than diachronic conditionalization. Here’s the norm: 
 
Synchronic Conditionalization Let P be the uniquely rational prior 
probability function. If at time t you have total evidence E, your credence at t in 
each proposition H should equal 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸). (Hedden 2015 138) 
 
 





And here’s the explanation: “The thought is that which route you took was determined by the 
result of a coin toss. And your current evidence that you seem to remember traveling by the 
Mountains does not discriminate between your having traveled by the Mountains and your 
having traveled by the Sea. So your credence that you traveled by the Mountains ought to 
equal 1 2⁄ ” (Hedden 2015 141). Now, I very strongly agree with Hedden that this is the intuitive 
story about why your credences should change when you enter Shangri La. But I think it’s very 
unclear as an explanation of how Synchronic Conditionalization is supposed to resolve the 
problem. 
Hedden can reasonably claim that the total evidence the agent has before and after 
entering the gate of the city are different in virtue of facts like where or when the memory was 
had, and so we can’t easily represent the agent undergoing the kind of cumulative learning 
required by ordinary diachronic conditionalization. But for Hedden’s account to work, the 
uniquely rational credence function does still have to treat the proposition “I have, at some 
point in the past, crossed through the gate” as evidence against having taken the path by the 
Mountains in cases where that’s the only thing that agent learns; the fact that the agent also 
plausibly has other changes in their total evidence only obscures that fact.  
 To see this, consider the case of a visitor to Shangri-La who has lost track of where they 
are and what time it is – it may help to imagine that they have lost the use of their sight. 
Consider two versions of this agent: one who remembers that they have passed through the 
gate (call this proposition G) with certainty, and another who has credence 0.5 in G. Their total 
body of evidence is in all other respects the same; in particular, both agents have qualitatively 
identical memories as of the same journey by the Mountains. Now, what should each of these 
agents conclude about the proposition M: “I took the path by the mountains”? Very clearly, for 
the same reasons we have been discussing, the first agent should have (nearly) credence 0.5 in 
M. If we think that the uniquely rational prior should satisfy Reflection, then the second agent is 
required to have credence 0.75 in M – they think there’s probability 0.5 that they’re in a 
situation where the required credence is 1 and probability 0.5 that the required credence is 0.5, 
so the required credence is 0.5 ⋅ 1 + 0.5 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.75. But even without committing to 




0.5 in the second case. But this is to say that the uniquely rational credence function treats 
learning G as evidence against M for the second agent. Let E be the second agent’s total 
evidence. We have 𝑃(𝑀|𝐸 ∧ 𝐺) < 𝑃(𝑀|𝐸).   
 
Ordinary Forgetting 
“Suppose you are now certain that you had cereal for breakfast. At some point in 
the future, you will no longer remember having had cereal today, but since you 
will not have learned anything new that bears on what you had for breakfast 
today, Conditionalization says that you ought to retain your certainty that you 
had cereal. But this is crazy! Surely once you no longer remember having eaten 
cereal, you ought to drop your confidence that you had cereal” (Hedden 2015 
42).  
Hedden also mentions what I take to be the correct response on behalf of the Conditionalizer: 
Conditionalization tells you what to do in certain cases of gaining evidence; it makes no 
recommendation about what to do when your evidence remains the same or when you lose 
evidence, because that is simply not the task for which it was built. However, Hedden argues 
that this response is a cop-out: the truly fundamental norms of rationality would address all 
such cases (2015 43). Moss (2015) makes a point in the same vein: “From the point of view of 
theory building, the repeated restriction of diachronic norms is unsatisfying. … Time-slice 
epistemology is a natural response to this pattern of observations” (175-6). For my part, I find it 
unclear why we would expect global, universally applicable rational norms. There are many 
different kinds of learning situations, and still more kinds of belief change that are epistemically 
undesirable (including at least some kinds of forgetting); these cases don’t seem especially easy 
to unify. Counting a failure to apply to all such kinds of situations as a black mark against a 
norm that performs admirably in a well-defined area of applicability is strange to me; this is 
especially true given that the cases Bayesian updating handles are some of the most 
paradigmatic kinds of learning experiences. And I am highly skeptical that there is any unified 
synchronic norm which actually handles all of the cases well. However, I completely agree with 




excellent reason for us to think that it might be more fundamental than a patchwork quilt sewn 
together from pieces of various diachronic norms. I also agree that a version of 
Conditionalization which demanded that agents maintain beliefs on the basis of evidence they 
no longer have seems implausible. However, I think it’s unfair to try to saddle the proponents of 
Conditionalization with this implausible view on the grounds that it would be a more 
generalized version of their view; to generalize to outside of a domain of applicability is a 
mistake. Make everything as simple as possible – but not more so!  
 So, I’m unconvinced by the objection from ordinary forgetting, and I’m skeptical that 
synchronic versions of conditionalization provide substantial improvement over diachronic 
conditionalization in cases like Shangri-La. But regardless of my stance on the specific examples, 
I am very sympathetic to the underlying mentalist internalist motivation: diachronic norms, by 
making reference to an agent’s actual prior mental states, certainly have the possibility of 
conflicting with norms that are instead based on the agent’s, e.g., beliefs about their prior 
mental states.6 And when it comes to action guidance, I agree that it seems preferable to base 
norms in states that agents have better access to; as a limiting case, if an agent could not even 
in principle access a state at all, it’s irrelevant to what the agent should do.  
 Similarly, although I’m not convinced by the specific examples of problems with 
personal identity that I’ve discussed, I completely agree with time-slice epistemologists that our 
epistemic evaluations should not depend on the identity facts in these weird, hard puzzle cases. 
However, I think treating each time slice as an agent complete-in-themselves, independent of 
previous time slices, is a massive overcorrection; I think the time-slice view has especially weird 
consequences when we concern ourselves not with action-guidance, but with epistemic 
evaluation. In the next section, I look at one major diachronist criticism of the time-slice view, 




6 Part of what is at issue here is how diachronic actual proponents of conditionalization take it to be. As I noted in 
the case of ordinary forgetting, Hedden and Moss create what they take to be a more general version of 





2. Diachronist Criticism of the Time-Slice Position 
 
 The criticism of the time-slice position that I will consider in this section centers around 
the idea that there are rational processes, e.g., reasoning, that are evaluable in ways that the 
time slice picture cannot accommodate. The properties of a process, the diachronist argues, are 
irreducibly diachronic – they cannot be captured by aggregating the properties that an agent 
possesses at various times. Podgorski (2016) presents an analogy with Zeno’s paradox of the 
arrow: the property of moving does not obtain at any instant. At each moment in time, the 
arrow occupies a single position. Although the positions occupied at each moment are 
different, at no moment is the arrow moving. And so, Zeno concludes, if the arrow is motionless 
at each moment, the arrow never moves. Similarly, the synchronist claims that rationality for an 
agent at each moment in time is a property that supervenes on (mental) properties of the agent 
at said moment. And since what it is rational for an agent to believe at each moment is 
determined purely synchronically, they synchronist concludes that rationality supervenes 
purely on the synchronic. Diachronic norms, if they exist at all, must be reducible to 
fundamental synchronic norms. Podgorski argues that this is the same kind of error as Zeno’s: 
rationality-at-an-instant is not the full story of rationality. There are some rationally evaluable 
properties that, like motion, are properties that a subject possess in virtue of behavior over an 
interval and cannot be reduced to the properties that the subject has at any instant. Purely 
synchronic norms simply lack the resources to address these properties: you can satisfy 
synchronic norms at each instant without exhibiting the required pattern over the interval. 
Thus, Podgorksi argues, if there are rational requirements that are fundamentally about 
processes like reasoning, the time-slice view will not be adequate (Podgorski 2016 862-3).  
 
Rationality of Belief Formation 
 Suppose that Podgorksi has a friend, Minnie, who delights in breaking promises. In most 
situations, receiving a promise from Minnie is excellent evidence that she will not do what was 
promised. However, Minnie is very superstitious and seriously attempts to keep all promises 




that she will attend his birthday party; he knows that it’s the 13th when he hears the promise. 
Call the time at which Podgorski receives the promise 𝑡0. Now, we are assuming that processing 
this evidence takes time: the soonest that he will be able to form an opinion about whether 
Minnie is coming to his party or not is some time 𝑡1 after 𝑡0. Unfortunately, at 𝑡1, Podgorksi will 
suddenly forget that the day’s date is the 13th, and have no idea what the date is. At present, he 
has no inkling this will happen. What belief about Minnie’s presence at his birthday party 
should he form at 𝑡1? (Podgorski 2016 867) 
 The synchronist, Podgorski claims (and as we will see, Hedden agrees), will say that the 
belief Podgorksi should have at 𝑡1 is the one supported by his evidence at that very instant: he 
should believe that she’s very unlikely to come to his party. Without a particular belief that 
today is the 13th, Podgorski should think it probably isn’t the 13th; after all, the average number 
of days in a month is 30.42, so a random day is quite unlikely to be the 13th.7 And on any day 
other than the 13th, Minnie’s promise is very strong evidence that she won’t be coming. The 
problem is that for Podgorski’s process of belief formation to result in a belief at 𝑡1 that Minnie 
(very probably) won’t be coming to his party, the process would have to be insensitive to the 
evidence that he has during the actual process. Throughout the entire time that Podgorksi is 
reasoning about whether Minnie will come to his party, he knows that it’s the 13th; he forgets 
what day it is only at the moment he forms the belief. And so the conclusion justified by his 
evidence during the process of forming the belief is that Minnie will very likely come to his 
party. A process that takes that evidence as input and yields as output that Minnie won’t come 
to the party is clearly a defective one; we should not want to reason this way.  
 Hedden (2016) presents two responses to this argument. The first is more tailored to 
Podgorski’s specific case, whereas the second is a very general claim about the relationship 
between the time-slice position and supposed epistemic norms governing processes. Hedden’s 
first response is to argue that Podgorski’s analysis of the case must be incorrect, because it 
implies that it’s sometimes rational to be in an incoherent doxastic state. If Podgorski is correct, 
 
7 This is admittedly a huge oversimplification. Depending on the month, which Podgorski presumably knows, we 
can fill in the more precise probability of 1 in 28, 1 in 30, or 1 in 31. Also, it may be much more realistic that 
Podgorski forgets what day it is, but has high confidence of being in some interval consisting of a couple weeks, or 
some similar arrangement. The details of this probability don’t really matter; the crucial point is just that Podgorski 




then at 𝑡1 he should believe that Minnie is coming to his party, that Minnie promised today to 
come to his party, and that the day’s date is probably not the 13th. But conditional on Minnie 
promising today to come to his party, and today not being the 13th, Podgorksi is supposed to 
believe that Minnie will almost certainly break the promise and not come to the party. So it 
seems as if he is committed to believing both that Minnie will and won’t attend the party 
(Hedden 2016 877). Now, Hedden points out that Podgorksi could reasonably claim that this is 
a case where there are conflicting rational norms: there’s a synchronic norm that requires 
agents not to have incoherent beliefs, and there’s a diachronic norm that requires that agents 
form beliefs using the evidence present during the formation process. In the Minnie case, it’s 
impossible for Podgorski to satisfy both norms – but maybe rational norms just conflict 
sometimes, and this is not evidence for either norm being incorrect. Hedden asserts, without 
argument, that “judging a case to be one in which there is a genuine conflict between 
requirements of rationality is a last resort” and that it is preferable to simply reject the 
supposed diachronic norm (Hedden 2016 879).  
 Although I share Hedden’s intuition that a putative normative dilemma should usually 
be interpreted as evidence that your normative framework needs revision,8 I find this response 
puzzling. Although it is technically true that it’s impossible for an agent to satisfy both norms in 
the Minnie case, the two norms do not share the burden of that impossibility equally. In cases 
like the Minnie case, it is impossible to consistently or deliberately satisfy the synchronic norm 
by itself; it is comparatively very easy to satisfy the diachronic norm. At 𝑡1, Podgorski forgets 
what day it is. As both authors present the case, this happens without any warning9 – there is 
nothing Podgorksi can do to avoid this happening, and no reason for him to make any prior 
preparations for his other beliefs at that moment. Essentially, we are not thinking of the 
forgetting as a belief change that is attributable to Podgorski as an agent, but as an arational 
change imposed from without. There is, in general, no way to safeguard the coherence of your 
beliefs against this kind of change. If your beliefs are coherent before such an arational change, 
they will typically be incoherent after it. Even if you knew that some arational change were 
 
8 I will also join Hedden in not trying to provide any argument supporting this intuition in the present discussion. 




coming, there would be no way of pre-emptively causing future coherence without evidence 
about what beliefs would be most likely to change and how. It’s not literally impossible to 
satisfy: you might get very lucky, and the arational change may happen to result in a coherent 
doxastic state. But not only is this very unlikely, there is no strategy that is expectedly better 
than doing nothing; the norm is also impossible to satisfy deliberately. In effect, applying a 
synchronic norm for coherence to this kind of case treats the agent as exhibiting a failure of 
rationality in virtue of arational processes. In this particular case, it treats forgetting as a 
rational mistake, which is the exact criticism that Hedden levies against diachronic norms, as 
discussed in the previous section. If this kind of forgetting is, at least sometimes, not under our 
voluntary control and not foreseeable, then treating this as a failure of rationality is 
incompatible with the internalist intuitions that I believe Hedden and I share.  
Suppose you have two premises, A and B. An argument by reductio starting with A and B 
shows that your premises are jointly inconsistent; it does not provide any evidence about which 
is false in the actual world. Now, suppose you have evidence that A is very likely false. This is 
still not evidence that B is true10 – or even non-contradictory – but it does show that rejecting B 
is very unlikely to help make any set of propositions that includes A true; choosing to reject B 
while holding that A is true is completely unmotivated. For all you know, B may or may not be 
problematic, but you should be very confident that A is. The same structure of reasoning seems 
applicable to the case of normative dilemmas. Trying to solve the dilemma by rejecting the 
diachronic norm is unmotivated when the synchronic norm is impossible to satisfy in any 
consistent or deliberate way.  
 Hedden’s second reply to Podgorski revolves around distinguishing between 
fundamental and derivative norms. He claims that the only fundamental norms of rationality 
are synchronic (e.g., at each moment, your current beliefs should be proportioned to your 
present evidence).  
“If we were perfectly rational, we wouldn’t need to engage in reasoning in order 
to satisfy the requirements of rationality and have beliefs which are 
 
10 Although it might be evidence that B is true if you have some independent reason to think that the disjunction of 




proportioned to our evidence. We reason precisely because we fall short of 
perfect rationality. Reasoning is a tool we can use to get ourselves to come 
closer to satisfying the requirements of rationality. In this way, its value is 
contingent and instrumental – contingent because it stems from our contingent 
cognitive limitations, and instrumental because reasoning serves as a means to 
the end of having beliefs proportioned to one’s evidence” (Hedden 2016 882).  
To the extent that we should be concerned with norms governing processes at all, he claims, 
we should see such norms as merely derivative; in particular, patterns of reasoning are 
epistemically good or bad precisely to the extent that employing them tends to lead to 
satisfying the fundamental norms well or poorly. In this way, norms of reasoning are of a kind 
with norms about how often to nap, how much caffeine to ingest, or how long to brainstorm 
(assuming we’re evaluating these actions in terms of their efficacy in producing the mental 
states required by the fundamental synchronic norms) (Hedden 2016 883).  
 Hedden thinks that an ideally rational agent would not need to reason. She would 
instead adopt the synchronically prescribed, uniquely correct, doxastic state instantaneously 
upon receiving new evidence; but he admits that because of our cognitive limitations it is at 
least sometimes impossible for real agents, like us, to do this. He claims we have an excuse and 
so are not blameworthy for our failure to live up to these very stringent epistemic norms. And 
he argues that it is a virtue of his account that it applies a single unified norm to a huge variety 
of different cognitive beings. On the alternative picture, where we tailor the norms to the 
limitations of each agent (so that we only demand of each agent that they satisfy the most 
stringent norms it is possible for them to satisfy), we would end up with disparate disunified 
norms: different epistemic norms not only for every species, but for most individuals (2016 
881). 
 I think there’s something intuitively compelling about the idea that you should 
incorporate new evidence into your beliefs as soon as possible. Any delay is time spent with 
beliefs that you think are less expectedly accurate and less practically useful than the beliefs 
you will have once you’ve finished responding to the evidence. And I can see claiming that you 




factors that determine what the minimum standard that actually applies to you should be. 
Hedden presents the picture as the most stringent, limiting case applying to everyone. But then 
he satisfies “ought implies can” by establishing derivative standards of blameworthiness, which 
are sensitive to the particular cognitive limitations of each individual. I’m unsure there’s any 
real difference between this position and the position which claims that the only real standards 
binding on each individual are the blameworthiness standards; it sounds to me like a verbal 
dispute.11 But I see the differences in the permissible delay in incorporating evidence as 
stemming entirely from differences in cognitive architecture: how many parallel processes is 
each system capable of executing at once, how many operations can each processor perform a 
second, what are the memory/storage constraints, etc. And the reason that I see these facts as 
relevant is that it makes a difference to which algorithms can be implemented most efficiently 
on the different pieces of hardware, and to how much real time running different programs will 
take. But the idea that the ideal case would be to achieve the correct belief state without any 
reasoning amounts to the claim that the limiting case is to get the correct result without any 
algorithm at all. This seems obviously false to me. 
 Let’s consider three different systems that are each supposed to be Bayesian agents. All 
three “agents” initially have the same prior credence function c, which is defined on some finite 
algebra. Call the atoms of the algebra 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛; as usual, the algebra is closed under negation 
and disjunction. Each agent is given the same series of inputs: propositions that they are 
supposed to learn with certainty, adopting credence 1. Each input is always some element of 
the algebra. Let’s call the first agent Siri. Siri updates using an algorithm that looks something 
like this: 
Siri’s Algorithm 
1. Read the input, determine which element of the algebra is specified.  
2. Initialize a counter variable i to 1. 
 
11 This isn’t intended to be a general claim that the distinction between “wrong, but not blameworthy” and “not 
wrong” is typically a verbal dispute. But when the stricter standard is one that’s impossible for any cognitively 
realistic agent to satisfy, even in principle, it leads me to think of that standard as useful primarily as a more 
abstract way of representing the real norms. This is, ultimately, what I will claim about my own norm of 




3. Calculate 𝑐(𝐴𝑖 ∧ 𝐸)/𝑐(𝐸) where E is the input from step 1. Write the result to 𝑐(𝐴𝑖).
12 
4. Increment i. 
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until 𝑖 = 𝑛. 
Siri is kind of slow and also has the disadvantage that she is incoherent in the middle of 
performing the update. One obvious way to improve on Siri is Parr. Instead of running a loop 
that iterates over all of the 𝐴𝑖, Parr has n modules running in parallel, each of which is 
dedicated to updating Parr’s credence in one of the 𝐴𝑖. So rather than performing n iterations 
of step 3, Parr performs all of the instances of step 3 at the same time. Parr also saves 
computational cycles by not needing to increment or check the counter – Parr doesn’t need a 
loop. Of course, to run his algorithm, Parr needs the ability to perform more simultaneous 
operation and needs more memory locations than Siri does. But if Parr has that available, his 
algorithm is much faster. Also, because his credences in each of the atoms of the algebra are 
updated at the same time, Parr is not incoherent at any time during the updating process.  
 Finally, consider a third system: Stan. There is no algorithm that describes Stan’s mental 
states – he doesn’t perform any analogue of the kinds of steps that Siri and Parr do. He doesn’t 
calculate any conditional probabilities, and there are no systems in him that look like they’re 
copying values from one memory location to another. Yet, somehow, every time that the same 
evidence presented to Siri and Parr is given to Stan, the values of each of his credences 
instantly jump to the same values that Siri and Parr will eventually arrive at after their toils. 
Now, I claim, Stan doesn’t appear to be some paradigm of rationality, vastly superior in his 
rationality to Siri and Parr. Stan doesn’t even appear to be any kind of agent! There is no causal 
story about why Stan’s credences end up taking the values they do (in stark contrast to both 
Siri and Parr).13 It’s not even clear what calling the inputs that Stan receives “evidence” means: 
evidence plays a certain functional role, and there’s nothing in Stan that shows any kind of 
comprehension, or any kind of use of the inputs he receives. He is just a collection of 
 
12 I’m ignoring the issue about what to do when 𝑐(𝐸) = 0. This is another way in which Siri’s algorithm could be 
improved! 
13 To be completely explicit: there isn’t even any causal story that explains why he assigns credence 1 to E. 
Although E is put into his input box, there is no process in Stan that says to assign credence 1 to whatever 




disconnected states which somehow have a magical correlation with the inputs that he’s being 
fed. Yet, at each instant, Stan’s “beliefs” are perfectly proportioned to his “evidence.” We can 
even stipulate that he satisfies Hedden’s Synchronic Conditionalization at each instant. But I 
claim the idea that Stan is even assessable with respect to rationality is highly implausible – let 
alone the claim that he is rationally superior to either Siri or Parr. If we encountered a system 
like Stan, that showed a clear pattern of states that looked like conditionalization, but with 
absolutely no evidence of doing any kind of internal processing, the obvious conclusion would 
be that Stan wasn’t an agent, but a result of the calculations of some other system. Stan could 
look to us like a collection of snapshots of something that might be an agent, but we would 
have no reason to think he was one. And if we couldn’t find any connection from some other 
system to Stan, then Stan would be deeply causally mysterious.   
 Although the above cases may not be fully decisive, I think they strongly suggest that 
Hedden’s view of synchronic rationality as primary, with the rationality of processes being 
merely derivative, is precisely backwards. As I will argue for a bit more in the subsection Why I 
Believe Relation R is What Matters to Rationality of the next section, playing certain roles in 
certain kinds of processes is foundational to what belief is. Merely satisfying a bunch of 
synchronic constraints, without the right kind of causal connections between those states, is 
not even sufficient to guarantee that the states in question are beliefs, let alone rational 
beliefs. Our paradigms of rationality should be developed from systems that exhibit certain 
kinds of connections between states over time. At this point, attentive readers might be 
confused. What I have been saying in this subsection might well sound like a full-throated 
endorsement of the necessity of diachronic norms, which I explicitly said wasn’t what I was 
going to do. In the next section, I will argue that there may be room for a kind of norm which is 
neither quite synchronic nor diachronic, but somewhat blurs the line between the two. I will 
argue that this kind of norm can provide the kind of structure necessary for rational processes, 







III. A Third Way: Neighborhood Norms 
 
In “Why Physics Uses Second Derivatives”, Kenny Easwaran defines the notion of a 
“neighbourhood property”14 as follows:  
“A (two-sided) neighbourhood property at t is a property of an object that is not 
grounded in the fundamental properties of the object at t, but, for every interval 
(𝑡 − Δ, 𝑡 + Δ), the fundamental properties of the object across that interval are 
sufficient to ground it” (847). 
Easwaran is concerned with explaining how so-called “instantaneous” velocity in 
classical physics can play the causal role that it does, given that (at first pass) it seems 
that some of the facts that are supposed to causally depend on instantaneous velocity 
(positions at nearby future times) seem to be part of the causal ground of the 
instantaneous velocity. Although this is certainly not the concern of this paper, 
instantaneous velocity is an excellent example to introduce the concept of 
neighborhood properties.  
 For simplicity, let’s focus on the case of motion in a straight line: we will choose 
our coordinates so that the x-axis is along this line, with the initial direction of motion 
being the positive direction; the origin is set to be the initial position of the object with 
time 0 being the start (of our consideration) of the motion, so that 𝑥0 = 0. Now, 
consider some interval [0, 𝜏] on which we know the x-position at each moment in time: 
that is, we know the position as a function of time 𝑥(𝑡) for 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏. We can use our 
knowledge of the position to calculate various average velocities. For any subinterval we 
like, say with temporal endpoints a and b, we can calculate ?̅?𝑎𝑏 =
𝑥(𝑏)−𝑥(𝑎)
𝑏−𝑎
. This average 
velocity is very useful: if we knew the average velocity and the length of the interval, but 
not the displacement of the object, we could calculate the change in position: Δ𝑥𝑎𝑏 =
(𝑏 − 𝑎)?̅?𝑎𝑏. Similarly, with the average velocity and the change in position, we can 
calculate how long that interval was. As the preceding discussion hints at, these average 
velocities are very firmly properties of the interval. They are determined by the 
 




conjunction of two facts: the displacement (change in position) of the object over the 
interval and the duration of the interval. Setting a particular average velocity on the 
interval places no constraints on the position of the object at any particular moment in 
time; for any time 𝑎 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑏, any 𝑥𝑡 whatsoever is consistent with any stipulated value 
for the average velocity ?̅?𝑎𝑏. Even if we set the initial position, say 𝑎 = 0, then the 
average velocity still only constrains the final position (e.g., now we have 𝑥𝑏 =
(𝑏 − 𝑎)?̅?𝑎𝑏); for any moment in time strictly after a and strictly before b, 𝑎 < 𝑡 < 𝑏, it’s 
still possible for the object to have any position. But nonetheless, it is a strict constraint 
on the endpoints.  
 Consider a series of intervals that each have duration Δt centered around time t. 
If the average velocities of each of these intervals converge to some value as the 
intervals approach length zero, we can call this limiting value the instantaneous velocity 













. The mathematics that talking this way enables us 
to do is so useful that doing classical physics without appealing to it seems unthinkable. 
 But notice that this quantity is conceptually kind of strange. First of all, as we’ve 
been discussing, average velocity is a kind of measure of how much an object has moved 
over a certain interval. As is famously abused by Zeno, motion cannot be a property of 
an instant: at any particular instant, the object has a single position 𝑥(𝑡). Motion 
consists in having a sequence of different positions at different times. So, despite the 
name and notation, this quantity of “instantaneous velocity” cannot be a property of an 
instant. Unlike with average velocity, specifying the initial and final positions on any 
finite interval (𝑎, 𝑏) centered around time t is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
determine 𝑣(𝑡). It’s not necessary, because any stipulated value of 𝑣(𝑡) is consistent 
with any pair of initial and final positions 𝑥(𝑎) and 𝑥(𝑏). It’s not sufficient, because any 
value of 𝑣(𝑡) is consistent with any stipulated positions 𝑥(𝑎) and 𝑥(𝑏); in fact, it’s 
consistent with stipulated initial and final positions on an infinite number of intervals 
centered around t – so long as the intervals have some finite minimum duration. What 
determines the instantaneous velocity is the displacement of the object over infinitely 




positional history of the object over any single interval containing t, no matter how 
small, is sufficient to fix 𝑣(𝑡); this makes 𝑣(𝑡) a neighborhood property.15 It is a property 
that is underdetermined by the truly instantaneous properties of the object and 
overdetermined by the properties that the object has on any finite interval.  
 So far, I have been considering the dispute between synchronic and diachronic 
norms of rationality. As I have discussed, one of the essential claims of the synchronic 
view is that norms of rationality must be expressed in terms that refer only to properties 
that obtain at an instant. By contrast, diachronic norms judge whether agents exhibit 
certain properties over extended intervals of finite duration. But we have just made 
salient that while these two views of the permissible forms of rational norms are 
contraries, they are not contradictories – there is a third possible kind of rational norm, 
the neighborhood norm. Neighborhood norms can thread the needle: they can avoid 
some of the challenges that synchronists raise to true diachronic norms, while still being 
able to capture much of the spirit of diachronic norms and avoiding some of what I take 
to be the problems with the synchronist position. I will discuss a subset of neighborhood 
norms that seem to naturally complement a certain view about the 
existence/persistence conditions of rational agents, and argue that this way of 
understanding the persistence of rational agents defuses the identity puzzle cases 
presented earlier in the chapter. Finally, I compare and contrast Parfit’s views about the 
identity of persons over time with my own views.  
 A neighborhood norm is a norm that an agent satisfies, at some instant, by 
having a certain conjunction of neighborhood properties and instantaneous properties; 
crucially, to count as a neighborhood norm, the norm cannot place constraints or 
depend on the properties that the agent exhibits at any other definite time,16 and so 
 
15 This is good enough for our purposes, but only the starting point for Easwaran. He goes on to define past and 
future neighborhood properties, and argues that we should treat velocity as a past neighborhood property, in 
order for it to play the correct causal role. I will not be dealing with any of the subtleties of causation that arise 
from the differences between two-sided, past, and future neighborhood properties. 
16 It will, of course, often be true that satisfying a particular neighborhood norm over an interval will place 
constraints on the properties that the agent has at various definite times; the point here is that whether the agent 




cannot be a standard diachronic norm.17 The most obvious class of neighborhood norms 
(at least to me) are those that an agent satisfies by conforming to certain 
“instantaneous” rates of change – although note that the value must also be specified in 
a way that depends only on the neighborhood and instantaneous properties of the 
agent at that instant.18 We can continue to use velocity as our toy example: 
instantaneous speed limits are a nice example of a neighborhood norm. So, consider the 
requirement that, at time 𝑡1, the agent must not be traveling at greater than 10 m/s. 
This norm places no definite restrictions on the positions that the agent is allowed to 
occupy at any moment in time: that is, for any time t, having any position at t is 
consistent with satisfying this norm at 𝑡1. Any average velocity, on any particular interval 
is also permissible. But it is not empty; there are many patterns of motion that this norm 
rules out. For instance, any constant velocity greater than 10 m/s will violate this norm.  
 It is also very interesting to see what happens when an agent satisfies this norm 
not merely at an instant, but over an interval. So, for each 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝜏], the agent does not 
have an instantaneous velocity at t exceeding 10 m/s. This continuous series of 
neighborhood norms puts very firm diachronic constraints on the agent’s permissible 
motion. The average velocity of the agent on any subinterval of [0, 𝜏] (including the 
entire interval itself) must be at most 10 m/s. The displacement of the agent over the 
interval can be at most 10𝜏 meters. The displacement over any subinterval can be at 
most 10 m/s multiplied by the duration of the subinterval. This is the kind of constraint 
that we might ordinarily think of as diachronic (it creates a very sharp dependence 
between the initial and final positions of the agent), but it was arrived at by following a 
neighborhood norm at each moment in the interval.  
 What would a neighborhood norm of rationality look like? In (Temporally) 
Continuous Probability Kinematics, I develop a specific example of a neighborhood 
norm, which is also an example of the kind of neighborhood norm that operates by 
 
17 Should truly synchronic norms count as a special case of neighborhood norms, or should we add a clause to the 
definition to exclude them? I don’t think anything important turns on which way choose to talk, as long as it’s clear 
that neighborhood norms have the potential to make commitments that outstrip the purely synchronic while not 
being straightforwardly diachronic.  




stipulating rates of change in the agent’s credences.19 Credal rates of change are defined 
in a very similar way to velocities: both average and “instantaneous”. On some interval, 




where 𝑐(𝑥; 𝑡) is the agent’s credence in x at time t. Instantaneous rates of credal change 
are defined as a limit of these average rates, exactly like with velocity. In the kind of 
learning experience governed by CPK, at each moment the agent is receiving inputs 
from nature that require the agent’s credences in some propositions should be 
increasing or decreasing at certain rates.20 From the pair of the agent’s current 
conditional probabilities and these inputs from nature, CPK specifies a particular rate of 
change (which might be zero) for each of the agent’s credences at that moment. This is 
not a diachronic norm: satisfying CPK at a given instant places no requirements on what 
credences an agent should have at any specific time after the moment in question. But, 
much like with the toy case of “instantaneous” speed limits, it does rule out various 
future evolutions of the credence function as impermissible. And, just like the speed 
limit case, what happens when an agent satisfies CPK over an interval is very interesting. 
CPK was constructed to satisfy a temporally continuous analogue of Rigidity – the 
property at the heart of both Bayesian and Jeffrey conditionalization. This results in 
obeying CPK over some interval being equivalent (in final outcome) to having performed 
a Jeffrey shift on a certain obviously relevant partition.21 CPK generates a kind of 
 
19 As I said, this is the kind of neighborhood norm which makes the most sense to me. But making essential 
reference to temporal rates of change means that this kind of neighborhood norm seems most naturally suited to 
certain ways of doing formal epistemology: representing agents as having some kind of degreed mental states, like 
credences. Are there any interesting and plausible neighborhood norms that would be useful to philosophers who 
prefer to think in traditional terms about concepts like full belief or knowledge, or in other kinds of formal 
frameworks that don’t make similar use of degreed quantities? I think this is a very interesting question, but not 
one that I will pursue here.  
20 That’s the modeling assumption, anyway. See both of the next two chapters, but especially Chapter III, for much 
more discussion of how we might connect this way of modelling the agent’s doxastic changes to other ways of 
representing the evidence the agent is acquiring.   
21 Suppose the agent is learning from nature about two propositions A and B, which might be arbitrarily related. 
Updating by CPK preserves the conditional probabilities on the refined partition {𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, 𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵, ¬𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, ¬𝐴 ∧
¬𝐵} throughout the duration of the learning experience. The final outcome is always equivalent to a Jeffrey shift 




learning that looks like a diachronic process, in aggregate, from constraints that are 
much “thinner” than true diachronic constraints at each moment in time.  
 How can an agent satisfy such a norm? What does it mean to “adopt” an 
instantaneous rate of change? What decisions would an agent who decides to conform 
to an instantaneous rate of change have to make? At this point, I think it’s probably best 
if we drop the abstraction of truly temporally continuous belief change and talk about 
what an agent that could only update its credences on discrete timesteps should do if 
they wanted to approximately follow a credal rate neighborhood norm. At some instant, 
the norm requires that their right credal derivative be equal to some value. The discrete 
approximation of this is to make their average credal rate over the interval starting at 
the present moment and concluding after 𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛 – the minimal timestep after which the 
agent is capable of adopting a new credence – equal to the stipulated value. That is, if 
the norm requires 
𝑑𝑐(𝑥; 𝑡)
𝑑𝑡




Notice that this equation fixes a unique value of the credence the agent should have 
after 𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛 has elapsed: 𝑐(𝑥;  𝑡 + 𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛) = 𝑐(𝑥;  𝑡) + 𝑢 ⋅ 𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛. So, to approximate the 
neighborhood norm, for any agent that can only update discretely (which is, again, 
almost certainly all possible agents) amounts to obeying a (derived) diachronic norm on 
the smallest possible future-looking interval. Satisfying the neighborhood norm over an 
interval is approximated by satisfying a bunch of these tiny diachronic norms at every 
timestep of the interval (the number of timesteps in the interval is the duration of the 
interval divided by the minimal time 𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛). 
 Now at this point, the reader may be wondering: what was the point of 
developing this contrast between neighborhood norms and diachronic norms, then? If 
the way that any real agent will go about trying to comply with a neighborhood norm is 
to implement a bunch of diachronic norms, how can neighborhood norms really have 
any advantage over diachronic norms? The point is that, even in their discrete 
realization, the demands placed by these norms are minimally diachronic. To determine 
what credence you should have at the next possible timestep, you don’t need to consult 




present credence function. And there’s also no room to suggest that this future time 
slice is a completely separate agent that some diachronic norm is illicitly and arbitrarily 
yoking together with your present self. What you are required to do at present, and in 
the time until that next slice, is to begin the mental operations (calculations/reasoning) 
that will result in you adopting the stipulated credence at the earliest possible time that 
can happen. The processes are the ties that bind. Thinking in terms of the abstraction of 
neighborhood norms allows us to avoid having to deal with the details of a given 
system’s minimal processing time – which, of course, has no fundamental normative 
significance, but is just an empirical fact about the system. It also allows us to think of 
multiple discrete systems as approximating the same neighborhood norm; and, e.g., to 
make judgments like that one is a better approximation than the other. If we were to 
focus on the derived diachronic norms, which will be different for most systems, much 
of the signal will get lost in the noise.  
 Directing the agent’s behavior as a series of neighborhood norms, while leading 
to strong diachronic patterns, places absolutely minimal demands on the agent’s ability 
to commit to future plans or remember past actions. They need to remember only 
actions that happened an arbitrarily short amount of time ago; they need to be able to 
influence only their most immediate next actions. In Section 1, while I argued against 
the specific problems from internalism that Hedden raised against ordinary 
conditionalization, I did confess sympathy with the problem in the abstract: diachronic 
norms, in being tied to what (mental) properties an agent had in the past, may impose 
requirements that an agent cannot rationalize with their current mental states. A 
neighborhood version of credal updating minimizes this problem by demanding only the 
smallest possible intervals of memory at any instant. However, successfully following 
the norm over some interval will still, in the aggregate, lead to behavior that looks 
thoroughly diachronic. Of course, even competent reasoners will sometimes make 
mistakes, and be unable to meet these demands. But I take it that some basic capacity 




what is to be an agent; this is the point that I’ll begin arguing in the next couple of 
subsections.  
  
(Credal Rate) Neighborhood Norms and Personal Identity 
I have just argued that neighborhood norms should seem attractive to anyone 
who, like me, is sympathetic to the internalist view that it’s better for rational norms to 
be expressed in terms of states that agents have a very high degree of access to: they 
make the access requirements as proximate as possible without collapsing into 
synchrony. However, it remains to see how neighborhood norms fare with the identity 
puzzle cases that synchronists also see as evidence of the defects of diachronic norms. 
Here, I will restrict my attention to the class of neighborhood norms that operate by 
stipulating credal rates of change: credal rate neighborhood norms, for short(er). One 
very interesting feature of such norms is that they assume that the credence function of 
the agent is a differentiable function of time at all points at which they apply. And to be 
a differentiable function of time at a point, the function must be continuous at that 
point. So, any solution to a series of credal rate neighborhood norms on some interval 
must consist of a temporally continuous function. Any agent that obeys this kind of 
neighborhood norm at all instants in some interval will exhibit a credal state that is a 
continuous function of time (on this interval).  
 I will argue that this kind of credal continuity implies an important kind of mental 
continuity, consistent with Parfit’s Relation R. I will show that any agent who has a 
credence function that is a continuous function of time will satisfy arbitrarily rigorous 
standards of continuity – and thus, any agent that obeys credal rate neighborhood 
norms should count as a mentally continuous agent under even the strictest of 
standards.  
 In Reasons and Persons, Parfit argues that the logic of personal identity 
obfuscates what really matters about personal identity. Personal identity has 




Teletransportation,22 it’s implausible that either Righty or Lefty can be identical to Pre. 
Both seem to have equally good claims to being identical to Pre, but they are 
distinguishable (Lefty and Righty are in different positions, for instance), which means 
they can’t both be identical to Pre, because transitivity would then mean that they 
would be identical to each other. Parfit argues that there is no further fact that could 
explicate why one is identical to Pre, while the other isn’t. His solution is to deny that 
Pre persists as either Lefty or Righty, but he also thinks that this fact isn’t very 
important; he claims that the way in which Pre ceases to exist is at least nearly as good 
as (and maybe better than) ordinary survival (261-64). Parfit claims that what matters is 
relation R: “R is psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity, with the 
right kind of cause”; and for Parfit, any cause can be the right kind of cause (262). Both 
Lefty and Righty are highly psychologically continuous (and connected, for that matter) 
to Pre, and that is much more relevant to almost all concerns about rationality and 
morality than whether or not Pre survives. For Parfit, “strong psychological 
connectedness” obtains between two time-slices A and B if there are many direct 
psychological connections between the two: B has direct memories of many things that 
A did, shares many of A’s intentions and desires, etc. (205-6). “Psychological continuity” 
consists in “overlapping chains of strong connection” (206). For B to be psychologically 
continuous with A, it suffices that there is some series of intermediaries, 𝐶1, … , 𝐶𝑛, so 
that A is strongly connected to 𝐶1, 𝐶𝑖 is strongly connected to 𝐶𝑖+1, and 𝐶𝑛 is strongly 
connected to B. I do not fully agree with Parfit about the (moral and self-interested) 
unimportance of ordinary survival (my strongest disagreement with him is about 
teleportation cases), but I find it very persuasive that Relation R, and not identity, forms 
the necessary condition for persistence of a rational agent.23 
 
22 The discussion I cite here is actually of a case he calls My Division, but they are similar enough that I’m confident 
Parfit’s judgment about Double Teletransportation would be much the same.  
23 I’ll say a bit more about this in a later subsection, but for now: I think that two separate persons (e.g., where I 
believe that A has died, and B is new individual person) can nonetheless be evaluable as a single agent. The 
clearest case is one where B begins existence with precisely A’s mental state, goes on to perform the actions A was 
intending just before death, and so on. For the norms of rationality, it seems clear to me that it makes no 





Why I Believe Relation R is What Matters to Rationality 
As I think of it, the defining characteristic of a rational agent is using information 
to plan for future contingencies. A rational agent is fundamentally a system that has 
plans about how to respond both to various new pieces of information it might receive, 
and about how it intends to use the information currently at its disposal to make 
choices when posed with various kinds of decision problems it might encounter. What 
we typically call beliefs or credences are states that play certain functional roles in 
processes of this kind. One constitutive role of belief is that it’s used in certain ways by 
the agent’s decision principles: to count as the kind of system that is a proper subject of 
prudential rationality, it must have decision principles that take as input both desire-like 
features (goals, objects of pursuit, some sense of value), and predictions about what 
kinds of outcomes are likely to result from various actions it might take. Any system that 
does not have the capacity to use a framework with roughly this structure is not the 
kind of thing that makes decisions in the sense that I’m concerned with; treating it as a 
target of norms governing rational actions is pointless, at best. Another constitutive role 
of belief is to be used in certain patterns of reasoning – this includes having some kind 
of “updating rule”: some commitment to a rule that maps from the pairwise input of the 
agent’s current doxastic state and some new piece of information to the output of a 
revised doxastic state. As I indicated towards the end of Section 2, I am deeply skeptical 
of updating rules that are not either implementable or at least capable of approximation 
by algorithm. Seeing the algorithm is what makes me believe that the agent is a rational 
system, making adjustments to its belief in accordance with its current commitments. 
The reasoning is what shows how the current doxastic state is being used, how the result 
depends on the inputs.  
On my view of what rationality consists in, a certain amount of psychological 
continuity is a necessary precondition for rationally assessable behavior. If, e.g., the 
states that would play the functional role of being beliefs are constantly being 




states cannot be beliefs. The system as a whole just isn’t the kind of thing that allows for 
the kind of states that beliefs are. And, again, as I hinted at towards the end of Section 
2, this is why I find the time-slice view of rationality so unsatisfactory: when you 
uncouple all of the time-slices, I cease to believe that the so-called “beliefs” are what 
they claim to be. Just as forming an intention that you believe your future self will have 
no reason to follow seems paradoxical, “beliefs” that are not constitutive of 
commitments about how your future self will respond to evidence and decision 
problems don’t strike me as beliefs at all; as I understand it, those commitments are 
what believing involves.  
 But such a system need not comprise a single person: corporations are typically 
composed of persons and can easily be rational agents on my view, but Citizens United 
notwithstanding, they certainly are not themselves persons. Such a system need not 
contain any persons: many very simple animals are assessable as rational agents on my 
view – they make predictions, choose, and learn. And, probably more controversially, I 
think such systems can even transcend death. Consider the case of ordinary 
teleportation: A steps into a box in Ann Arbor, where she is scanned and a perfect 
molecular blueprint of the structure of her body is created. The body in the box is 
vaporized, which kills A. The blueprint, now stored online, is accessed a few seconds 
later in Tokyo to build an exact molecular copy of A’s body, which we’ll call B. A had 
been planning to travel (by teleporter) to Tokyo for business, and B now executes A’s 
plans. Now, unlike Parfit, I do not think that A should regard this as anywhere near as 
good as ordinary survival; I think A has made a horrible mistake and thrown her life 
away. I believe, roughly, that my mind either is, or is an effect of, a certain pattern of 
neurological activity. My mind might be able to survive the total replacement of my 
brain in gradual stages. I am quite convinced24 that my mind can survive certain kinds of 
unconsciousness (e.g., sleep) that exhibit certain neurological patterns, but there are 
certain other kinds of unconsciousness (e.g., brain death) that it seems likely my mind 
cannot survive, and still others (e.g., long-term comas) where I don’t know whether I 
 




would survive or not.25 I take everything I just said to be fairly controversial, but I think 
the claim that being vaporized utterly destroys the mind really shouldn’t be. In any case, 
it also seems clear to me that the system jointly consisting of A and B (who are two 
different persons – A died just before B came into existence) are naturally considered as 
a single rational agent. A and B are connected in all of the right kinds of ways: B inherits 
A’s beliefs and executes A’s plans. For almost all purposes of rational evaluation, it 
makes the most sense to consider them as a single system. Here’s one more example: 
consider a computer program intended to sort some data set. Suppose that the program 
can be interrupted, which will cause it to store a partially sorted set, and the program 
can later be resumed from this partially sorted state without issue. Someone starts 
running the program on one computer, stops, transfers the file to another computer, 
and runs a new instance of the program on that second machine. There are clearly two 
different computers in this case, but for evaluating the task of sorting the data, the 
relevant system is comprised of both of them. Now we can imagine it is somewhat 
ambiguous whether or not the second computer is the same as the first one (say, the 
second computer resulted from various hardware upgrades to the first). Our 
identity/persistence conditions for computers are absolutely irrelevant to whether we 
should treat it as a single system for the purposes of evaluating the task: even if we 
think the computer didn’t survive, there was a persistent agent (consisting of a 
combination of two different computers) which worked as a unit to perform the task. 
What the computer should do at the later time to complete the process of sorting 
doesn’t depend on whether it’s the same computer as earlier – only on the continuity of 
the file and how the sorting procedure works.  
  
Connectedness in the Time of Credences 
How should we translate Parfit’s conception of strong psychological 
connectedness to a framework where we are representing agents as being modelled by 
 
25 To be completely clear: I don’t think you would survive brain death even if the brain could be “rebooted” fairly 
quickly after it occurred, and I’m unsure someone who wakes up after certain kinds of comas persisted as a single 




degreed credences? What’s the credal analogue to the persistence of a memory, or an 
intention? I suggest that the obvious answer is to think of each memory as encoding a 
bunch of credal values. The persistence of a memory should not, ordinarily, be thought 
of as requiring the precise maintenance of all of these values over an extended period of 
time. We all know that our memories change in their details as years go by: certain 
details become fuzzier and fuzzier, until they may eventually be completely forgotten, 
and what we believe about certain other details may even change – we may end up 
falsifying some aspects of our memories to various degrees, while still ordinarily 
counting the result as a version of the same memory. Sometimes, through repeatedly 
focusing on certain aspects of a memory, we even become more confident that an event 
transpired a certain way years later than we were within minutes of the experience the 
belief is based on! For strong psychological connectedness to obtain over some interval, 
it was already true on Parfit’s view that we need not maintain all of our memories, etc – 
we just need a large number of direct connections, with precisely how many being left 
intentionally vague. But when we move to frameworks using credences, there now 
seems to be an obvious second degree of freedom: how similar do the credences that 
comprise, e.g., some memory need to be for it to count as a direct connection. So, I 
suggest that we think of psychological connectedness as a two-parameter family of 
conditions: 
 
A is psychologically n-connected to B in proportion m if, of the propositions that A has 
credences in, it’s true of at least a proportion m of them that the |𝑐𝐵 − 𝑐𝐴| ≤ 𝑛.  
 
 For short, we say that A is psychologically (𝑚, 𝑛)-connected to B. By varying m, 
we vary how much of A’s credal state B has to preserve to count the two as 
psychologically connected. By varying n, we vary how similar B’s credences have to be to 
count as being similar enough to be a direct connection. The strictest possible condition 
is (𝑚 = 1, 𝑛 = 0), which would require that B would perfectly inherit all of A’s 




two (normalized) credence functions as connected.26 These two extremes are obviously 
both useless. A condition of connectedness that counts all credence functions as 
connected is patently silly. But a credence function that demands perfect inheritance of 
credences makes any kind of meaningful mental life impossible – there can be no 
learning, no forgetting, no reasoning or belief acquisition of any kind. However, it seems 
plausible to me that there may be various contexts in which different members of the 
family may find useful niches; I don’t think there’s any unique standard that’s most 
appropriate. Just as Parfit does, we can now use our family of conditions of 
psychological connectedness to generate a family of criteria for psychological continuity: 
B is psychologically (𝑚, 𝑛)-continuous with A if there is some sequence of 
intermediaries 𝐶1, … , 𝐶𝑛, so that A is (𝑚, 𝑛)-connected to 𝐶1, 𝐶𝑖 is (𝑚, 𝑛)-connected to 
𝐶𝑖+1, and 𝐶𝑛 is (𝑚, 𝑛)-connected to B. 
 For our purposes, it turns out that it doesn’t matter which standards in this 
family are most plausible, so long as we can rule out (1, 0). This is because we can show 
that any agent which follows a credal rate neighborhood norm on some interval is 
guaranteed to satisfy arbitrarily strict standards of psychological continuity on that 
interval. The agent will satisfy standard (1, 𝑛), for any 𝑛 > 0. The crucial point is that an 
agent who satisfies a credal rate neighborhood norm will have credences that are a 
continuous function of time. First, some notation: let 𝑋 be the set of all propositions 
that A has any credence in. 𝑐(𝑥; 𝑡) is the credence in some proposition 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 that the 
system holds at time t.27 Let (0, 𝜏) be some interval on which the system is following a 
series of credal rate neighborhood norms. Because the credence function is continuous 
 
26 Technically, I suppose, we could weaken the condition even further by choosing larger values for n, which could 
then allow credence functions that contain credences greater than 1 or less than 0 to count as connected.  
27 What is the “system” I’m referring to? I’m assuming that there is some kind of causally unified system that has 
the credal states we’re talking about. This assumption involves the claim that the states of the system at earlier 
times are causally relevant to the states at later times, and various assumptions to the effect that the system has 
certain basic capacities necessary for causally connecting the states that we’re (somewhat prematurely) calling 
credences to outputs necessary for decision making and to the kind of inputs that learning might happen through. 
What we are deliberately not assuming is that the system has the right kind of continuity in these internal states 
for the system to count as a temporally extended agent in the sense discussed earlier in this section; whether the 
states we are calling “credences” will end up playing the functional role that makes them credences depends partly 




on the interval, (∀𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝜏))(∀𝑛 > 0)(∃𝛿 > 0)(∀𝑥)|𝑐(𝑥; 𝑡 + 𝛿) − 𝑐(𝑥; 𝑡)| ≤ 𝑛. For 
every time t in the interval, for an arbitrarily strict n, there is some later moment in time 
𝑡 + 𝛿, where all of system’s credences at this time differ by at most n from the system’s 
credences at t. So, we let the state of the system at 𝑡 + 𝛿 be the first intermediary, 𝐶1. 
By construction, A is (1, 𝑛)-connected to 𝐶1. We now repeat this process: continuity 
guarantees us that there’s an intermediary 𝐶2, such that 𝐶1 is (1, 𝑛)-connected to 𝐶2, 
and so on. This chain of (1, 𝑛)-connectedness will cover the entire interval (0, 𝜏), and so 
the system is psychologically (1, 𝑛)-continuous on (0, 𝜏). Obeying a series of credal rate 
neighborhood norms on (0, 𝜏) is sufficient to guarantee that 𝑐(𝑥; 𝑡) is a continuous 
function of time on (0, 𝜏), and so obeying credal rate neighborhood norms guarantees 
(1, 𝑛)-continuity on (0, 𝜏) – for any strictness of n. If we believe that what matters to 
the persistence of rational agents is not personal identity, but psychological continuity, 
then obeying credal rate neighborhood norms is a way in which a system can organize 
itself as a rational agent.  
 
Psychological Continuity and Identity Puzzles 
I’ve argued that systems that obey credal rate neighborhood norms will exhibit 
the kind of continuity in their mental states appropriate to being a temporally extended 
agent. I think it’s worth taking a moment to note that this kind of continuity is not all 
there is to being an agent. As footnote 27 began discussing, only systems that have 
certain kinds of causal properties are even the kinds of systems that could have the 
kinds of states that might play mental roles. So, in essence, the continuity 
considerations we’ve just gone through are assuming that the states we’re talking about 
are present in a system with the right kinds of capacities and causal interrelations to be 
the kind of system that might have mental states. Continuity is then just a further 
precondition on those states persisting in ways that allow them to fulfill the necessary 
functional roles to count as belief-like states. So, seeing that a system meets very strict 
standards of continuity in certain states is not itself a reason to think that the system is 




to be an agent, showing that mental continuity is preserved in strange cases like fission 
and fusion is evidence that there are uninterrupted rational processes that survive 
whatever the strange event is. Because these processes are uninterrupted, it makes 
sense to think of the causally and mentally unified system that is responsible for these 
processes as a persisting agent – even if we cannot resolve the logic of identity, or have 
independent reason to think that organisms or persons involved died. And as we will 
see, that the systems in question continue to have the relevant capacities and causal 
structure is not in question in the kinds of puzzle cases that we’ve been considering so 
far (except in Combined Spectrum, where in most of the intermediate cases, the most 
likely outcomes seem to be that nothing which could be regarded as an agent survives).   
 What should the view of agenthood that we’ve just developed say about the 
particular identity puzzle cases mentioned in Section I: the Combined Spectrum and 
Double Teletransportation? As it turns out, not much. As I already claimed back in 
Section I, I think the correct response to both of these cases is that they involve either 
arational belief change (in Combined Spectrum) or no belief change (Double 
Teletransportation), and so asking about the rationality of the temporal evolution of 
belief is pointless in both cases. There are a couple primary purposes that talk about 
what beliefs it would be rational for an agent to have at a time serve: action guidance 
(principles that agents can consult when they are deciding or reasoning about what to 
believe) and evaluation (judging how well an agent that is following some action-guiding 
principles is succeeding at certain epistemic goals). In the Combined Spectrum case, 
whatever beliefs the agent ends up having (if any), are not up to it. There is no guidance 
to perform, no process attributable to the agent to evaluate. Talking about the 
rationality of the agent’s belief change just isn’t very meaningful in this context. In 
Section 1, I claimed that the proponent of ordinary conditionalization should reply that 
their norm is about learning experiences, and needn’t say anything about the Combined 
Spectrum. I think this is still the right thing to say even with the more powerful 
machinery we’ve just developed. Depending on what exactly happens in the Combined 




victim, Parfit, to count as a single agent.28 But whether that’s true or not, asking about 
the rationality of the resultant beliefs is kind of silly – they’re stipulated to be arrived at 
by an exogenous, arational process. In Double Teletransportation, it’s similarly true that 
the beliefs that Lefty and Righty wake up with aren’t up to them, and so questions about 
what they should believe are similarly inert. What happens to Pre is much less horrific 
than what happens to Parfit in (intermediate cases of) the Combined Spectrum, but the 
case is alike in there being nothing interesting to say about the rationality of the belief 
change – there’s no room for action guidance and no point to evaluation. Now, of 
course, my view of agential persistence does have something interesting to say about 
how Lefty and Righty are related to Pre – but it’s very similar to what Parfit’s view says. 
Although neither Lefty nor Righty can be identical to Pre (and I have additional reasons 
for believing Pre’s dead that Parfit doesn’t share), both the systems consisting of Pre 
succeeded by Lefty and Pre succeeded by Righty are psychologically continuous agents. 
Both Lefty and Righty will have no trouble in continuing to use various evidence that 
was originally learned by Pre, and they both will and should continue to follow through 
with the plans they remember making before stepping into the teleportation booth. On 
both Parfit’s and my understanding of psychological continuity, this case is trivial: Pre is 
fully psychologically connected to, not merely continuous with, both Lefty and Righty. 
To really put my criteria to work, we need a harder puzzle case. So, consider: 
  
The Doxastic Amoeba 
The doxastic amoeba is a very smart creature and has a mental life at least as 
complex as that of an ordinary human. Much unlike a normal human, however, there 
comes a point in its life where it starts slowly dividing into two copies: I say copies, 
because at the moment of division, both of the “children” – call them B and C – have 
precisely the same credence function, which is also arbitrarily similar to the mental 
states that the “parent” amoeba – call her A – has in moments leading up to the 
 




division.29 This is, of course, very tricky to accomplish. In the days leading up to her 
division, A has to create a constantly-updated duplicate of her entire credal set, as well 
as building within her enough systems to keep two separate organisms alive after the 
separation occurs. She has to do all of this, while continuing to function as a doxastic 
agent. Because unlike in the previous example of personal fission that we’ve discussed, 
A is continually learning throughout the entire process of her division. At each instant, 
she’s processing continuous streams of information about her environment – changes in 
the pH, changes in salinity, monitoring the distribution of various nutrients, etc.30; she is 
continuously revising her beliefs about these facts as the information comes in.31 She 
may also be simultaneously revising her beliefs on other topics – perhaps she’s 
wondering whether either of her “children” could be considered identical to her, and 
her opinion is vacillating as she considers various arguments and counterarguments. In 
any case, her credences are in a state of constant but gradual flux until the precise 
moment at which she divides. And even at the moment, both of her children continue 
continuously learning, without skipping a beat. How should we evaluate the rationality 
of B’s and C’s beliefs? Are either of B or C identical to A? Does that matter to how we 
should evaluate their beliefs? 
 My answers to the above question might be obvious from what I’ve said so far in 
the chapter in conjunction with how I’ve set the case up, but let’s go through it anyway. 
I think it is fairly clear that neither B nor C are identical to A, for reasons very similar to 
the reasons already mentioned by Parfit. Do I think this case is as good, or close to as 
good, as ordinary survival for A? Not really, but I don’t have the same kind of visceral 
disagreement with Parfit as I do in the teleporter cases, and I don’t have any compelling 
arguments. What I am, again, convinced of is that these hard questions about identity 
 
29 A little more precisely: call the moment of division 𝑡 = 0. The credence functions that the children each have at 
this moment are 𝑐𝐵(𝑥; 0) = 𝑐𝑐(𝑥; 0). The value of the parent’s credence function 𝑐𝐴(𝑥; 𝑡) approaches the value 
𝑐𝐵(𝑥; 0) = 𝑐𝑐(𝑥; 0) as time gets arbitrarily close to 0, despite the fact that A’s credence function doesn’t exist at 
𝑡 = 0. Viz., lim
𝑡→0
𝑐𝐴(𝑥; 𝑡) = 𝑐𝐵(𝑥; 0) = 𝑐𝑐(𝑥; 0). 
30 I have no reason to believe real amoebas do any of this.  
31 For much, much more on how it might be possible to continuously update on multiple continuous streams of 




and the survival of persons don’t matter in the slightest to whether there are continuous 
agents. It is perfectly clear that both B and C are psychologically continuous with A, by 
as strict a standard as we’d like; the case was constructed so that this would be true! 
Both B and C obviously have the relevant causal capacities (at least, if we judge that A 
did, before engorging herself to prepare for fission) to be agents, and so the systems 
consisting of A succeeded by B and A succeeded by C both seem like continuous, 
persistent, rational agents. How should we evaluate the rationality of B or C’s credal 
state at the moments just after division? In exactly the same way that we were 
evaluating A’s processes just before division! In particular, if we think that it would be 
rationally (permissible, obligatory, etc.), for A’s learning processes to be governed by a 
credal rate neighborhood norm like my Continuous Probability Kinematics32, we should 
think that it would be rationally (permissible, obligatory, etc.) for B and C to both 
continue updating according to this same norm. Both of the two persisting agents can 
(and can permissibly, and should, etc.) even satisfy the norm at the moment of division.  
 I don’t think it’s worth running through all of the details, but the view of agential 
persistence developed in this section can also accommodate puzzle cases involving the 
fusion of persons/organisms. But, as the reader can probably imagine from the 
discussion so far: these are cases where the questions of identity are quite fraught, but 
the question of whether there is some system that can reasonably be regarded as a 
single temporally-extended rational agent is not difficult at all. (Indeed, much like in the 
fission case, there will be two such systems.) And so, by tying the application of our 
epistemic norms to the persistence of epistemic agents, we simply avoid having to settle 













 In this chapter, I’ve considered two major kinds of arguments that time-slice 
epistemologists bring against diachronic norms: arguments that diachronic norms 
violate a commitment to mentalist internalism, and arguments that diachronic norms 
rely on personal identity in a problematic way. Although I don’t think that either kind of 
argument is as telling against ordinary conditionalization as the synchronists do, I share 
much of the commitments underpinning these arguments: I also believe that rational 
norms should supervene on the agent’s mental state, and that our judgments about the 
rationality of an agent’s mental state at some instant shouldn’t depend on our 
judgments about whether that time slice is the same person as some other time slice – 
especially in puzzling cases like the ones we’ve discussed. On the other hand, I find the 
purely synchronic view impoverished. I share Podgorski’s worry that it simply cannot 
properly handle the evaluation of rational processes like learning and reasoning. And as 
I’ve tried to explain, I strongly disagree with Hedden that these kinds of rational 
processes should be seen as an activity that only imperfectly rational agents need to 
engage in; these kinds of rational processes are at the very core of what it is to be an 
agent.  
 I have argued that neighborhood norms should be attractive to anyone who, like 
me, sees the synchronic picture as inadequate – and believes our norms must impose 
some kind of connections between time slices to properly capture what is involved in 
rational processes like learning – but who also, like me, is sympathetic to the idea that 
norms that are action-guiding should be accessible from an agent’s current mental 
states. In recapitulation, the idea is that neighborhood norms require an agent to be 
able to remember her previous mental states, or bind her future actions, on only the 
smallest possible time scales. Yet nonetheless, neighborhood norms are fully capable of 
governing long, complex processes of learning. I have also argued that neighborhood 
norms are readily compatible with a view that ties the rationality of time slices not to 




for a system to comprise an agent; what matters in the identity puzzle cases should not 
be, as Hedden correctly notes, personal identity. And I believe that Parfit’s Relation R 
gives a crucial part of the answer to what it takes for a system to comprise a temporally 
extended agent: mental continuity and/or connection is the key. I have also argued that 
the importance of Parfit’s R Relation is deeply complementary to my view of rational 
processes as being foundational to agenthood. Finally, I argued that systems that obey a 
certain class of neighborhood norms (credal rate neighborhood norms) will exhibit the 
necessary kind of continuity to persist as temporally extended agents. And it is the 
persistent agents that are the proper target of these kinds of rational norms – the 
questions about which persons persist simply don’t matter to what the various time 
slices should believe.  
 And so, I see neighborhood norms as largely compatible with the concerns that 
motivate the time-slice epistemologists (though perhaps not in a way that they will find 
fully satisfactorily), while still having just enough temporal structure at each instant to 
meaningfully guide and evaluate processes like learning. In this sense, neighborhood 
norms are minimally diachronic at each instant. But when followed on some interval, 
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 The setting is Victorian London. You are concerned about your dipsomaniacal uncle who 
has not yet come home, despite the hours having grown small. You muster your resolve to find 
him, checking several of his usual haunts. After some searching, you happen upon an alleyway 
filled with fog, only dimly illuminated by the streetlamp. At the far end of the alley is a shadowy 
figure drunkenly singing. There are two signs by which you hope to determine if this figure is 
your uncle: your uncle wears a very distinctive red frock coat; and when he sings after drinking, 
he usually sings a song of his own invention – although many of your uncle’s associates know 
the song, your uncle is drastically more likely to sing it that anyone else. You walk towards the 
figure, while gazing intently into the fog and with ears closely tuned to the song echoing 
through the alley. As you approach, your confidence that you see a red coat increases; you also 
gradually come to believe that the song you hear is your uncle’s. You become confident that you 
have found him at last.  
Richard Jeffrey famously realized that agents often acquire evidence that is difficult to 
represent as propositional and developed an updating rule that allows for treating the impact 
of evidence as direct manipulation of the agent’s credences in propositions. In a similar spirit, I 
claim that agents often have learning experiences that consist of gradually changing confidence 
in propositions. In this paper, I develop an updating rule for this kind of learning experience 
that is able to integrate streams of information about propositions that can be correlated in 
arbitrary ways. In the next section, I begin with an overview of Jeffrey’s probability kinematics. 
In Section 3, I consider how to formulate a temporally continuous version of Jeffrey 




information. Section 5 develops my updating rule, which answers the question raised in Section 
4, and has the continuous rule from Section 3 as a special case. Finally, in Section 6, I attempt to 
provide answers to some questions and objections. 
 
2. Jeffrey’s Probability Kinematics  
 
There are many cases of seemingly rational change in belief where it is difficult to 
represent the change as conditionalization on some proposition. Modelling the agent as 
performing Bayesian conditionalization on the content of her visual and auditory experiences 
would require that she had conditional priors over the possible content of each sensory 
modality, which seems wildly implausible.33 This aspect of our problem has already been solved 
by Jeffrey’s Probability Kinematics. In this section, I will work through the motivation for 
Probability Kinematics (or Jeffrey conditionalization) and discuss some important properties 
that it has: rigidity (or sufficiency) and non-commutativity. After explaining the role that 
rigidity plays in Probability Kinematics, I present what I take to be the most compelling 
motivation for rigid updating, with an eye towards what we should try to preserve in the 
continuous case. I also discuss the difference between soft and hard learning experiences, as 
distinguished by Joyce (2004).  
  
Observation By Candlelight34 
An observer is interested in finding out whether the color of a piece of cloth is green, 
blue, or violet – let G, B, and V represent the propositions that the cloth is green, blue, and 
violet, respectively. These three propositions are mutually exclusive: at most one can be true. 
Although the propositions are not, in general, jointly exhaustive (the cloth could be some other 
color, like red), suppose that the agent starts out confident that the cloth is definitely one of 
those three colors. The set {𝐺, 𝐵, 𝑉} is thus a partition: exactly one of the propositions must be 
 
33 This makes mundane cases of learning possible only with unimaginable foresight. I’ve had many sensory 
experiences I was incapable of imagining prior to their occurrence. Having priors conditional on them would 
require my having detailed representations of those events before they happened, which seems implausible.  




true (according to the agent). Before looking at the cloth, the agent has some prior credences in 
each of the propositions, say, 𝑐0(𝐺) = 𝑐0(𝐵) = 0.3 and 𝑐0(𝑉) = 0.4; he thinks it’s most likely 
that the cloth is violet, but not by much, and blue and green are equally likely. The agent looks 
at the cloth in dim candlelight and becomes much more confident, but nowhere near certain, 
that the cloth is green. Because of the poor lighting, it wouldn’t be a huge shock to learn that it 
was actually blue. The cloth being violet is only barely consistent with the visual impression he 
had, but can’t be ruled out. Let’s say the agent’s final credences are 𝑐(𝐺) = 0.7, 𝑐(𝐵) = 0.25, 
and 𝑐(𝑉) = 0.05. This seems like a very plausible kind of learning, but it’s not best thought of in 
terms of becoming certain of some proposition.  
Clearly, the agent has not become certain of any of G, B, or V. But maybe we can think 
of the agent as becoming certain of the proposition that his visual experience was such-and-
such-a-way, where such-and-such-a-way is elliptical for some incredibly fine-grained 
description of the character of his experience – call this proposition E. Then we regard the 
agent as having prior conditional credences 𝑐0(𝐺|𝐸) = 0.7, 𝑐0(𝐵|𝐸) = 0.25, and 𝑐0(𝑉|𝐸) =
0.05, so that he obtains his final credences by Bayesian conditionalization on E. As Jeffrey 
notes, “there need be no such proposition E [under consideration]; nor need any such 
proposition be expressible in the English language. … It seems that the best we can do is to 
describe, not the quality of the visual experience itself, but rather its effects on the observer …” 
(Jeffrey 1983, 165). Rather than modelling the agent as having a prior over the infinitely many 
incredibly fine-grained specifications of varieties of visual experience, Jeffrey proposed a way of 
accounting for the learning experience directly in terms of the changes in credences.  
 
Probability Kinematics35 
Suppose an agent begins with prior credence function 𝑐0 and undergoes a learning 
experience that assigns new credences to the elements of some partition {𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛}. Then, the 
agent’s resultant credence in an arbitrary proposition, x, is given by 









where the 𝑐(𝐴𝑖) are the credences stipulated by the learning experience and the 𝑐0(𝑥|𝐴𝑖) are 





Probability kinematics is a strict generalization of Bayesian conditionalization: Bayesian 
updating on learning some proposition E with certainty is just a special case of Jeffrey 
conditionalization on the partition {𝐸, ¬𝐸} – namely, the case where the stipulated credences 
are 𝑐(𝐸) = 1, 𝑐(¬𝐸) = 0. This is true because Probability Kinematics is the unique updating 
rule for the class of learning experiences Jeffrey identified (which, as just mentioned, includes 
all Bayesian learning experiences) which satisfies the same core property as Bayesian updating: 
rigidity, sometimes also called sufficiency.  
 
Rigidity (Sufficiency). 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴𝑖) = 𝑐0(𝑥|𝐴𝑖) for each 𝐴𝑖 ∈ {𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛} and any proposition 
x in the agent’s algebra.36 Updating on the elements of the partition {𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛}  maintains the 
credences conditional on all elements of that partition.  
 
It’s fairly simple to prove that, for Jeffrey’s class of learning experiences, an agent can 
satisfy rigidity if and only if they update by Probability Kinematics. But that raises the question: 
why should an agent satisfy rigidity? In the next subsection, I present what I find to be the most 
compelling motivation for updating rigidly.37  
  
The Probative Value of Evidence 
In the context of discussing probabilistic confirmation theory, Hájek and Joyce (2008) 
draw a distinction between the incremental value of a piece of evidence and the probative 
 
36 Take the set of all (either finitely many, or perhaps countably infinite) propositions that the agent has beliefs 
about. The agent’s algebra is the closure of this set under negation and disjunction. 
37 I’m not talking about the tradition of diachronic Dutch book arguments for Jeffrey conditionalization – e.g., 
Skyrms (1987), but this isn’t because I don’t find this kind of argument compelling. The main reason is that it’s 





value of the same.38 The incremental value of evidence, measured by 𝑐𝐸(𝐻) − 𝑐(𝐻), answers 
the question: ‘if you were to learn that E is true, how would your confidence in H change’? This 
is obviously one very important sense of the quality of evidence: among other things, if you 
actually acquire E, the incremental value measures how much your confidence in your 
hypothesis changes. The probative value of a piece of evidence, measured by quantities 
𝑐𝐸(𝐻) − 𝑐¬𝐸(𝐻), is a bit more subtle, though also very useful. One of the kinds of questions it’s 
useful for answering is ‘how much does your present confidence in H depend on your 
confidence that you will observe E’?  
The distinction can be illustrated clearly with an example:  
“Suppose that Ellen is a randomly chosen citizen of a town inhabited by 990 
Baptists, 2 Catholics, and 8 Buddhists. Let H say that Ellen is not a Buddhist. 
According to all incremental measures, the datum E that Ellen is a Baptist 
provides exactly the same amount of evidence for H as does the datum E* that 
she is a Catholic. The probative measures disagree, saying Ellen’s being a Baptist 
provides a great deal of evidence for H whereas the datum that she is Catholic 
provides hardly any.” (Hájek and Joyce 2008, 153) 
At present, when all I know about Ellen is that she’s chosen randomly from the population, I am 
quite confident she’s not a Buddhist: 𝑐(𝐻) =
992
1000
. If I learn that she’s either Catholic or Baptist, 
I will then be certain that she’s not Buddhist (assuming that the religious affiliations are all 
mutually exclusive), so 𝑐𝐸(𝐻) = 𝑐𝐸∗(𝐻) = 1. So, E and E* have the same incremental value for 












. What’s going 
on here is that much of my confidence that Ellen isn’t a Buddhist is attributable to my belief 
that she’s probably a Baptist. If I were to learn that she weren’t a Baptist, it would drastically 
change how likely I think she is to be Buddhist. But because I’m already so confident that she’s 
Baptist, becoming certain she’s a Baptist wouldn’t change my confidence in H very much; I can 
only be so confident that she’s not a Buddhist because I think I almost definitely won’t learn 
she’s not a Baptist. On the other hand, because being Catholic is already such a small share of 
 




the ways in which she might not be Buddhist, learning that she’s not Catholic makes an almost 
negligible difference to how likely I think H is. The probative value is sensitive to how your 
present credence in the hypothesis depends on whether the evidence obtains, while the 
incremental value isn’t.  
Using Jeffrey conditionalization on a binary partition {𝐴, ¬𝐴} has a special connection 
with the probative value of evidence.39 First of all, it will clearly hold the probative values of 
both 𝐴 and ¬𝐴 constant for any arbitrary hypothesis that the agent is interested in. By the 
definition of rigidity, we have that 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) and 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴), for any proposition x in the agent’s 
algebra, are held constant by the probability kinematics. Thus the probative value of A for x, 
𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴) is also constant. In fact, it turns out that the change in the agent’s credence 
in x is equal to the change in the agent’s credence in A multiplied by the probative value of A 
for x: Δ𝑐(𝑥) = [𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)]Δ𝑐(𝐴). 40 This means that, in the case of a binary partition, 
there is a special justification for using a rigid updating rule: it’s the way of changing your 
credences in {𝐴, ¬𝐴}, and any other propositions that might depend on them, that respects 
your current commitments about 𝐴 and ¬𝐴 as evidence. Other methods of updating will, in 
general, change the probative values of A for various propositions. Thus, rigid updating rules 
are especially appropriate if you find yourself in a situation where you’re learning that some 
proposition is more (or less) likely than you initially thought it was, but you think that learning 
the proposition (or its negation) with certainty should still have the same degree of evidential 
support for the hypotheses you’re interested in. There may be other kinds of learning 
experiences where the evidence you’re acquiring changes the evidential support relations that 
obtain between the proposition and various other hypotheses; rigid updating rules won’t be 
applicable in those situations. Rigidity “should not be thought of as a universal and mechanical 
rule of updating, but as a technique to be applied in the right circumstances, as a tool in what 
Jeffrey terms the ‘art of judgment’” (Bradley 2005, 362).  
 
39 There are related quantities that are preserved by Jeffrey shifts on a partition with 𝑛 > 2 elements, but it’s a bit 
more complicated. For partitions of arbitrary size, the 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴𝑖) − 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴𝑗) are preserved for all i and j. You can think 
of these quantities as jointly encoding the probative values of the elements of the partition for x, but I choose to 
focus on the simpler binary version.  







In general, performing two successive Jeffrey updates on distinct partitions A, and then 
B will not yield the same result as Jeffrey conditionalizing on B, then A. This is because the shift 
on {𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛} will, typically, change the conditional credences on the elements of {𝐵1, … , 𝐵𝑚}, 
and vice versa. For our purposes, the key result is this: two shifts on binary partitions A and B 
commute only if A and B are probabilistically independent – viz., 𝑐(𝐴𝑖|𝐵𝑗) = 𝑐(𝐴𝑖) and 
𝑐(𝐵𝑗|𝐴𝑖) = 𝑐(𝐵𝑗), for all i and j.
41 
 
Shifts, Hard and Soft 
When presented as a direct assignment of new credences to the elements of some 
partition, successive Jeffrey shifts on the same partition also don’t commute. It’s easy to see 
why: the first shift will assign credences 𝑐(𝐴𝑖) = 𝑎𝑖 , the second assigns 𝑐(𝐴𝑖) = 𝑎𝑖
∗. Unless 𝑎𝑖 =
𝑎𝑖
∗ for all i, in which case the supposedly two shifts are in fact the same, changing the order the 
shifts are performed in will differ in at least the credences assigned to the elements of 
{𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛}. This way of characterizing Jeffrey’s probability kinematics also treats it as what 
Joyce (2004) terms a “hard” shift (or learning experience): “it ignores the prior and resets [the 
credences assigned to each element of the partition] de novo, thereby requiring the posterior 
to satisfy [the imposed credences] for any prior” (448). If a hard Jeffrey learning experience 
directly sets 𝑐(𝐴𝑖) = 𝑎𝑖, then two agents with completely different priors who are both 
exposed to this same evidence will end up with the same resultant credences for the elements 
of A. In contrast, Joyce (2004) defines a soft learning experience as one where the constraints 
on the agent’s resultant credences are sensitive to the agent’s prior.  
As Field (1978) shows, the fundamental dynamics of Jeffrey’s probability kinematics do 
not require that we interpret evidence as imposing hard constraints. He suggests we think of 
nature as providing the agent with an input parameter that fixes the agent’s resultant 
credences as a function of their prior credence (364). Jeffrey shifts that can be described in this 
 




way are soft and commute.42 Wagner (2002, 2003) pursues a similar strategy: rediscribing the 
content of learning experiences as specifying the Bayes factor. In the next section, we will see 
that a differential version of Jeffrey updating is also soft. To be clear: these soft “versions” of 
Jeffrey updating describe qualitatively different learning experiences but share the core 
principle of rigidity.  
 
3. A Temporally Continuous Version of Jeffrey Updating  
  
As I presented it in the previous section, Jeffrey conditionalization is a temporally 
discontinuous process: you start with some prior credence function 𝑐0, you have a learning 
experience where you assign new credences to the members of some partition {𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛}, and 
then you have a new credence function c which reflects what you learned in the experience. 
Now let’s consider a different example: observation under brightening light.    
Just as in Observation by Candlelight, our agent is interested in the color of a piece of 
cloth and she has various other beliefs about the cloth which depend on its color. Unlike in the 
previous case, let’s assume that all that matters is whether the cloth is blue or not – initially, 
she thinks both possibilities are equally likely. A lamp that can be dimmed/brightened 
continuously is aimed at the piece of cloth. The cloth initially receives no illumination, so that 
the image the agent sees is pitch-black. The illumination is gradually, almost imperceptibly, 
increased until she can see the cloth’s color quite clearly. By the end, she is nearly completely 
confident that the piece of cloth is blue. Let’s say her final credences are something like 
𝑐𝑓(𝐵) = 0.999, 𝑐𝑓(¬𝐵) = 0.001. How should we model the agent’s credences throughout the 
duration of this process?  
One option is to think of the agent as undergoing continuum-many learning experiences 
that update the credences the agent should have for the elements of the {𝐵, ¬𝐵} partition; we 
can think of our agent as obeying Jeffrey conditionalization at each moment in time. So, the 
kind of evidence nature is giving our agent consists of a function, 𝑐𝑡(𝐵), that specifies at each 
 
42 Field’s reparameterization also differs in not having Bayesian conditionalization as a special case – see p. 365 for 




time 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑡𝑓] the credence that the agent should assign to the cloth being blue. (Coherence 
requires that 𝑐𝑡(¬𝐵) = 1 − 𝑐𝑡(𝐵), so one function suffices to set the credences for the 
partition.) At each moment in time, the agent’s credences in some proposition x in her algebra 
is given by 𝑐𝑡(𝑥) = 𝑐(𝑥|𝐵)𝑐𝑡(𝐵) + 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐵)(1 − 𝑐𝑡(𝐵)). There are no temporal indexes on the 
conditional credences, because (as shown in the previous section), updating via Jeffrey 
conditionalization will preserve 𝑐(𝑥|𝐵) and 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐵) as constants.  
If the functions given by nature are differentiable, we have a second option. Rather than 
treating the process as myriad Jeffrey shifts, we can think of nature as presenting the agent 
with temporal rates of change in 𝑐(𝐵); we can think of our agent as satisfying an equation 
relating her temporal derivatives of each of her credences to the temporal derivatives being 
supplied by nature. So, nature is supplying a function  𝑟𝐵(𝑡) that specifies at each time 𝑡 ∈
[0, 𝑡𝑓] the rate of change that 𝑐(𝐵) should be undergoing; viz., 𝑟𝐵(𝑡) =
𝑑𝑐(𝐵; 𝑡)
𝑑𝑡







. The rate of change for the agent’s credence in an 
arbitrary proposition 𝑥 ∈ 𝑨 is then given by  
𝑑𝑐(𝑥; 𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= [𝑐(𝑥|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐵)]
𝑑𝑐(𝐵; 𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
. 43 All 
expressions in the previous equation are evaluated at time t.44  
Another somewhat subtle difference between these two kinds of continuous Jeffrey 
updating procedures is that the differential “version” of the many-hard-shifts process is 
automatically a soft learning experience. The many-normal-shifts version is hard for the same 
reason that the default way of presenting the probability kinematics is: the credences assigned 
by nature are completely insensitive to the agent’s priors on the partition. Because the 
differential version specifies rates of change at each moment in time, the total effect over the 
duration of the interval is to require that the agent’s credence in 𝑐(𝐵) changes by a certain 
amount. Her final credence in B at the end of the interval is the sum of her initial credence 
 
43 I’m using the fairly cumbersome notation 
𝑑𝑐(𝑥; 𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 for the temporal derivatives of the credences to try to make the 
structure of what’s happening as clear as possible: we’re thinking of the agent’s credences as a function from the 
product of the agent’s algebra and the temporal interval [0, 𝑡𝑓] to real numbers in the interval [0,1]. This means 
that, say, 𝑐(𝐵) is itself a function of time: 𝑐(𝐵; 𝑡): [0, 𝑡𝑓] →  [0,1] that specifies which credence the agent has in B 
at each moment. I will often use the simpler notation 
𝑑𝑐(𝑥)
𝑑𝑡





𝑐0(𝐵) with this change – thus, her final credence in B depends both on the quality of the 
evidence and on her prior. Also, although every evolution governed by the differential process 
could be represented as satisfying the hard process, the converse is not true; one obvious 
difference is that the hard process is free to require jumps that aren’t even continuous – let 
alone differentiable. 
So, now we have an updating rule that can handle continuous streams of information 
about a single binary partition. The final result of updating in this way is always equivalent to 
the Jeffrey shift that sets the final credence in B, 𝑐𝑓(𝐵). This is because the conditional 
credences for all propositions 𝑐(𝑥|𝐵) and 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐵) are constant over the duration of the entire 
interval. So, the agent’s final credence, at time 𝑡𝑓 , in an arbitrary proposition is given by 
𝑐(𝑥; 𝑡𝑓) = 𝑐0(𝑥|𝐵)𝑐𝑓(𝐵) + 𝑐0(𝑥|¬𝐵) (1 − 𝑐𝑓(𝐵)). But this is exactly the result of the Jeffrey 
shift on {𝐵, ¬𝐵} that sets 𝑐𝑓(𝐵). So far, so boring. Although the differential version and 
continuum-many Jeffrey shifts version are conceptually very different (they involve radically 
different kinds of evidence from nature, with one consequence being that the former is always 
a soft shift while the latter can be hard), moving to the differential version doesn’t solve any 
problems that the many shifts version couldn’t.  However, in the next section I will begin 
introducing a closely related updating rule that has the benefit of being able to handle multiple 
streams of continuous information about arbitrarily related propositions. 
 
4. The New Problem: Integrating Multiple Continuous Streams of Evidence 
 
Let’s consider a third example: Ori, the blind florist. Ori is a talented florist with years of 
experience who has lost her sight. Now that she cannot see, she relies on both touch and a 
variety of tools to determine which flowers she’s working with. For a certain arrangement, she 
wants a flower that is both a particular shape and blue. For the shape, she relies on touch. For 
the color, she is using a blue detector. The blue detector is a very sophisticated device that uses 
machine learning to try to identify whether the predominant color of an image it’s viewing is 
blue. It performs this analysis in real time, and outputs its current confidence about the color of 




to certainty that the image is blue, and a lowest pitch representing certainty that the image is 
not blue. The pitch may change quite rapidly, or rather slowly, depending on how quickly the 
confidence of the program is changing. Ori picks a flower from a box that she believes has 
flowers that are mostly either blue or the shape that she wants; unfortunately, being both blue 
and that particular shape is quite rare. Let’s say that her initial credences on the two partitions 
in question {𝐵, ¬𝐵} and {𝑆, ¬𝑆} are given by the table below: 
 
Table II.1: Ori's prior 
 B not B 
S 0.15 0.4 
not S 0.4 0.05 
 
The pitch of the blue detector gradually increases, telling her to increase her confidence 
that the flower is blue; and her touch experiences slowly lead her to the conclusion that the 
flower is the correct shape. This process takes several seconds. How should Ori’s credences 
change over the course of the interval?  
Modelling Ori as undergoing many different Jeffrey shifts isn’t as promising a strategy as 
in the previous case. If we include the agent’s credences about the sound she’s hearing and the 
tactile experience she’s having, it’s very difficult to identify a single partition that could provide 
the basis for the agent’s total evidence at each moment in time (such a partition would have to 
have uncountably many elements), and it seems somewhat implausible that the agent would 
really have prior conditional probabilities for every pairwise combination of each possible touch 
sensation and pitch. Of course, Jeffrey’s great insight was that we don’t need to do this in cases 
like Observation by Candlelight. 
An alternative, then, is to have Ori perform successive alternating Jeffrey shifts on the 
two partitions {𝐵, ¬𝐵} and {𝑆, ¬𝑆}. This idea runs into a couple of problems. As I discussed in 
Section 2, Jeffrey shifts do not generally commute. (And the shifts will not commute for this 
case in particular, as we will see in a moment.) To pursue this strategy, we must arbitrarily 




be no real motivation, will result in a different final credence function for Ori than if we had 
chosen the other. Why, then, think that either method is correct? Another, perhaps more 
interesting, consequence of this strategy is that it will lead to Ori’s credences “zig-zagging”. For 
definiteness and simplicity, let’s assume that the blue detector and Ori’s touch are both telling 
her to increase the respective credences at a rate of 0.05 per second, and that the entire 
process lasts for 8 seconds. Suppose we model Ori with the alternating update method, using 
timesteps of 1 second; we’ll update on {𝐵, ¬𝐵} first. Here are the results of the first three 
updates: 
Table II.2: The shift from Ori's prior to c(B)=0.6 
 B not B 
S 0.164 0.356 
not S 0.436 0.0444 
 
Table II.3: The shift from Table II.2 to c(S)=0.65 
 B not B 
S 0.205 0.445 
not S 0.318 0.0323 
 
 
Table II.4: The shift from Table II.3 to c(B)=0.7 
 B not B 
S 0.274 0.280 










Figure II.1: The "zig-zag" 
 
In Table II.3, we can see that Ori’s credence in the flower being blue is approximately 
0.523 – she is less confident that the flower is blue than when she started! In Table II.4, Ori’s 
credence that the flower is the right shape is about 0.554 – significantly less that 0.65, which 
was how confident she was a second before that, in Table II.3. Each update on {𝐵, ¬𝐵} causes 
Ori to lose some of her previous confidence in the flower’s shape; each update on {𝑆, ¬𝑆} 
results in losing some confidence that the flower is blue. The result is that the graphs of 𝑐(𝐵) 
and 𝑐(𝑆) as functions of time exhibit a “zig-zag” pattern; see Figure II.1 for an example. This 
process gets something right: Ori is initially convinced that the flower having the desired shape 
and being blue are anti-correlated, in the sense that 𝑐(𝑆|𝐵) < 𝑐(𝑆|¬𝐵) and 𝑐(𝐵|𝑆) <
𝑐(𝐵|¬𝑆). This means that Ori is correct to view evidence that the flower is blue as evidence 
against the flower being the desired shape, and vice versa.  
But this process also gets something very wrong. At each moment in time, Ori’s total 
evidence for the flower being blue is monotonically increasing. It’s true that the evidence from 
touch is evidence against the flower being blue, but the evidence from the detector is stronger 
– the net effect is that Ori’s confidence that the flower is blue should increase at each moment, 
but at a slower rate than if she were only listening to the detector and not touching the flower 
to determine its shape. Similarly, the net effect on Ori’s confidence in the flower having the 
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to the detector. Ori’s credences should not be zig-zagging. What we want is to somehow 
combine the two streams of information in a way that simultaneously respects the 
contributions of both.  
Why not merely model Ori as successively updating on the more fine-grained partition 
{𝑆 ∧ 𝐵, 𝑆 ∧ ¬𝐵, ¬𝑆 ∧ 𝐵, ¬𝑆 ∧ ¬𝐵}?45 In a way, I think that’s exactly what we should do! As we 
will see, the final result of updating according to the rule I develop in the next section will 
ultimately be equivalent to a Jeffrey shift on this very partition, and the rule is rigid with respect 
to this partition throughout. So, it is completely possible to redescribe what I think Ori should 
do as many Jeffrey shifts on the refined partition. But the key questions are: which shifts? And 
how are those shifts on the refined partition related to the information that Ori is receiving? Ori 
is receiving information directly about how her credences in S should change and how her 
credences in B should change, at each instant. As most naturally understood on the many-shifts 
picture, these demands are mutually incompatible – this is one way of understanding why the 
“zig-zag” occurs. So, another way of understanding the problem that I am proposing a solution 
to is: can we come up with a principled way of generating required changes on the fine-grained 
partition {𝑆 ∧ 𝐵, 𝑆 ∧ ¬𝐵, ¬𝑆 ∧ 𝐵, ¬𝑆 ∧ ¬𝐵} from the inputs from nature that seem to be about 
changes on {𝑆, ¬𝑆} and {𝐵, ¬𝐵}? And can we do so in a way that makes sense of the result as a 
direct combination of what we think Ori should do with the signals about {𝑆, ¬𝑆} and {𝐵, ¬𝐵}, 
if she were to receive them separately? My updating rule is, fundamentally, an attempt at 
answering these questions in the affirmative. I especially want to avoid the view that what Ori 
“really” learns about at each moment is the refined partition, where this is understood as a 
rejection of the claim that she’s receiving two separate streams of information. She could, at 
each moment, choose to focus only on what she heard or felt and ignore the other source. 
Combing the information is a choice (the rational one, I think), so we should be able to 
represent the evidence as separable.   
 
 
45 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for raising this question. See also the subsection of Section 5, The 





5. Differential Rigidity and Continuous Probability Kinematics  
 
Let’s return to the second option from Section 3, where we think of nature as giving 
agents credal rates of change. The goal will now be to answer the question: suppose nature 
tells an agent to change her credence in some proposition A at a certain rate in time through 
one channel of information (e.g., whether the flower is a certain shape) at the same time as 
telling her to change B at some rate (e.g., whether the flower is blue or not). These propositions 
may, in general, be related in arbitrary ways. B might entail A, A may be strong evidence for B, 
A and B might be jointly inconsistent, etc. What rates of change in 𝑐(𝐴) and 𝑐(𝐵) should the 
agent adopt at each moment in time? What rate of change should the agent adopt in any 
proposition x that depends in arbitrary ways on 𝑐(𝐴) and 𝑐(𝐵)?  
Outside of special cases, we can no longer interpret the rates of change given by nature 






, because the logical relationships between A and 
B may make it impossible to evolve the agent’s credences in a coherent way. Suppose, for 
example, that A and B are logically equivalent, and the rates that nature hands the agent at 
some moment in time are 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) = 2  and 𝑠𝐵(𝑡) = −0.1 . If the agent is initially coherent and 
tries to conform her credences to 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) =
𝑑𝑐(𝐴)
𝑑𝑡
| 𝑡 and 𝑠𝐵(𝑡) =
𝑑𝑐(𝐵)
𝑑𝑡
| 𝑡, she will end up with 
incoherent credences. Since A and B are logically equivalent, to be coherent the agent must 






 for all moments in time when A and B are equivalent. However, we can still interpret 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) 
and 𝑠𝐵(𝑡) as specifying partial temporal derivatives: 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) =
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡
| 𝑡 and 𝑠𝐵(𝑡) =
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡
| 𝑡. What 
this means is that nature is telling the agent that 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) is the instantaneous rate of change in 
𝑐(𝐴) that the agent would be obligated to adopt if she weren’t learning anything else, and 
similarly for 𝑠𝐵(𝑡) and 𝑐(𝐵).
46 However, the total rate of change for the agent’s credences in 
 
46 In general, the partial derivative of 𝑧 = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) with respect to x, 
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑥
, expresses how tiny changes to x would 





𝑓(𝑥+Δ𝑥,   𝑦)−𝑓(𝑥,   𝑦)
Δ𝑥
. Of course, if y is also a function of x, then 
the actual rate at which varying x changes z, 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑𝑥
, will not typically equal 
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑥




𝑐(𝐴) and 𝑐(𝐵) will, in general, be some functions of 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) and 𝑠𝐵(𝑡); those functions may also 
depend on the agent’s present credences.  
An analogy may be helpful: consider a clock with two hands that are coupled together 
by a system of gears so that manually moving one hand also causes the other to move. Let’s call 
the angular position of one hand 𝛼 and let 𝛽 be the position of the other. If someone directly 
moves the first hand, then you can think of them setting some rate of angular motion of that 
hand, call it 𝑟𝛼 =
𝑑𝛼
𝑑𝑡
. You can calculate the rate of motion of the other hand, 
𝑑𝛽
𝑑𝑡
, if you know 
what the gear ratio between the two hands are – call this ratio 
𝜕𝛽
𝜕𝛼
. Similarly, if you moved the 
other hand, you could directly impose 𝑠𝛽 and calculate the motion of the first hand, 
𝑑𝛼
𝑑𝑡
, as long 
as you know 
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝛽
. What happens if you impose 𝑟𝛼 and 𝑠𝛽 at the same time? Well, now you’re 
directly moving the first hand at the rate 𝑟𝛼, but the first hand is also being moved by the direct 













𝑟𝛼. Put another way: now we’re thinking 
of 𝛼 as a function, both of time directly, and of 𝛽, which is itself a function of time: 𝛼(𝑡; 𝛽(𝑡)). 











: the sum of a direct rate of 
change in terms of time and the contribution to 𝛼’s change that direct change in 𝛽 makes. We 













? There are 
some special cases that I hope will be intuitive to the reader:  
1. When A and B are logically equivalent, 
𝑑𝑐(𝐴)
𝑑𝑡







 to ensure coherence. 
 
 




















should be given by 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) − 𝑠𝐵(𝑡). 
𝑑𝑐(𝐵)
𝑑𝑡
 must equal −
𝑑𝑐(𝐴)
𝑑𝑡
 for the agent to be coherent.  
 
3. Suppose B is incremental evidence for A in the sense that 𝑐(𝐴|𝐵) > 𝑐(𝐴|¬𝐵), then: 
𝑑𝑐(𝐴)
𝑑𝑡
> 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) when 𝑠𝐵(𝑡) is positive; 
𝑑𝑐(𝐴)
𝑑𝑡
< 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) when 𝑠𝐵(𝑡) is negative.  
 









Here are some brief comments on my judgments about the four cases: 
 Cases 1 and 2: These are basic compositionality principles. It might sometimes be convenient to 
model one stream of information as two or more streams of information about the same 
proposition. Whether we choose to break up a stream of information or not should have no 
impact on the result of the updating rule. Similarly, whether we combine instructions to 
increase 𝑐(𝐴) and 𝑐(¬𝐴) into a single instruction (to increase or decrease 𝑐(𝐴), depending on 
the relevant magnitudes), or treat the instructions as two separate streams of information, we 
should get the same result. Without obeying these two constraints, we have no way of 
consistently combining or breaking up streams of information, even about a single proposition 












 come directly 
from coherence. If A and B are logically equivalent, then a coherent agent must have 𝑐(𝐴) =
𝑐(𝐵); if they’re complements, the agent needs to satisfy 𝑐(𝐴) = 1 − 𝑐(𝐵). Differentiating those 
equalities yield said constraints.  
Case 3: If B is probative evidence for A in the sense that 𝑐(𝐴|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝐴|¬𝐵) > 0, then 




𝑟𝐴(𝑡), this would mean that the agent was experiencing the same rate of change in 𝑐(𝐴) that he 




neglecting the probative value of B for A. (And 
𝑑𝑐(𝐴)
𝑑𝑡
< 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) would be even worse: it would 
mean that the agent becomes less confident when getting both direct and indirect evidence in 
favor of A than they would be if they had only received the direct evidence.) Similarly, if  𝑠𝐵(𝑡) 
is negative, this means that the agent is losing confidence in a proposition that provides part of 
their current evidential support for A. If we had 
𝑑𝑐(𝐴)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝐴(𝑡), the agent would be ignoring the 
loss of this support.  







= 𝑠𝐵(𝑡) means that the agent is taking account of the evidential relations 
between A and B, so that, e.g., learning about B is also an indirect way of learning about A. If A 
and B are independent, this means that the agent doesn’t believe there is any such evidential 
relationship; changing his confidence in one proposition should have no bearing on his 
confidence in the other.   
These four constraints are highly suggestive. Together, they suggest that the agent 
should satisfy:  
𝑑𝑐(𝐴)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) + [𝑐(𝐴|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝐴|¬𝐵)]𝑠𝐵(𝑡) (1) 
𝑑𝑐(𝐵)
𝑑𝑡
= [𝑐(𝐵|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝐵|¬𝐴)]𝑟𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑠𝐵(𝑡) (2) 
 
Note that [𝑐(𝐴|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝐴|¬𝐵)] is the probative value of B for A which, as discussed in 
Section 2, is one way of measuring the evidential import that B has for A. Similarly, 
[𝑐(𝐵|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝐵|¬𝐴)] is the probative value of A for B. If we interpret 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) =
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡


























The form of these equations is also quite suggestive: if we’re thinking of 𝑐(𝐴) as a 
function of both time directly, and of 𝑐(𝐵) (which is itself a function of time), then the 
























Comparing equations 5 and 4 suggests that 
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)




[𝑐(𝐵|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝐵|¬𝐴)]. Consider a learning experience where nature only directly varies 𝑐(𝐵); 
viz., 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) = 0. After an arbitrarily small amount of time Δ𝑡, there will be a change in 𝑐(𝐵) of 
Δ𝑐(𝐵) = 𝑠𝐵Δ𝑡. The corresponding change in in 𝑐(𝐴) is 𝑐𝑡+Δ𝑡(𝐴) − 𝑐𝑡(𝐴), where 𝑐𝑡+Δ𝑡(𝐴) is 







. There are 
plenty of possible updating rules for which this quantity will not even be defined. But when it is, 
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)




[𝑐(𝐴|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝐴|¬𝐵)], then at each moment in time, the infinitesimal change in the agent’s 
credence in B due to nature’s stipulation will also be accompanied by a change in 𝑐(𝐴) that is 
proportional to the probative value of B for A.47  
In addition to satisfying the four desiderata I outlined above, there’s another reason to 
like combining the rates of change in this way: it’s the unique way of doing so that satisfies a 
constraint that I call differential rigidity.  
 
Differential rigidity. Let A and B be the propositions that nature is providing rates of 
change for, and let x be an arbitrary proposition in the agent’s algebra. Then, differential rigidity 












 are all zero at every instant. (This is the 
constraint for the case where nature is providing rates of change for two propositions; the 
generalization is obvious.)  
 
47 Continuing the clock analogy, 
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
 is like the gear ratio. (Although this is a little misleading, because unlike in the 











One consequence of differential rigidity is that, in a learning experience where nature is 
only providing information about A, 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) and 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴) will be constant throughout the 
duration; the differential version of Jeffrey conditionalization introduced in Section 3 falls out as 
a special case. In more general cases where nature is providing information about both A and B, 
𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) and 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴) will generally not be constant. However, the rate at which 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) and 
𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴) change will depend only on 
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡
, and not on 
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡
. Intuitively, the way in which the 
agent updates on the stream of information that’s about A respects, at each moment the 
agent’s credences conditional on A. However, as the agent learns about B, it will likely change 
her credences conditional on A. And so, in the most general case, there need be no non-
infinitesimal interval on which any of the conditional credences are constant. Similarly, the 
agent makes uses of the changing confidence in B in a way that doesn’t change the credences 
conditional on B; but, because the agent is also learning about A at the same time, her 
credences conditional on B will also typically be constantly changing.  
We can derive Equations 3 and 4 from differential rigidity. We start with Equations 5 
and 6, and with the law of total probability: 
𝑐(𝐴) = 𝑐(𝐴|𝐵)𝑐(𝐵) + 𝑐(𝐴|¬𝐵)𝑐(¬𝐵) (7) 
 
Differentiating both sides with respect to 𝑐(𝐵), we obtain 
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)








So, if the agent satisfies differential rigidity, 
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)




[𝑐(𝐵|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝐵|¬𝐴)]. Recall once again that 𝑐(𝐴|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝐴|¬𝐵) is a measure of the probative 
value of B for A, while 𝑐(𝐵|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝐵|¬𝐴) is a measure of the probative value of B for A.48 By 
satisfying differential rigidity, we see that direct changes to 𝑐(𝐵) will also induce changes in 
𝑐(𝐴) according to the agent’s current beliefs about the evidential import of B for A, and vice 
versa. Plugging these equalities into Equations 5 and 6 yields Equations 3 and 4. 
 




 Indeed, we are now in a position to calculate the updating rule for an arbitrary 
























= [𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)] (10) 
𝜕𝑐(𝑥)
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
= [𝑐(𝑥|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐵)] (11) 
Substituting Equations 10 and 11 into 9, we finally have: 
  
Continuous probability kinematics 
𝑑𝑐(𝑥)
𝑑𝑡
= [𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)]
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡





The generalization to the n-proposition case (viz., updating on n streams of evidence 
each concerned with a binary partition 𝐴𝑖) is:  
𝑑𝑐(𝑥)
𝑑𝑡









The Relationship Between CPK and Ordinary Jeffrey Conditionalization 
As I already mentioned when I introduced differential rigidity, one interesting property 
of CPK is that it has the single-partition differential version of Jeffrey updating discussed in 
Section 2 as a special case. But it is also related to Jeffrey conditionalization in a much more 
general way. Just as that “version” of Jeffrey conditionalization is equivalent (in outcome, but 
not conception) to continuum-many ordinary Jeffrey shifts, any credence function over some 
temporal interval that can be modelled as obeying CPK can also be generated by continuum-




For convenience, let’s continue to consider the case where the agent is learning directly 
about two propositions A and B. The first trick is to notice that updating by CPK always results 
in the conditional credences 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴 ∧ 𝐵), 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵), 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴 ∧ 𝐵), and 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵) 
remaining constant for the duration of the learning experience, for any proposition x. To show 
this, we show that the total derivative of each of the above-listed conditional credences with 
respect to time is identically 0.49 In other words, updating by CPK is rigid on the partition 
{𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, 𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵, ¬𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, ¬𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵}.  
Now, because updating by CPK preserves coherence,50 the credence function of an 
agent obeying CPK at any moment t will always satisfy 𝑐𝑡(𝑥) = 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴 ∧ 𝐵)𝑐𝑡(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) +
𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴 ∧ 𝐵)𝑐𝑡(¬𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) + 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵)𝑐𝑡(𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵) + 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵)𝑐𝑡(¬𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵). (The 
conditional credences aren’t time-indexed because they are constant throughout.) So, that 
temporal evolution of the agent’s credences could also be described as the result of performing 
a Jeffrey shift at each moment t on the partition {𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, 𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵, ¬𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, ¬𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵}.51 The 
input from nature is reinterpreted as four functions that specify the values 𝑐𝑡(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵), 
𝑐𝑡(¬𝐴 ∧ 𝐵), 𝑐𝑡(𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵), and 𝑐𝑡(¬𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵) that the agent is required to adopt at each moment 
in time. 
The primary philosophical motivations for thinking about this process in terms of CPK 
rather than as many ordinary Jeffrey shifts are conceptual. As I alluded to in the end of Section 
4, the point is that CPK gives a unified account that makes learning about A and B 
simultaneously a simple matter of combining the evidence that the agent would have received 
if they were learning only about A and B individually. On the ordinary Jeffrey shift picture, it’s 
much harder to find a story that makes the evidence in the joint case a straightforward 
combination of the evidence in the separate cases – this is because the ordinary picture thinks 
of the specified values for credences of the elements of the partitions as what the agent learns, 
 











50 See the Appendix for the proof. 
51 Note, however, the converse is not true: there are Jeffrey shifts that can be specified on {𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, 𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵, ¬𝐴 ∧





and the specified values are incompatible; when we move to thinking about the content of the 
learning experience as specifying partial derivatives, it’s much easier to see how to coherently 
combine them into one unified learning experience.   
 
6. Questions, Objections, and Answers52 
 
Q: How does CPK apply to credence 0? 
 
A: There are two issues related to how CPK applies to credence 0. The first is that the usual 
ratio “definition” of the conditional credence 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) as 
𝑐(𝑥∧𝐴)
𝑐(𝐴)
 is undefined when 𝑐(𝐴) = 0. The 
obvious solution to this (and the one that is typically employed in traditional conditionalization) 
is to simply restrict our attention to when this is the case; CPK only applies when the values of 
all of the directly-varied credences are between 0 and 1. A second issue: when 𝑐(𝑥) = 0 (and 
the directly-varied credences are nonzero), 
𝑑𝑐(𝑥)
𝑑𝑡
= 0. The problem is that the agent’s future 
credal evolution seems to be underdetermined; it’s consistent with the agent’s credence in x 
increasing, decreasing, or remaining constant in arbitrarily small intervals near the moment in 
question. As I’ve presented CPK so far, I don’t see a way to prove that it is incompatible with 
𝑐(𝑥) taking on negative values. Again, however, there is an obvious fix: once 𝑐(𝑥) = 0,  keeping 
𝑐(𝑥) identically zero for all later times is always a solution to CPK.53 So, to maintain non-
negative credences, I can place an additional constraint on CPK: treat credence 0 and credence 
1 as “gutters”. Once you have an extremal credence in some proposition, your credence in that 
proposition is constant for the remainder of the learning experience.  
Are these fixes costly? In comparison to ordinary conditionalization (both Bayesian and 
Jeffrey), no. Both updating rules run into exactly the same issue about the traditional 
“definition” of conditional probability being undefined when the denominator is zero; both also 
have the property that, once a proposition achieves an extremal credal value, your credence in 
it cannot be changed by updating on any partition it’s not an element of. It would be nice to 
 
52 The questions in this section were either raised by anonymous reviewers, or inspired by questions they raised.  




extend CPK to apply outside of these restrictions, but that would be a bonus. For now, the 
official formulation of CPK is equation (12)54 plus the two restrictions outlined in this section. 
 
Q/O: Why think that what happens during some gradual learning process is relevant to 
rationally evaluating an agent? Why not just be concerned with the final result of the process? 
 
A: I believe that reasoning, as a process, is a more valuable target of rational evaluation than 
result. I would be very suspicious of a system that arrived at the “correct” (according to me) 
final result via a process that did not have deep structural similarities to CPK – I would think it 
was almost certainly either extremely lucky or cheating. See the first chapter of this dissertation 
for much more discussion of this point.   
A more shallow, but obvious reason is this: evaluating the entire process allows us to 
make judgments about cases where the agent is interrupted.  
Finally, as a general rule, agents should incorporate new evidence as quickly as possible. 
To wait is to lose all kinds of expected value (epistemic, pragmatic, moral). If nature is providing 
evidence gradually, the obvious ideal would be to incorporate each bit as soon as it comes in. 
(This ideal is almost certainly unobtainable; see the next question for further discussion.) But 
waiting longer than you have to, until the end of a potentially fairly long process, is an obvious 
failure of rationality. See both the first and third chapters of this dissertation for additional 
discussion of this point.  
 
Q/O: What does it mean for nature to stipulate that the agent adopt a certain credal derivative 
at each moment? And why think that’s possible, let alone rationally required? Isn’t it much more 
plausible that agents learn in discrete chunks?  
 
A: Taking the last part first: yes, of course! I’d be willing to bet that all agents we know of have 
some minimal timescale on which they’re capable of processing incoming information (so, their 
mental time is functionally discrete), and probably also some minimal change in the value of 
 




credences that they’re capable of representing. I would be amazed if humans were capable of 
learning truly continuously; further, I doubt that it’s even possible for there to be an agent that 
could. I like the idea that agents should be representable as implementing computer programs, 
in which case we should expect discrete timesteps and storage limits. Others may, of course, 
have very different reasons for arriving at the same conclusion that learning is probably best 
fundamentally understood discontinuously.  
The continuity of CPK is an abstraction of the kind that is ubiquitous in classical physics. 
In classical electromagnetism, for example, charge is fundamentally discrete – yet Maxwell’s 
equations, whether in differential or integral form, assume continuity. The assumption is that 
the granularity of the fundamental units is so miniscule compared to the scale of application of 
the continuous laws that the continuous description of the evolution of the properties of the 
system is a very good approximation of the much more complicated discrete interactions. One 
great benefit of this kind of abstraction is that it works even when you’re ignorant of the 
precise details on the fundamental scale! To know whether an agent approximates updating by 
CPK, we don’t necessarily need to know the details of what their mental timestep is, or what 
the minimum difference in tonal pitch that they can detect is; and two different systems that 
differed in these fundamentals could still be very well-described as approximating CPK, as long 
as the chunks are small enough. By abstracting in this way, it both keeps the math simpler and 
demonstrates a kind of unity between different systems that discretely approximate the 
continuous property. Keeping the above in mind, then, having a certain credal derivative is just 
to be understood as a limit of making various small credal changes over small intervals of time.  
 
Appendix: Proof that updating by CPK preserves coherence 
 
Suppose the agent has a prior credence function which is coherent – that is, it satisfies 
the probability axioms.  
1. Non-negativity. For every proposition x in the agent’s algebra, 𝑐0(𝑥) ≥ 0. 




3. Countable Additivity. Let 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … be an arbitrary sequence of disjoint 
propositions. 𝑐0(⋁ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) = ∑ 𝑐0(𝑥𝑖)𝑖 . 
I show that the resultant credence function will continue to satisfy the axioms. This 
proof is presented in terms of the case where the agent is receiving evidence about two 
propositions, A and B, but the generalization to the n-proposition case is obvious.  
 
Non-Negativity 
By stipulation of the first restriction, the directly-varied credences are always greater 
than zero. Now we must show updating by CPK never causes the agent’s other credences to fall 
below zero. 
 For any proposition x in the agent's algebra other than the directly-varied credences, 
when 𝑐(𝑥) = 0, 𝑐(𝑥|𝐴), 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴), 𝑐(𝑥|𝐵), and 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐵) are all 0. Thus, updating by CPK yields 
𝑑𝑐(𝑥)
𝑑𝑡
= [𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)]
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡
+ [𝑐(𝑥|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐵)]
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡
= 0.  
For reductio, assume that there is some time 𝑡2 at which 𝑐2(𝑥) is negative. By 
assumption, 𝑐0(𝑥) ≥ 0. The agent’s credence function 𝑐𝑡(𝑥) is a continuous function of time, so 
by the intermediate value theorem, there must be some time 𝑡1 (possibly identical to 𝑡0) in the 
interval [𝑡0, 𝑡2) at which 𝑐1(𝑥) = 0. But from 𝑡1 onward, the agent was required to have 
𝑐𝑡(𝑥) = 0,
55 and so the agent’s credence in x must be 0 at 𝑡2. Reductio. In the next paragraph, 
we show that the gutter stipulation is consistent with equation (12), the core principle of CPK. 





= 0. Let 𝑐′(𝑥; 𝑡) =
{
𝑐(𝑥; 𝑡), 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1
0, 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡1
 . Then, 𝑐′(𝑥; 𝑡) satisfies equation (12). By construction, 𝑐′(𝑥; 𝑡) satisfies 
equation (12) for 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1. It also works for  𝑡 > 𝑡1.  LHS: 
𝑑𝑐′(𝑥)
𝑑𝑡




+ [𝑐′(𝑥|𝐵) − 𝑐′(𝑥|¬𝐵)]
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡
  is identically 0, because 
[𝑐′(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐′(𝑥|¬𝐴)] and [𝑐′(𝑥|𝐵) − 𝑐′(𝑥|¬𝐵)] are identically 0. LHS=RHS for all 𝑡 > 𝑡1. 
 
 


















+ [𝑐𝑡(⋁ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 |𝐵) − 𝑐𝑡(⋁ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 |¬𝐵)]
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡








For the agent to fail to satisfy countable additivity at 𝜏 means that 𝑐𝜏(⋁ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) ≠






𝑑𝑡 + [𝑐𝑡(𝑥𝑖|𝐵) − 𝑐𝑡(𝑥𝑖|¬𝐵)]
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡
𝑑𝑡 ) . Now, by assumption, the agent initially 
satisfies countable additivity, so 𝑐0(⋁ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) = ∑ 𝑐0𝑖 (𝑥𝑖). Thus, the only way the inequality can 
hold is if ∫ ([𝑐𝑡(⋁ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 |𝐴) − 𝑐𝑡(⋁ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 |¬𝐴)]
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡







∑ (∫ [𝑐𝑡(𝑥𝑖|𝐴) − 𝑐𝑡(𝑥𝑖|¬𝐴)]
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡






) .𝑖  For this inequality 
to hold, it is necessary – though not sufficient – that there is some time 𝑡0 < 𝑡1 < 𝜏 such that 
one of the four following inequalities obtains: 
• 𝑐1(⋁ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 |𝐴) ≠ ∑ 𝑐1(𝑥𝑖|𝐴)𝑖  
• 𝑐1(⋁ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 |¬𝐴) ≠ ∑ 𝑐1(𝑥𝑖|¬𝐴)𝑖  
• 𝑐1(⋁ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 |𝐵) ≠ ∑ 𝑐1(𝑥𝑖|𝐵)𝑖  
• 𝑐1(⋁ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 |¬𝐵) ≠ ∑ 𝑐1(𝑥𝑖|¬𝐵)𝑖  
But to satisfy any of these inequalities is for the agent to already violate countable 
additivity at 𝑡1. In general, at each instant, changing your credences in line with CPK can 
contribute to a divergence from countable additivity (at a later time) only if your credences 
already fail to obey countable additivity at present. Thus, updating by CPK will never cause an 
agent who initially has coherent credences to violate countable additivity.  
 
Normality 
Since, by assumption, the agent initially satisfies normality, to show that the agent 
continues to satisfy normality while updating by CPK, it suffices to show that 
𝑑𝑐(Ω)
𝑑𝑡




thus that 𝑐(Ω) is a temporal constant. Because Ω is the union of all elements of the agent’s 
algebra, we’re free to represent it as Ω = 𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴. Recall that A is one the two propositions 
whose credal rate of change is being set by nature. Because CPK satisfies countable additivity 









. It’s a very straightforward 
















The above reasoning holds at any moment in time at which the agent is updating by 
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In this chapter, I consider questions about whether CPK is a learning experience, and 
what we should think about the evidential character of the rates of change supplied by nature. I 
first argue that CPK is, indeed, a genuine learning experience in the following sense: as long as, 
prior to receiving the signals from nature, the agent’s expected value for each signal is zero, the 
agent will regard the credence function obtained by updating by CPK on these signals from 
nature as expectedly better at making decisions than the agent’s present credence function. 
This condition, that the agent’s expected value of the signals be zero, is the analogue of the 
standard Martingale condition – it is a minimal constraint for the agent’s current credence 
function to be justifiable, under the assumption that the agent’s present credences should 
reflect her expectation of her future credences.  
After proving that an agent that satisfies this condition will regard CPK as a genuine 
learning experience, I investigate the question of whether the rates of change stipulated by 
nature can properly be regarded as evidence. The main worry here is that there are prominent 
arguments from epistemologists like Timothy Williamson that evidence must be propositional 
in order to play the roles evidence fills in epistemic life. But it’s not obvious that the content of 
the kind of signals that CPK responds to can be correctly regarded as propositional: if anything, 
the signals seem much more like imperatives than any kind of statement that encodes factive 
information about the world. My response to this worry is two-fold: first, I will argue that 
Williamson’s conception of evidence is too narrow; he has successfully picked out constraints 
that apply to a certain kind of evidence – in particular, a kind of evidence that we expect in 




consisting of, roughly, whatever plays the functional role of input to a learning experience in 
the sense that will shortly be explained. And there is no particular problem with understanding 
the signals that CPK responds to as evidence of this kind.  
My second response will be to show that we can obtain superconditioning results for 
CPK. Thus, if I can’t convince the reader that they should be comfortable with evidence that 
doesn’t have propositional content, I will try to convince you that agents that update by CPK 
can also be modelled as if they are updating on propositional content in a richer space of 
propositions. Finally, the strategy of providing a constructive superconditioning result for CPK 
provides an interesting lens to examine the evidential commitments that an agent who updates 
by CPK has (or can be modelled as having). I use this lens to reexamine the question of the 
factivity of the kind of evidence with which CPK is concerned.  
 
2. Learning Experiences and the Value of Information 
 
One governing principle of genuine learning that many epistemologists accept is that 
the agent must regard her future self, after the experience is concluded, as being better-
informed than her current self. As I've stated this requirement, it's ambiguous: do we require 
that the future agent regard herself after the experience as better-informed than she was 
before, or do we require that the present agent expects her future self to be better-informed 
than she is presently? Is it possible to have a genuine learning experience that you don't regard 
as one beforehand, but only after the fact? Viewed through the widely accepted lens of 
Immodesty, it turns out that the first proffered interpretation is trivial. An agent who satisfies 
Immodesty will always regard her own credence function as having the highest expected 
epistemic utility - and this will be true even in cases where the agent, beforehand, will regard 
her new credences as resulting from a mistake on her part. In cases where Immodesty applies, 
we cannot use the agent's retrospective comparison of her present and prior credences as any 





However, the second understanding of the requirement is usually regarded as more 
substantive, and there are at least two major ways of formalizing it. One formalization is part of 
the foundation of a burgeoning research program in formal epistemology: the agent's expected 
accuracy or expected epistemic utility, as evaluated from her prior, must increase as a result of 
the experience. The idea that many epistemic norms can be derived from the assumption that 
agents are expected-epistemic-utility maximizers has recently been a popular and fruitful 
starting point for epistemological research. The other formalization is part of an older tradition 
of measuring the value of knowledge from its pragmatic consequences - the value of being 
better-informed is reflected in better practical decision-making, attaining greater expected 
utility. Dutch book arguments for diachronic constraints are rooted in this tradition of using the 
potential for good decision-making (e.g., bookmaking!) as a measure of epistemic success.  
A particularly famous example of this older tradition is the Savage-Good Value of 
Information Theorem, proved in Good (1967). It shows that, in the context of Savage's decision 
theory, and assuming updating by Bayesian conditionalization, the expected utility of making a 
decision after a costless experiment where you learn some outcome with certainty is always 
greater-than-or-equal-to the expected utility of making the decision before the experiment. 
Skyrms (1990) gives an overview of a generalization of this concept, in the section “Black-Box 
Learning and Higher-Order Probabilities”. Skyrms considers learning experiences of a much 
more general form:  
“Suppose that the bookie at 𝑡1 has probabilities over some finite space, 
𝑊, and anticipates an observational experience such that she cannot describe 
the possible observational results, or even specify a sufficient partition à la 
Jeffrey for the experiment. But she can think about how her probabilities at 𝑡2 
may have been modified by the observation, and we will suppose that at 𝑡1 she 
also has prior probabilities over the possible posteriors that she may have at 𝑡2 - 
in other words, over the space W.” (121-2)  
Skyrms summarizes a Dutch book argument which shows that, to avoid Dutch books, an 






∗) = 𝑝∗(𝑤), for each 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊.  
 
This Martingale principle has been widely discussed in the epistemology literature, although it 
is more commonly called the Reflection Principle. In an earlier section of Skyrms (1990), 
“Dynamic Probability and Learning Generalized”, Skyrms argues that this condition represents 
“your belief in the epistemological validity of the impending belief change” (98), and gives a 
generalization of the Savage-Good theorem which shows that the expected utility of making a 
decision after a belief change that conforms to the Martingale principle is greater-than-or-
equal-to the expected utility of making a decision on the basis of your prior.  
In “Learning Experiences and the Value of Knowledge”, Simon Huttegger proves what 
one might call a reverse Value of Information theorem. He takes the conclusion of the other 
Value of Information Theorems as his foundational premise. That is, Huttegger starts by 
assuming that an experience represents genuine learning only if the expected utility of a 
decision after the experience is higher than the expected utility of making the decision on the 
basis of your prior. “Postulate. If a belief change from 𝑝 to {𝑝𝑓} constitutes a genuine learning 
situation, then ∑ 𝑝(𝑝𝑓)𝑓 max
𝑗
∑ 𝑝𝑓(𝑆𝑖)𝑢(𝐴𝑗&𝑖 𝑆𝑖)  ≥  max
𝑗
∑ 𝑝(𝑆𝑖)𝑢(𝐴𝑗&𝑖 𝑆𝑖)”(285), where the 
𝐴𝑗 are the agent's available actions in the decision problem, the 𝑆𝑖 are a partition of possible 
states of the world, and 𝑢(𝐴𝑗&𝑆𝑖) is the utility to the agent of performing act 𝐴𝑗 in state 𝑆𝑖. 
From this assumption, Huttegger derives the Martingale principle. Taking Skyrms (1990) and 
Huttegger together, we have that the Martingale principle is both necessary and sufficient for 
regarding your future self, after some credal change, as being better-informed than your 
present self - as measured by ordinary expected utility.  
 
The Martingale Principle and Gradual Learning  
What is the relevance of the Martingale principle to CPK? Well, superficially at least, the 
Martingale principle seems to present a challenge to the idea of gradual learning experiences. 
The philosophical foundation upon which the CPK formalism has been constructed presupposes 
the idea that gradual learning experiences are not only possible, but in some important cases 




apparent problem, it's helpful first to observe that the Martingale principle entails a 
requirement that your present credence in some proposition be equal to your expectation of 
your future credence in said proposition. For now, let's assume that there is a finite set {𝑐𝑖} of 
credence functions such that you are certain that your credence function after the learning 
experience, 𝑐2 , will be one of them: 𝑐2 = 𝑐
𝑖 , for some 𝑐𝑖. Assuming you have credences 
representing how likely each of the 𝑐𝑖 are to be your posterior, your expectation of your 
posterior credence in some proposition 𝑥 is  




By the Martingale principle,  
𝑐𝑖(𝑥) = 𝑐1(𝑥|𝑐2 = 𝑐
𝑖) (2) 
and so, 




𝑖) = 𝑐1(𝑥), (3) 
by the Law of Total Probability. If we define Δ𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑐2(𝑥) − 𝑐1(𝑥), the Martingale principle 
entails that the expected change in your credence, 𝐸[Δ𝑐(𝑥)], in any proposition 𝑥 over any 
finite interval of time (𝑡1 , 𝑡2) must be zero! This is because 
𝐸[Δ𝑐(𝑥)] = 𝐸[𝑐2(𝑥)] − 𝐸[𝑐1(𝑥)] = 𝑐1(𝑥) − 𝑐1(𝑥) = 0. (4) 
 
If the Martingale principle is a necessary condition for a genuine learning experience, 
this means that there is no genuine learning where an agent expects her credence to gradually 
increase over some finite interval of time. The intuitive reason for this is that the Martingale 
principle is an expert-deference principle. If you expect to be better-informed by the end of the 
interval, and you have a (non-zero) expectation of how your credence will change by the end of 
the interval, you're rationally required to adopt that change as soon as possible. As showcased 
by the diachronic Dutch book arguments given by Skyrms, delaying just exposes you to losses 
that could be avoided by adopting the better credences immediately. Or, again in (arguably) 
more purely epistemic terms: if you regard all of the changes over the interval as epistemic 
improvements, so that for each 𝑡′, 𝑡′′ ∈ (𝑡1 , 𝑡2) such that 𝑡
′′ > 𝑡′, your doxastic state at 𝑡′′ will 




no reason not to adopt it immediately - to the extent to which you can predict what it will be. 
And a credal change that consisted of specifying the Δ𝑐(𝑥) for the interval would allow you to 
predict what your final credence on the interval would be with certainty, assuming you know 
your updating procedure. It's, of course, a trivial consequence of this requirement that 
specifying a constant rate of change on some finite interval also cannot be regarded as a 
genuine learning experience. The Martingale principle requires instantaneous updating; as soon 
as you know what your final credences would be, those are the credences you should have.  
This supposed problem for CPK, though initially compelling, misses a crucial aspect of its 
formalism. Although I have shown, at some length, that the final resultant credence functions 
from updating by CPK will be equivalent to the results of a single, instantaneous (soft) Jeffrey 
shift on the refined partition, at no stage of the process is the agent who updates by CPK given 
information like this. An agent who updates by CPK is given instantaneous rates of change for 
some of her credences, and she learns the rate of change for the present moment as that 
moment occurs. CPK does not consist of being given a credal change to accomplish by the end 
of some interval but is governed by a differential equation. Formally, it’s equivalent to being 
given an infinite number of infinitesimal shifts that are each accomplished infinitely quickly. 
Conceptualizing CPK this way, we can show that CPK is consistent with an infinitesimal version 
of the Martingale principle and that, when this principle holds, each instantaneous CPK credal 
change will be regarded by the agent as a genuine learning experience.  
As in much of this dissertation, I will consider the two-directly-varied proposition case of 
CPK. The generalization to when the agent is being directly given information about more 
propositions is readily apparent. At the present moment, the agent has a credence function c 
defined over a σ -algebra of propositions, including A and B; the agent's algebra also contains a 
set of hypotheses about the state of the world, { ℎ𝑖}, which is a partition. In the near future, the 
agent is going to be given a decision problem, with a finite set of of possible actions {𝐴𝑗}. The 
utilities to the agent of the outcomes of her decision are completely determined by which 
action she performs in which state of the world. The expected utility of an act, given her 
present credences, is thus 𝐸𝑈(𝐴𝑗) = ∑ 𝑐(ℎ𝑖)𝑢(𝐴𝑗 ∧ ℎ𝑖)𝑖 . Additionally, the agent is about to 




credences simultaneously to two experimental results. Nature is going to specify two 






∈ ℝ and the agent is going to perform an 
infinitesimal CPK shift, using the stipulated rates of change to calculate her new credences after 




𝑐(𝑥) + [𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)]
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡










each have continuum-many possible values, we cannot require that the agent has credences 
defined over the possible values results of the two experiments. However, we can and do 







= 𝑠), which I will henceforth abbreviate as 𝜌(𝑟, 𝑠).  We can obtain the 




= 𝑟) = ∫ 𝜌(𝑟, 𝑠)
∞
−∞
𝑑𝑠. Similarly, 𝜌𝐵 (
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑠) = ∫ 𝜌(𝑟, 𝑠)
∞
−∞
𝑑𝑟. The distribution 𝜌 is 





 We'll notate the final credences resulting 
from the shift after learning experimental results 
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑟 and 
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑠 as 𝑐𝑟𝑠(𝑥) = 𝑐(𝑥) +
[𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)]𝑟 𝑑𝑡 + [𝑐(𝑥|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐵)]𝑠 𝑑𝑡. Now that we have this established, we 
can pose the question: suppose the agent were able to choose whether to make the decision 
immediately, or to first learn the experimental results and then make the decision. Which 
would give her higher expected utility? 
If we make a pair of assumptions analogous to the Martingale principle in this 
infinitesimal case, the answer is that we can prove that the agent will regard CPK as a genuine 
learning experience in much the same fashion as the Value of Information Theorems discussed 
above. The agent's expected utility for first obtaining the experimental results and then making 
the decision will always be greater-than-or-equal-to making the decision on the basis of her 
current credences. So, what are the two assumptions? That the expected value of the 
stipulated instantaneous rates of change are both 0: 












This pair of assumptions together comprise a weaker assumption than the standard 
Martingale principle. As shown above, the standard Martingale principle entails (4), which 
demands that the expected credal change in any proposition is 0. (5) and (6) only demand that 
agent's expectation of the (instantaneous) directly stipulated changes be 0. And the rationale 
for (5) and (6) is very similar to the standard Martingale principle as a kind of expert-deference 
principle requiring that an agent adopt credences she believes to be better than her own. We 
are assuming that, before learning the values of  
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡
  and 
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡
 from nature, the agent 
endorses her present credences - she does not see them as requiring updating. But if, prior to 
learning the experimental results, she had non-zero expectations for either 
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡




would not generally be the case. She would see her credences which depend on either 𝑐(𝐴) or 
𝑐(𝐵) as needing revision - and she would already have begun the process of moving her 
credences in the direction of expected adjustment, before even having the learning experience. 
Although (5) and (6) alone are weaker than the standard Martingale principle, we can show that 
(5), (6), and CPK together entail the analogous result to (3):  












We can rewrite the RHS of (8) as a sum of three integrals: 


















If the Martingale constraints (5) and (6) hold, (I2) and (I3) both vanish. I’ll work through why (I2) 
must be zero; the reasoning for (I3) is exactly parallel.  













Then from (5), we have (𝐼2) = 0. Because (𝐼3) = 0 for very similar reasons, we are left with  







Because 𝜌(𝑟, 𝑠) is normalized, we finally have: 
𝐸[𝑐𝑟𝑠(𝑥)] = 𝑐(𝑥), (9) 
which is the equivalent of (3). The expected value of an agent's posterior credence in any 
proposition 𝑥 is the same as her current credence in 𝑥. Just as (3) entails (4), (9) immediately 
entails: 
𝐸[Δ𝑐(𝑥)] = 𝐸[𝑐𝑟𝑠(𝑥) − 𝑐(𝑥)] = 0. (10) 
Now, the expected utility of making the decision based only on the agent's current credences, 
without learning the experimental results is: 
𝐸𝑈(𝐷) = max
𝑗
∑ 𝑐(ℎ𝑖)𝑢(𝐴𝑗 ∧ ℎ𝑖).
𝑖
 (11) 
The expected utility of making the decision after learning the results of the experiment is: 
𝐸𝑈(𝐸 ∧ 𝐷) = ∫ ∫ max
𝑗







Using (9), we can rewrite (11) as:  
𝐸𝑈(𝐷) = max
𝑗






By Tonelli's theorem,57 we can rewrite (13) as: 
 
57 Tonelli’s theorem gives a sufficient condition for when nested integrals can be interchanged, resulting in 
equivalent expressions. Because discrete sums are, of course, just a special case of integration, Tonelli’s theorem 
also gives a sufficient condition for interchanging sums embedded in integrals with integrals embedded in sums. In 
this application, Tonelli’s theorem states that if 𝑓𝑛(𝑥) is non-negative for all 𝑛 and all 𝑥,  then ∑ ∫ 𝑓𝑛(𝑥)𝑋 𝑑𝑥 =𝑛
∫ ∑ 𝑓𝑛(𝑥)𝑛 𝑑𝑥𝑋 . Because utility functions are defined only up to positive affine transformation, we are free to 
represent the agent’s utility function so that 𝑢(𝐴𝑗 ∧ ℎ𝑖) is always non-negative. 𝑐𝑟𝑠(ℎ𝑖), 𝜌𝐴(𝑟), and 𝜌𝐵(𝑠) are 
all required to be non-negative in virtue of being credences/credal distributions, so  
𝑐𝑟𝑠(ℎ𝑖)𝑢(𝐴𝑗 ∧ ℎ𝑖)𝜌𝐴(𝑟)𝜌𝐵(𝑠) is always non-negative. Thus, we can interchange the outer sum with both 












Now, we follow Skyrms (1990, p.98) in noting that, if we define 𝐵(𝑐) = max
𝑗
∑ 𝑐(ℎ𝑖)𝑖 𝑢(𝐴𝑗 ∧
ℎ𝑖), 𝐸𝑈(𝐷) = 𝐵[𝐸(𝑐𝑟𝑠)], while 𝐸𝑈(𝐸 ∧ 𝐷) = 𝐸[𝐵(𝑐𝑟𝑠)]. Because 𝐵 is convex, by Jensen's 
inequality, 𝐸𝑈(𝐸 ∧ 𝐷) ≥ 𝐸𝑈(𝐷).  
And, so we have a Value of Information Theorem for CPK. If the agent satisfies conditions (4) 
and (5), analogues of the Martingale principle, she will regard each infinitesimal CPK shift as 
leaving her better-informed in the sense of allowing her to make better practical decisions.  
 
3. CPK and the Propositionality of Evidence 
 
 Some epistemologists will be skeptical of the argument that I’ve just given on the 
following grounds: genuine learning experiences can only occur as a response to evidence, and 
some may find it difficult to believe that the kinds of rate of change signals from nature which I 
have been concerned with can count as evidence. The primary source of this skepticism, I 
believe, is the view that evidence must be propositional in order to fulfill the functional roles 
that we expect it to play. And from what I have said so far, it may be hard to conceive of the 
content of the rate of change signals as being propositional. In Knowledge and Its Limits 9.5: 
“Evidence as Propositional”, Timothy Williamson gives three major arguments for thinking that 
evidence must be propositional: 
1. Inference to the best explanation. We often use evidence to discriminate between 
hypotheses on the basis of which hypothesis best explains our evidence. But the relata 
in the explanation (why) relation, Williamson claims, must be propositions. Thus, 
evidence must be propositional.  
2. Probabilistic reasoning. A typical standard for probabilistic evidence is that E is evidence 
for 𝐻 iff 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸) > 𝑃(𝐻). But the probability function 𝑃 being referred to, whatever it 
is, is defined over propositions. So 𝐸 must be propositional.  
3. Restricting possibilities / ruling out hypotheses. Evidence sometimes reduces what 




evidence is inconsistent with the propositions to be rejected. This kind of inconsistency 
is a feature of propositions, and so evidence must be propositional to play this role.  
 
In this part of the chapter, I want to briefly discuss some worries I have about 
Williamson’s arguments in favor of this point. But before I turn to my thoughts about these 
arguments, I should point out that Williamson’s claim that evidence must be representable as 
propositional in form has, I think, already been refuted. In Probabilistic Knowledge, Sarah Moss 
compellingly argues that probabilistic contents (understood as sets of probability spaces) can 
themselves directly play many of the functional roles that epistemologists had previously 
thought to be reserved to propositional content. Among other things, probabilistic contents can 
be the contents of belief, can be the objects of assertion, can be evidence, and can be 
knowledge. If this is correct, and I think it is, then Williamson is wrong that evidence must be 
propositional, because there will be kinds of evidence on Moss’s view that have thoroughly 
probabilistic58 content, and so cannot be adequately represented by any proposition. However, 
this refutation of Williamson’s claim is in more or less the opposite spirit of the problems that I 
have with it. Moss’s framework establishes that the kinds of objects that can play the functional 
role of evidence can have a richer structure than merely propositional content. Probability 
spaces are ordered triples, where one of the elements of the triple is an algebra of propositions 
(p. 2, fn 2). As already mentioned in my footnote 57, probability spaces are strictly more 
expressive than merely propositional content – any content expressible as a proposition is 
representable as a nominally probabilistic content, but there are many thoroughly probabilistic 
contents that cannot be represented as propositions. My thought is that information with 
representational structures that do not remotely resemble propositions may nonetheless be 
evidence; I believe that this includes information with much less representational content and 
structure than the framework of propositions provides.  
 
58 See Probabilistic Knowledge, p. 14 for the introduction of this terminology. The point is that sets of probability 
spaces include propositional content as degenerate cases: there are sets of probability spaces that assign only 
extremal credences, and so function to pick out some possible worlds. Nominally probabilistic is the term that 




One general, overarching worry that I have is that Williamson’s arguments rely on a 
confusion between formal representations of structures of reasoning and the structures being 
so represented. I take the easiest demonstration of this problem to be the second argument 
concerning probabilistic reasoning.  Reasoning probabilistically, in the sense of treating 𝐸 as 
evidence for 𝐻 just in case 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸) > 𝑃(𝐻), does not require understanding what probabilities 
are. It merely requires having some representational states that function like probabilities, and 
of having systematic procedures for changing these representational states in the appropriate 
way when provided with evidence. Similarly, although the way we would formally model the 
probabilities that such a system employs uses variables that represent propositions, the system 
itself need not represent those propositions. The dispositions to use the probability-like 
representations to decide on certain actions and to update the representations when given 
certain kinds of stimuli will lead us (theorists about the system) to label the representations as 
encoding probabilities about certain propositions, but the system need have no idea what these 
propositions are. And, thus, there is no reason to think that propositions are what such a 
system is responding to as evidence.  
What does count as evidence for such a system? My suggestion is very simple: whatever 
functions as an input to a genuine learning experience.  I will not explore this at any great 
length here, but I think there are obviously related worries for the other two arguments. An 
agent that performs reasoning that conforms to the schema of inference to the best 
explanation need not model itself as doing so, and so need not see its evidence as giving a 
propositional why-justification; an agent that correctly decides that certain possibilities are no 
longer worth worrying about on the basis of some evidence need not understand that 
reduction in possibility-space as a feature of the inconsistency of propositions. Our 
understanding of propositional content is certainly a highly useful modelling tool in 
understanding why various kinds of reasoning processes are justifiable, but systems can act 
according to justified schemas without self-modeling the processes in this particular way. 
 The reader may wonder if this objection is actually fair to Williamson: isn’t his claim 
merely that evidence “consists of” propositions (p. 197), not that any particular system that is 




genuinely not sure. Throughout this section of the book, Williamson not only claims that 
evidence must be propositional, but that the propositions must be grasped by the agents in 
question to count as evidence for the agent. It is not entirely clear what “grasping” entails for 
Williamson, but it at least sometimes seems like it requires something like the ability to express 
the proposition in some language of thought. E.g., “one grasps the propositions that are one’s 
evidence; one can think them” (p.194). And again, on p. 195, Williamson ties the idea of 
grasping a proposition to the ability to use a proposition in an explanation, where context 
suggests that this is to be understood as something very much like a verbal/linguistic exercise: 
“One can use an hypothesis to explain why A only if one grasps the proposition that A.” In the 
previous paragraph, in discussing the sense in which a bloodied knife can be evidence in a court 
of law, he argues that it is the use the knife is put to in the theories of the case advanced by the 
prosecution and defense which make the knife a source of evidence, qua source of various 
evidential propositions: “…the bloodied knife provides evidence because the prosecution and 
defence offer competing hypotheses” (p. 195, my emphasis in bold, original emphasis in 
italics). In the context of discussing point 3 labelled above, Williamson argues: 
“In particular, our evidence sometimes rules out some hypotheses by being 
inconsistent with them. … But only propositions can be inconsistent in the 
relevant sense. If evidence e is inconsistent with an hypothesis h in that sense, it 
must be possible to deduce ~ℎ from e; the premises of a deduction are 
propositions. Moreover, the subject who deduces ~𝒉 from e must grasp e.” (p. 
196, my emphasis in bold) 
So, in context, Williamson is arguing that evidence must be propositional because only 
propositions can play the appropriate role in logical deduction that he believes evidence must 
play in order to rule out hypotheses. But he is also arguing that only grasped propositions can 
function as evidence, and one of his pieces of evidence for that claim, this last bolded claim, 
seems to me to very strongly suggest that he regards the ability to perform a certain kind of 
deduction, in some language with the structure of propositional logic, as a precondition for 




 Although the passages that I have cited so far seem to support the idea that “grasping” 
is, for Williamson, a very cognitively rich relation, often seeming to involve the ability to express 
the concepts involved in the potentially grasped proposition, there is also some evidence 
against this interpretation. In discussing whether certain very simple creatures, which may lack 
the concept of appearance can grasp the proposition that something appears in a certain way, 
he suggests a dispositional account of grasping that seems significantly less demanding than the 
kind of grasp suggested by the earlier passages:  
“Although one’s grasp of the property of appearance may be inarticulate, one 
must have some inkling of the distinction between appearance and reality. For 
instance, one should be willing in appropriate circumstances to give up the belief 
that things were that way while retaining the belief that they appeared to be 
that way. In the absence of such dispositions, it is implausible to attribute the 
qualified belief that thing appear to be that way rather than the unqualified 
belief that they are that way.” (p. 199) 
And so the net effect is that I am quite unsure what exactly Williamson intends grasping 
to amount to, and hence fairly dubious about whether he thinks that agents must be 
capable of representing the content of propositions that constitute their evidence in 
order to count as possessing that evidence.  
 Still, whether it’s Williamson’s view or not, the reader might press: even if my objection 
is correct, don’t these three arguments give us some reason to think that if external theorists 
(like us) look at something that can play an evidential role in some genuine learning process, we 
should be able to represent it as having propositional content? I think this is a very good 
question (and might even be Williamson’s original point!), but the best answer I have is that I 
am deeply unsure. My uncertainty stems from the fact that I am still worried that the model of 
evidence underwriting the three arguments is based in highly sophisticated traditions of 
evidence that involve a great deal of meta-analysis. The discussion revolves around questions 
like “what kinds of things can answer why-questions?” and “what are the sorts of mental 
objects that might be able to eliminate hypotheses?” These kinds of questions are, of course, 




disciplines and in socially-structured, norm-governed decision making (e.g., law). But I think it’s 
crucial to notice that an important aspect of these disciplines is that debates about the nature 
and standards of evidence are part of the ordinary practice of these disciplines. And so my 
worry is that when we think about what features evidence must have to fulfill the functional 
role that it plays in this kind of discipline, we are not merely investigating what representational 
features are necessary for something to serve as evidence – we are imposing a much stricter 
requirement. We are actually asking what representational features are necessary for the kinds 
of mental objects that can be analyzed as evidence in these kinds of systems. We are asking 
what features are necessary to argue that some putative evidence is evidence, to explain why 
some evidence generates the support that it does, etc.; these are much more demanding tasks 
than merely playing the functional roles of leading to better-informed, more accurate beliefs 
and decisions (or whatever basic conception of evidence the reader may wish to substitute). 
And I think this tendency to think about this kind of highly intellectualized use of evidence, 
where that includes meta-analysis of the evidence, in certain kinds of social epistemic systems 
as the model of evidence’s basic functional features explains the modelling/modelled confusion 
that I have attempted to identify in the past several paragraphs.  
 
4. Superconditioning on the (Propositional) Content of Experience  
 
 Although I am skeptical of the source of our intuitions that evidence should be 
representable as propositional by theorists external to the agent using said evidence, I do not 
have any compelling arguments against this claim. The claim that I do strongly disagree with, 
whether it is actually Williamson’s or not, is that possession of evidence requires the ability by 
the agent to represent this propositional content, and to make use of it in exercises like logical 
deduction, answering why-questions, or verbally identifying the elements of the space on which 
their probabilities are defined. For all that I have said in this section so far, it may well be that 
any putative evidence must be representable by external theorists in such a way that it is, e.g., 
possible to use it answer why-questions, etc. So, now I turn to the question of what the 





 The first place to look is, of course, at what Richard Jeffrey had to say about the 
propositional contents of the kinds of evidence at play in his learning experiences. In The Logic 
of Decision, Jeffrey explains that the reason to model the agent as directly acquiring some new 
degrees of belief, is not that it is in principle impossible to regard the agent’s sensory 
experiences as containing some kind of propositional content – it’s that there’s no reason to 
think that the agent knows what this content is, and thus that’s it’s implausible to regard the 
agent as updating on priors over it.  
“In all such cases there is some definite quality of his sensuous experience which 
leads the agent to have various degrees of belief in the various relevant 
propositions; but there is no reason to suppose that the language he speaks 
provides the means for him to describe that experience in the relevant respects. 
… and even if [the experience is describable in his language], there is every 
reason to suppose that the agent is quite unaware of what that pattern is and is 
quite incapable of uttering or identifying a correct description of it.” (p. 166) 
And so Jeffrey thinks that understanding such a learning process through the lens of Jeffrey 
updating is more useful as a norm that is intended to consciously guide an agent’s process of 
belief revision: “To serve its normative function, the theory of decision must be used by the 
agent, who therefore must be able to formulate and understand the relevant propositions” 
(167). Asking an agent to perform a Jeffrey shift is, the thought goes, a much more plausible 
task than asking an agent to conditionalize on some proposition that we should very much 
doubt the agent as being able to even identify.  
 Of course, whatever it makes sense to require of the agent, there is a separate question 
about what kinds of modelling are accessible to external theorists: for any learning experience 
representable as a Jeffrey shift, can a theorist choose to think of the agent’s learning process as 
if it were some kind of Bayesian conditionalization on some kind of propositional content? The 
answer to this question is famously yes – as long as the theorists are comfortable with 
modelling the conditionalization as taking place on a greatly expanded algebra that they may 
have no reason to believe that the agent has priors over. This is Diaconis and Zabell’s proof of 




824; Jeffrey, Probability and the Art of Judgment pp. 128-9). (Somewhat) informally, a 
probability function 𝑄 is obtainable by superconditioning from probability function 𝑃 whenever 
you can: 
1. “Translate” 𝑃 into a probability function 𝑀 defined on a larger 𝜎 algebra. 
2. Update 𝑀 on some element of the larger algebra by Bayesian conditionalization to 
obtain probability function 𝑁. 
3. 𝑁 on the larger algebra corresponds to 𝑄 on the algebra 𝑃 was defined on.  
 
Diaconis and Zabell proved that 𝑄 is obtainable by superconditioning from 𝑃 iff there exists 
some 𝑏 ≥ 1 such that 
𝑄(𝜔)
𝑃(𝜔)
≤ 𝑏, for all elements 𝜔 of the algebra Ω that 𝑄 and 𝑃 are defined on 
(p. 824). In particular, this shows that any Jeffrey shift defined over finitely many propositions 
can be obtainable by superconditioning.  
One way of thinking about this result is that it gives us a proof that any learning process 
that is representable as a Jeffrey shift (over finitely many propositions) is also representable as 
a learning experience that consists of learning some propositional content – although, from 
what we have said, it is not at all clear why we should be convinced that the proposition that 
we use to perform the update on the larger algebra correlates in any way with our intuitions 
about what the content of the agent’s learning experience plausibly might be. Nonetheless, this 
kind of result at least lends some credibility to the idea that Jeffrey shifts can be thought of as 
involving propositional evidence. Of course, as the previous quotes from Jeffrey suggest, the 
case is also bolstered by the fact that we have an intuitive grasp of what the representational 
content of an agent’s learning experience might be in the cases of sensory learning that he is 
concerned with. These are propositions that represent the agent as having experienced certain 
visual perceptions, having heard sounds with certain characteristics, etc. So, next I will show 
that the Diaconis and Zabell superconditioning result can be shown to apply to CPK on any finite 
algebra; afterwards, I will try to give an intuitive sketch of how we might relate the intuitive 
propositional content of sensory experiences to the rate-of-change signals that CPK updates on.  
First, the proof: let 𝑃 be an agent’s coherent credence function prior to some CPK 




and updating by CPK preserves coherence, 𝑄 must also be a probability function. Assume 
further that 𝑃 is defined over some finite algebra 𝒜. The existence of an upper bound is then 
trivial: consider the ratio 
𝑄(𝜔)
𝑃(𝜔)
 for all 𝜔 ∈ 𝒜. Because there are finitely many such ratios, there 
will be a greatest. Let 𝑏 = max
𝑄(𝜔)
𝑃(𝜔)
; by definition, 
𝑄(𝜔)
𝑃(𝜔)
≤ 𝑏 for all 𝜔 ∈ 𝒜. We are also 







≤ 𝑏, so 𝑏 ≥ 1.  The conditions of Diaconis and Zabell’s proof are met, and thus 𝑄 can 
be obtained from 𝑃 by superconditioning. 
 What might the propositional content of a CPK learning experience consist in, and how 
should we think of this content as related to the rate-of-change signals that the agent is 
updating on? Consider an agent who is interested in whether a particular piece of cloth is blue 
or not. The agent is getting a continuous stream of sensory representations of the cloth, which 
we can think of as continuum-many visual representations, one for each moment in some 
interval of time. We might also idealize the agent as having, at each moment in time, a certain 
kind of conditional visual expectation that somehow characterizes the kind of experience they 
would expect to have if the cloth is blue. There are many other kinds of visual experience that 
the agent would regard as not matching this expectation: these are experiences that are 
different enough from what the agent expects to see if the cloth were blue, and similar enough 
to what the agent might expect see if the cloth were some color other than blue, that the agent 
will regard these images as evidence against the cloth being blue. How strong is each of these 
pieces of evidence? Perhaps we can use some measure of similarity to the blue conditional 
visual expectation: when the observed images are very good matches for typical blue 
experiences, the agent is more confident that the cloth is blue. If the agent is just ambivalent 
between classing the image as a match with the blue expectation vs. a match with what they 
would expect to see if the cloth weren’t blue, perhaps this would correlate to a Jeffrey 
experience of assigning credence 0.5 to both blue and not blue. 
Of course, rather than processing each image fully and comparing it separately against 
the visual expectation, we can imagine a system that is primarily interested in easily observable 




delivers a judgment as to whether the just received image is more or less similar to the blue 
expectation than the agent’s current model of the cloth, and then estimates the magnitude of 
this change in similarity. Thus, rather than directly tracking the similarity of each new image to 
the blue expectation and performing the appropriate Jeffrey shift, the agent could track 
whether the similarity of images to blue is increasing or decreasing, and how quickly this 
change in similarity is occurring. And if the agent chooses to process this visual information as 
increasing/decreasing similarity to the blue expectation, the natural way to understand how 
this should affect their credences is as a rate that their credence that the cloth is blue is 
changing at with respect to time; this way of processing the information naturally lends itself to 
thinking about the temporal derivative of their confidence that the cloth is blue.  




= 𝑥, we could instead choose to think of the agent as instead learning some 
propositional content derived from the image that she is processing. But, of course, there is 
really no reason to think that the agent has access to that content in all its overabundant 
richness of detail – just as Jeffrey argued about the cases of sensory experiences that he 
discussed. And, although we might be able to formally model the agent as updating as if they 
were conditionalizing the content of this experience on some algebra, it will not – in general – 
be an algebra that we have any reason to believe they have credences defined over.  
 The preceding sketch of how the propositional contents of visual perception might 
plausibly generate the kinds of credal derivatives with which CPK is concerned is, 
unapologetically, extremely speculative. My only real goal in providing it is to help the reader 
imagine that some such process might be possible. However, there is some support for the 
basic ideas underwriting the suggestion that can be found in the psychology and neurobiology 
literature. To begin with, there is a fairly long tradition of arguing that the raw signals from 
sensory organs are to be regarded as tests of predictions that the agent makes prior to 
observation, with the processed contents that are visually presented to the agent containing 




generated by some kind of inference from the raw data that makes use of the agent’s prior 
beliefs. For instance, in “Perceptions as Hypotheses”, the psychologist R.L. Gregory writes:59 
 “Are perceptions like hypotheses of science? … It may be said that 
hypotheses structure our accepted reality. More specifically, it may be said that 
hypotheses allow limited data to be used with remarkable effect, by allowing 
interpolations through data-gaps, and extrapolations to be made to new 
situations for which data are not available. These include the future. … I shall 
hold that all these statements are true, and that they apply to perception. In 
addition, both the hypotheses of science and the perceptual processes of the 
nervous system allow recognition of familiar situations or objects from strictly 
inadequate clues, as signaled by the transducer-instruments of science and the 
transducer-senses of organisms. … To suggest that perceptions are like 
hypotheses is to suppose that the instruments and the procedures of science 
parallel essential characteristics of the sense organs and their neural channels, 
regarded as transducers transmitting coded data; and the data-handling 
procedures of science may be essentially the same as the cognitive procedures 
carried out by perceptual neural processes of the brain” (pp. 181-2) 
The idea that these predictions of what will be observed take a specifically probabilistic 
form, and that systems are most interested in tracking deviations from these 
predictions, are important aspects of the paradigm of predictive coding in both 
psychology and neuroscience. In “Predictive Coding in the Visual Cortex: a Functional 
Interpretation of Some Extra-Classical Receptive-Field Effects”, Rao and Ballard argue 
that there are visual effects in processed images that are well-explained as resulting 
from hierarchical processing of images involving detection of discrepancies (“errors”) 
between predictions by higher levels of the activity of lower levels and the actual neural 
 
59 Interestingly, in the same article, Gregory also expresses skepticism about whether the representational content 
of “perceptual hypotheses” must be propositional: “The example of a graph illustrates that hypotheses – for the 
accepted curve or function may be a predictive hypothesis – can be non-propositional. Perhaps hypotheses are 
generally thought of as sets of propositions, but there seems no reason to restrict hypotheses to propositions as 
expressed in language. … There seems no reason to hold that ‘perceptual hypotheses’ require a propositional brain 




activity at lower levels of the hierarchy. In the abstract for “Bayesian Surprise Attracts 
Human Attention,” Itti and Baldi write: 
“We propose a formal Bayesian definition of surprise to capture subjective 
aspects of sensory information. Surprise measures how data affects an observer, 
in terms of differences between posterior and prior beliefs about the world. Only 
data observations which substantially affect the observer’s beliefs yield surprise, 
irrespectively of how rare or informative in Shannon’s sense these observations 
are. … Bayesian surprise is a strong attractor of human attention, with 72% of all 
gaze shifts directed towards locations more surprising than average, a figure 
rising to 84% when focusing the analysis onto regions simultaneously selected by 
all observers. The proposed theory of surprise is applicable across different 
spatio-temporal scales, modalities, and levels of abstraction.” 
I am not claiming that the details of any of the accounts that I am citing go any significant way 
towards confirming that my just-so story about how the contents of perception might generate 
signals encoding credal derivatives is psychologically realistic; I merely hope the reader is 
convinced that such a connection is somewhat plausible.  
 Further, we have the result that the final product of updating by CPK is always some 
Jeffrey shift on the refined partition – that is, if 𝐴 and 𝐵 are the propositions that the agent 
receives direct signals about, then the entire outcome of the learning experience will always be 
representable as some Jeffrey shift on the partition {𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, 𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵, ¬𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, ¬𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵}. But, of 
course, that means we can also represent the outcome of the entire experience as the result of 
superconditioning. What might the content of such a proposition be? Well, again, we have no 
guarantee from the formalism that the proposition that plays the role in superconditioning will 
be related in any obvious way to our intuitive understanding of the propositional content of the 
learning experience. But if our goal is just to sketch what kind of content we might find it 
plausible to play such a role, there is certainly an obvious candidate: the conjunction of the 
content of all of the sensory impressions that the agent received over the interval. Again, this 
will be a conjunction with continuum-many terms, and so there is absolutely no reason to 




with it! But if our goal is just to satisfy epistemologists that demand that evidence must be in-
principle representable as some kind of proposition, this intractability should be of no special 
concern.  
 
5. Discretized-Signal CPK: A Superconditioning Result 
 
One very natural thought is that we should be able to represent the result of a CPK shift 
as obtainable by superconditioning on the partition whose elements are the propositions 







content of these propositions are 
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑟 and 
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑠. Unfortunately, I’m not quite sure 
how to make this idea work, because we’ve been assuming that 𝑟, 𝑠 ∈ ℝ and that the agent has 
a continuous probability distribution 𝜌(𝑟, 𝑠) over the values these signals might take. The 
agent’s credence in any specific ordered pair of precise values 𝑐(𝑟, 𝑠) should thus presumably 
be zero, and so it is impossible to represent the agent as updating on the elements of this 
partition via standard Bayesian conditionalization. However, if we constrain the possible values 
of (𝑟, 𝑠) to a finite grid so that we allow some finite number of signals (𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗), we can 
approximate any single infinitesimal CPK shift by conditionalization on the elements of this 
discretized grid, to any desired level of accuracy.60 For finite, cognitively limited agents such as 
ourselves, we will only be capable of representing finitely many different signals anyway, and so 
the choice of step size between signals could be chosen to match the cognitive capabilities of 
the system in question. There may similarly be cognitive limitations on the maximum and 
minimum values of signals representable by the system (perhaps generated by facts about the 
cognitive architecture, facts about the physical implementation of the system, or both). Also, as 
we will see shortly, if we assume that the system is approximating the CPK update on some 
small finite timescale, rather than in infinitesimal time, this will also naturally place constraints 
on the maximum and minimum value of the signals that the system will regard as consistent 
 
60 Throughout the entirety of this section, I will be discussing a CPK shift with respect to two propositions, but the 




with maintaining coherence – and thus of needing to be entertained as signals that might be 
part of a genuine learning experience.  
 First, we assume that the algebra 𝒜 that the agent’s prior credence function, 𝑐, is 
defined over has some number of finite atoms. We interpret the atoms as truth assignments to 
some finite number 𝑛 of propositions 𝑃𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}. The atoms are propositions of the form 
𝑋1 ∧ … ∧ 𝑋𝑛, where each of the 𝑋𝑖 is what is often termed a literal: each 𝑋𝑖 consists of either 𝑃𝑖  
or its negation, ¬ 𝑃𝑖. There are 2
𝑛 such atoms, corresponding to the 2𝑛 possible truth 
assignments to the 𝑃𝑖. The algebra is closed under negation and disjunction. As in earlier in the 
chapter, we assume that the agent has some prior distribution 𝜌(𝑟, 𝑠) over the values that 
might be specified in an infinitesimal CPK shift with respect to two propositions in this algebra, 
𝐴 and 𝐵. Now, consider the discretization of 𝜌(𝑟, 𝑠) onto a grid with 𝑙 × 𝑚 elements, where 𝑙 
represents the number of allowed signals for r and and 𝑚 is the number of allowed signals for s, 
𝑙, 𝑚 ∈ ℕ. Let 𝑐(𝑟𝑖) be some suitable discretization of 𝜌𝐴(𝑟), for 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑙}, and 𝑐(𝑠𝑗) be some 
suitable discretization of 𝜌𝐵(𝑠), for 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑚}. We require that 𝑐(𝑟𝑖) and 𝑐(𝑠𝑗) satisfy 
discrete analogues of the Martingale constraints (5) and (6): 
𝐸𝑐(𝑟𝑖)(𝑟) = ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑐(𝑟𝑖)
𝑙
𝑖=1
= 0 (15) 
𝐸𝑐(𝑠𝑗)(𝑠) = ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑐(𝑠𝑗)
𝑚
𝑗=1
= 0 (16) 
The pseudo-credences 𝑐(𝑟𝑖) and 𝑐(𝑠𝑗) must satisfy these constraints for the same reason that 
(5) and (6) must hold: if the agent had non-zero expectations for the values of the signals that 
she is about to receive in the learning experience, an agent with those credences would regard 
the agent’s current credence function61 as already in need of revision before the learning 
experience occurs. We also require that 𝑐(𝑟𝑖) and 𝑐(𝑠𝑗) are normalized: 
∑ 𝑐(𝑟𝑖) =
𝑙
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑐(𝑟𝑖) = 1
𝑚
𝑗=1 , which guarantees that the entire discretized distribution 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) is 
normalized. In order to ensure that we can update on any allowed combination of signals, we 
 




also demand that 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) is nowhere zero. See the table below for an example of 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) for 
the very course discretization 𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗 ∈ {−1,0,1}. 
 
 𝑟 = −1 𝑟 = 0 𝑟 = 1 
𝑠 = −1 𝑥𝑦 𝑧𝑦 𝑥𝑦 
𝑠 = 0 𝑥𝑤 𝑧𝑤 𝑥𝑤 
𝑠 = 1 𝑥𝑦 𝑧𝑦 𝑥𝑦 
Table III.5: A toy, extremely coarse, discretized prior over CPK signal inputs. This example assumes r and s are independent.  
2𝑥 + 𝑧 = 2𝑦 + 𝑤 = 1. The very strong symmetry of this table arises from the assumption that 
𝑐(𝑟𝑖) and 𝑐(𝑠𝑗) are independent, the Martingale constraints – (15) and (16), and the very small 
number of elements of the grid. This symmetry will not necessarily be a feature of 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) that 
don’t treat r and s as independent, or that are defined over more elements.  
 Now, we construct a refinement, 𝒜#, of the algebra 𝒜 and a new credence function 𝑐# 
defined on 𝒜# with the following properties: 
1. 𝑐#(𝑥) = 𝑐(𝑥), for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝒜. 
2. 𝑐#(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) = 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗). 
3. 𝑐#(𝑥|𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) = 𝑐𝑓(𝑥), for 𝑥 ∈ 𝒜, and where 𝑐𝑓 is the credence function that results from 
an infinitesimal CPK shift with respect to 𝐴 and 𝐵, with 
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑟𝑖 and 
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑠𝑗 . 
First, the algebra: we subdivide the atoms of 𝒜 to make the atoms of 𝒜#. Let 𝑍 be an arbitrary 
atom of 𝒜; then, the atoms of 𝒜# include 𝑍 ∧ 𝑟 = 𝑟𝑖 ∧ 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑗, for 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑙} and 𝑗 ∈
{1, … , 𝑚}. Where 𝒜 has 2𝑛 atoms, 𝒜# has 2𝑛 × 𝑙 × 𝑚. Close 𝒜# under negation and 
disjunction. Then, we identify any proposition 𝑥 ∈ 𝒜 with ⋁ (𝑥 ∧ 𝑟 = 𝑟𝑖 ∧ 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑗𝑖,𝑗 ) ∈ 𝒜
#. 
 We construct 𝑐# as follows: for any 𝑥 ∈ 𝒜,  








We define:  
𝑐#(𝑥) = 𝑐# (⋁ 𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑗
𝑖,𝑗
) 
= ∑ 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) ⋅ ([𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)]𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑡 + [𝑐(𝑥|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐵)]𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡 + 𝑐(𝑥))
𝑖,𝑗
 (18) 
Because of the Martingale constraints (15) and (16), both of the 𝑑𝑡 terms vanish: 
∑ 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) ⋅
𝑖,𝑗
[𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)]𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑡 = [𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)]𝑑𝑡 ∑ 𝑟𝑖 ∑ 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗)
𝑗𝑖
 
∑ 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗)𝑗 = 𝑐(𝑟𝑖), so: 
∑ 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) ⋅
𝑖,𝑗




∑ 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) ⋅
𝑖,𝑗
[𝑐(𝑥|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐵)]𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡 = 0 
in much the same way. So, we’re left with: 
𝑐#(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) ⋅ 𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑐(𝑥)
𝑖,𝑗
 (19) 
because 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) is normalized, by construction.  
Property 1 holds.  
  
We define: 
𝑐#(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) = 𝑐
#(Ω𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑗), (20) 
where Ω ∈ 𝒜 is some tautology. Assuming c is coherent,  
 
𝑐(Ω|𝐴) = 𝑐(Ω|¬𝐴) = 𝑐(Ω|𝐵) = 𝑐(Ω|¬𝐵) = 𝑐(Ω) = 1. (21) 
Thus,  
 










From (17), (22), and (23), we have: 
 
𝑐#(𝑥|𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) = [𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)]𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑡 + [𝑐(𝑥|𝐵) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐵)]𝑠𝑗𝑑𝑡 + 𝑐(𝑥), (24) 
which is the 𝑐𝑓(𝑥) that results from an infinitesimal CPK shift with 
𝜕𝑐(𝐴)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑟𝑖 and 
𝜕𝑐(𝐵)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑠𝑗 . 
 Property 3 holds.  
We can also define 𝑐#(𝑟𝑖) and 𝑐
#(𝑠𝑗) in the obvious ways, and check that 𝑐
#(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑐(𝑟𝑖) and 








From (22),  
𝑐#(𝑟𝑖) = ∑ 𝑐(𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑗)
𝑗
= 𝑐(𝑟𝑖), (26) 
because 𝑐(𝑠𝑗) is normalized. 𝑐
#(𝑠𝑗) is defined in the parallel way, and the reader is invited to 
check for themselves that 𝑐#(𝑠𝑗) = 𝑐(𝑠𝑗). 
 So, we’ve shown that 𝑐# satisfies the three properties outlined above. These together 
entail that 𝑐𝑓 is obtainable from 𝑐
# by ordinary Bayesian conditionalization on the proposition 
(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗). Now, if all we care about is a constructive superconditioning result for CPK – viz., giving 
a recipe for some way to embed 𝑐 in a larger algebra and obtain 𝑐𝑓 by Bayesian 
conditionalization on some element of the larger algebra, this result is exact. For any 
infinitesimal CPK shift, we can retroactively choose a grid that happens to include the exact 
(𝑟, 𝑠) that were specified, cook up any arbitrary 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) that is normalized and satisfies the 
Martingale constraints, and construct a 𝑐# such that 𝑐𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑐
#(𝑥|𝑟, 𝑠).62 But I think this result 
is actually more interesting than that.  
 
 




6. Superconditioning on (𝒓, 𝒔): CPK’s Evidential Commitments  
 
First of all, the elements of 𝒜# that we are updating on are not just arbitrary: they are, 
intuitively, propositions that actually pick out different CPK experiences that the agent might 
undergo. Second, the 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) are also not arbitrary. Although the toy example 3 × 3 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) 
matrix that I cooked up in Table III.1 is obviously farcical as a genuine approximation of the 
agent’s priors over CPK inputs they might receive, much more fine-grained discretizations can 
claim to be approximations of the agent’s priors over possible CPK inputs with a straight face. 
Neither the choices of how finely to discretize (viz., the step value 𝑟𝑖+1 − 𝑟𝑖) nor the choice of 
maximum and minimum values for the signals need be arbitrary. The step value might be 
chosen according to either limits in the discriminatory power of the system (e.g., the system is 
only capable of distinguishing some physical signal that plays the r-role up to some level of 
precision), informed by some memory/storage limits (e.g., the system only has the resources to 
store a certain number of values for this task), etc.  
More interestingly, the maximum and minimum allowed values for the 𝑟𝑖 and the 𝑠𝑗 can 
be given epistemic significance, under the assumption that this updating procedure is being 
performed by a real system that takes finite time to perform calculations. Such a system will 
obviously not be able to perform infinitesimally fast CPK shifts, but will have to approximate 
CPK updating in finite chunks of time. In equation (17), etc., we can replace 𝑑𝑡 with Δ𝑡, and 
think of the shift specified that way as a time step in a linear approximation of some CPK 
process. The appropriate value of Δ𝑡 will depend on some facts about the computational speed 
of the system in question, which will determine the rate at which the system can effectively 
execute calculations in the CPK approximation. Unlike in the infinitesimal case, where any 
assignments of 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 could be epistemically reasonable inputs, in the finite time 
approximation, there are values of  𝑟𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 that amount to instructions to violate coherence: 
they will result in credences above 1 or below 0. And so in the finite time approximation, we 





The result of updating 𝑐(𝐴) according to a finite time CPK approximation that specifies 







= 𝑟Δ𝑡 + 𝑐(𝐴) (27) 
We can get an upper bound on 𝑟 by considering the inequality 𝑐#(𝐴|𝑟) ≤ 1, and a lower 








And thus any signals outside of this range can be rejected by the agent as not epistemically 
reasonable. What should an agent do if they receive such a signal? Given that this is a linear 
approximation of a temporally continuous process where arbitrarily large signals could make 
sense, it might make sense to “assimilate” all signals above the upper bound to the highest 𝑟𝑖 
that the agent has in their discretized model; similarly, perhaps it makes sense to collapse all 
signals less than the lower bound to the smallest modelled input. I haven’t thought very 
thoroughly about the potential costs and benefits of this proposal – it is merely a tentative 
suggestion. But the details of how to implement this kind of restriction to epistemically 
reasonable signals in the approximation case is not really my interest here. The point is just that 
there are non-arbitrary reasons to establish certain cutoffs for the allowed values of the signal 
inputs. Just as in the choice of step value between the 𝑟𝑖, there may also be reasons for 
narrower constraints (viz., lower upper bound or higher lower bound) that emerge from various 
physical or computational limits of the system.  
 If we have a fine-grained enough 𝑐(𝑟𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) to take it seriously either as (1) a decent 
approximation to some agent’s continuous prior over (𝑟, 𝑠), or (2) as the actual prior of some 
realistically constrained system, we can use this conditionalization result as a lens into how CPK 
treats 𝑟 and 𝑠 as evidence. We can glean this insight by looking at some conditional 












Now, a bit of useful terminology: by 𝑟+, I mean any positive-valued 𝑟𝑖; by 𝑟−, I mean any 













< 1, and 𝑐#(𝑟+) = 𝑐(𝑟+), from equation (25). The most obvious 
interpretation of (30) is that 𝑐# thinks it is more likely to receive a positive 𝑟-signal under the 
assumption that 𝐴 is true than the current probability it assigns to a positive 𝑟-signal. As is well-
known, 𝐸 is incremental evidence for some hypothesis h iff 𝑐(𝐸|ℎ) > 𝑐(𝐸). 63 So, we can see 
that 𝑐# regards any positive value of the 𝑟-signal as incremental evidence for 𝐴 – upon receipt 
of any positive 𝑟-signal, 𝑐# regards its current credence in 𝐴 as too low.64 In (29), holding fixed 
the prior probability of the signal 𝑐(𝑟+), 𝑐
#(𝑟+|𝐴) increases as 𝑟+ increases; assuming 𝐴 
increases its confidence in larger signals more than it increases its confidence in smaller positive 
signals. Put another way, if 𝑐# initially assigns the same prior to two positive signals, assuming 𝐴 
is true leads it to think that the larger signal is more likely than the smaller one.  
 We can see parallel facts about 𝑟−: 𝑟− is incremental evidence against 𝐴, and assuming 
that 𝐴 is true decreases 𝑐#’s confidence in more negative signals more than in less negative 
signals. Perhaps somewhat more surprisingly, (29) also entails that   
𝑐#(𝑟0|𝐴) = 𝑐
#(𝑟0). (32) 
The reader might find this surprising, because you might have expected some of 𝑐#′𝑠 increased 
confidence in various positive 𝑟-signals under the assumption that 𝐴 is true to come “at the 
expense” of 𝑐#′𝑠 credence that it will receive a null signal; this shows that all of the extra 
weight on positive 𝑟-signals must be taken from negative 𝑟-signals. But there is an intuitive 
gloss: (32) also means that 𝑟0 cannot be incremental evidence for 𝐴, and this is clearly as it 
should be.  
 
63 I think this standard of incremental evidence is usually presented the other way around: 𝑐(ℎ|𝐸) > 𝑐(ℎ). But it is 
a consequence of Bayes’ Theorem that these two formulations are equivalent. The (incremental) evidence-for 
relation is symmetric: 𝐴 is evidence for 𝐵 iff 𝐵 is evidence for 𝐴. 




 I won’t rehearse it here, but 𝑐#(𝑠𝑗|𝐵) encodes a parallel evidential relationship between 
the 𝑠𝑗 and 𝐵. Another absolutely crucial thing to notice about the 𝑐
#(𝑟𝑖|𝐴) and 𝑐
#(𝑠𝑗|𝐵) is that 
they depend on 𝑐(𝑟𝑖) and 𝑐(𝑠𝑗), respectively. In a way, this is not very surprising – in order to 
believe that the signal 𝑟𝑖, generated by some process that is sensitive to the truth of 𝐴 is 
advising the agent about how they should be changing their current credence in 𝐴, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the process generating this signal must also be in some way 
sensitive to what the agent’s current credence is. It would, after all, be deeply mysterious how 
a process could advise the agent about how rapidly to increase their credence in 𝐴 without any 
access to what the agent’s current credence in 𝐴 is. However, this does mean that only certain 
kinds of very special sources of information are going to be remotely plausible candidates for 
generating CPK signals. The most realistic kind of case, I think, is a system internal to the agent 
that is processing some kind of stream of evidence with reference to predictions about said 
evidence encoded by the agent’s current mental state. The paradigm example of this kind of 
process is informational processing of sensory evidence, as discussed toward the end of the 
previous section. Although I think this kind of sensory processing is the most natural fit, there is 
no reason that CPK could not also be useful in modelling various kinds of purely internal 
deliberation, evaluation, or re-evaluation. Plausible sources of CPK signals are not confined to 
systems internal to some agent in principle; it’s merely that for a process external to the agent 
to plausibly provide useful CPK signals, it would need a great deal of informational access to the 
agent’s mental states. At present and in the near future, this may be especially plausible in 
cases involving computer systems that are in constant communication. But the barriers to 
imagining this kind of continuous monitoring of mental states for biological agents like humans 
is really a matter of the present condition of technology, not some kind of fundamental 
distinction between biological systems and computers.  
For arbitrary 𝑥 ∈ 𝒜, we also find the results for 𝑐#(𝑥|𝑟𝑖) and 𝑐
#(𝑥|𝑠𝑗) that we should 
expect:  
𝑐#(𝑥|𝑟𝑖) = [𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)]𝑟𝑖Δ𝑡 + 𝑐(𝑥) (33) 




Whether some signal 𝑟𝑖 is incremental evidence for/against an arbitrary proposition 𝑥 ∈ 𝒜 
depends both on whether the signal is positive or negative and on whether 𝐴 is evidence for 𝑥 
or not. If 𝑥 and 𝐴 are independent (according to 𝑐 and, hence, 𝑐#), then the probative value65 of 
𝐴 for 𝑥, [𝑐(𝑥|𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑥|¬𝐴)] is zero, and so no 𝑟𝑖-signal of any valence will be evidence for or 
against 𝑥. If 𝐴 is evidence for 𝑥, then positive 𝑟𝑖 signals are incremental evidence for 𝑥, negative 
signals are evidence against 𝑥, and the zero-valued, 𝑟0, signal has no effect on 𝑐
#’s confidence 
in 𝑥. Exactly the opposite is true if 𝐴 is evidence against 𝑥: 𝑟+ signals are evidence against 𝑥, 𝑟0 
has no effect, and the 𝑟− are evidence for 𝑥. In all cases, the magnitude of the change is 
proportional to the product of the probative value and the strength of the signal. As usual, the 
story about whether 𝑠𝑗 is evidence for or against 𝑥 is exactly the same, except that the main 
character is the probative value of 𝐵 for 𝑥.  
 Again, this is not at all surprising – this evidential dependence is exactly what CPK was 
designed to exhibit. An agent that regards the 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 as inputs in a CPK-learning experience 
thinks of the 𝑟𝑖 as evidence that their confidence in 𝐴 should change, without changing the 
evidential relations between 𝐴 and any of the other propositions in 𝒜.66 In exactly the same 
way, the agent interprets the 𝑠𝑗 as signals that are directly about 𝐵, but don’t effect the extent 
to which 𝐵 is probative evidence for any other propositions.  
 And so, this representation result gives us an alternative way of characterizing a CPK 
learning experience. An agent who updates by CPK can also be thought of as if they were 
conditionalizing on the proposition that picks out which signals they receive, given a prior that 
represents the signals as having certain evidential connections to the propositions in 𝒜 that the 
agent is interested in. We can think of the 𝑐#(𝐴𝑟𝑖) and 𝑐
#(𝐴𝑠𝑗) as encoding the beliefs that 
make it reasonable for the agent to treat the 𝑟𝑖 as specified rates of change for 𝑐(𝐴) and the 𝑠𝑗 
as specified rates of change for 𝐵. In general, the 𝑐#(𝑥𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑗) encode the agent’s commitment to 
use the changes to 𝑐(𝐴) and 𝑐(𝐵) directly caused by 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 in a way that respects the agent’s 
 
65 For a discussion of the significance of probative value, see the second chapter of this dissertation.  
66 Again, this is in the sense of probative evidence. Changing 𝑐(𝐴) will, of course, change the extent to which 
learning 𝐴 or ¬𝐴 can be incremental evidence. The larger 𝑐(𝐴) is, the less that becoming certain (assigning 𝑐(𝐴) =
1) will change any 𝑐(𝑥); while for very large 𝑐(𝐴), learning ¬𝐴 can have a much larger impact on confidence in 
other propositions that depend on 𝐴. Similarly: for small 𝑐(𝐴), learning ¬𝐴 will have a much smaller impact on 




prior beliefs about whether, and to what extent, 𝐴 and 𝐵 are evidence for all of the other 𝑥 ∈
𝒜. And of course, by construction, this superconditioning result also gives us a way of 
understanding the content of the learning experience as propositional – we can model the 
agent as if they were performing Bayesian conditionalization upon learning which signals they 
in fact received, among several signals that they might have.  
 
7. Factivity and Fittingness of CPK Signals 
 
A question that I am sometimes asked by other philosophers67 who read about CPK is: 
“evidence is usually understood as factive. But credal rates of change aren’t the kind of thing 
that can be true or false. How should we understand the credal rates of change that are the 
inputs to CPK as evidence?” In the past, I’ve responded roughly as follows: it’s true, of course, 
that it doesn’t make sense to ask whether or not an instruction to increase 𝑐(𝐴) at some rate is 
true or false. But we can assess whether or not such an instruction is fitting in the conditions 
the agent finds themselves in. In very broad strokes, I just mean that we can ask whether or not 
the recommendation to increase the agent’s credence is good advice. And there are various 
ways that we might reasonably fill in this question of whether the suggested changes are good 
advice which are intuitively related to different standards for belief/credence that we might be 
interested in.  
First, we can ask whether such a recommendation actually increases the agent’s real 
accuracy in the situation at hand. According to this standard, a CPK process is fitting/good 
advice just in case the agent’s resultant credences are more accurate, given the actual truth 
values of the propositions the agent has credences over, than they were before the CPK 
process. Of course, we could also ask the more restricted questions of whether the raw rate-of-
change inputs are good advice in this way: are the agent’s resultant credences in 𝐴 and 𝐵 more 
accurate than they were before? If this is true, and the agent’s resultant credences are less 
accurate overall, then we might think that the problem wasn’t with the specified rates of 
change – the problem was that the agent had inaccurate priors about how other propositions 
 




were related to 𝐴 and 𝐵 such that becoming more confident in these two propositions misled 
them about the world in general. And, of course, this can happen according to any standard 
updating rule or learning process.  
Another question we might be interested in is not actual accuracy, but something like fit 
to objective chance. So, suppose there is some genuinely non-deterministic process, such that it 
is empirically impossible to determine what the outcome will be prior to the result. Obtaining a 
highly accurate credence in the outcome that happens to obtain is arguably not any kind of 
credit to an agent trying to predict the outcome. I think it’s fairly natural to think that we should 
attribute this success merely to good fortune. I am partial to the idea that the epistemically 
best prediction in this kind of case would be to accurately match the objective chance of the 
outcome according to the non-deterministic laws that govern the process. If this is correct, 
that’s another natural notion of whether the signals the agent receives are good advice or not: 
are the agent’s credences after the CPK shift closer or further away from the objective chance 
function than they were prior? And again, we can ask the more restricted question: would 
following the direct advice about 𝑐(𝐴) and 𝑐(𝐵) make these credences better or worse aligned 
with the objective chance? 
Now, I still think that all of that is more or less correct – as far as it goes. But the 
superconditioning result I presented in the previous section reveals another very interesting 
feature of CPK: an agent that updates their credences according to my proposal is acting as if 
they have certain conditional priors about how the 𝑟 and 𝑠 signals they might receive are 
correlated with the truths of 𝐴 and 𝐵, respectively. As mentioned in the analysis starting under 
equation (30), among other things, holding fixed the respective priors, they must believe that 
stronger (more positive) 𝑟 signals are likelier, assuming 𝐴, than weaker (closer to zero) signals;68 
the same correlation must hold for 𝑠𝑗 and 𝐵. This correlation is something that the agent might 
be wrong about. So, if we have a system that is responding to some real signals generated by 
some process (perhaps as the output of some sensor or organ, a computational output of some 
 
68 A little more carefully: 
𝑐#(𝑟+|𝐴)
𝑐(𝑟+)




other system within the agent, etc.), we can ask: is the agent correct to treat this signal as a CPK 
input? And just as above, there are multiple things we might mean.  
First, we might mean something like: are the 𝑐#(𝑟𝑖|𝐴) and 𝑐
#(𝑠𝑗|𝐵) accurate? Are these 
good predictions of the actual frequencies with which the relevant process will tend to 
generate those signals when 𝐴 or 𝐵 are true, respectively? And yet again, here there are two 
distinctions to be made. Even if the 𝑐#(𝑟𝑖|𝐴) are not accurate predictions of the signal-
generating process’ propensity to transmit the various signals, the process could still have a 
frequency profile that does recommend itself as a CPK input. That is, there might be some 𝑐∗ 
defined on 𝒜# that estimates the real frequencies fairly well and which, when conditionalized, 
outputs the results of the corresponding CPK shifts. In this case, it’s not clear that the agent is 
mistaken to treat the signals as CPK inputs; we might want to say that the agent merely has 
unfortunate priors. If there is no such 𝑐∗, then we can say that treating the signals as inputs to a 
CPK process is a mistake.  
Second, we might be interested in questions about whether the system is justified in 
treating the signals as inputs to a CPK process, irrespective of whether the beliefs we can model 
them as having are accurate. And there are many ways that we might approach this. We might 
be interested in evidential justification: if an agent that updates by treating some signals as 
inputs to a CPK process repeatedly finds the beliefs it forms this way to be very inaccurate, 
maybe we should think that the agent isn’t justified in continuing to treat the signals this way, 
because it has a very large amount of evidence that the signals aren’t operating the way it 
thinks they are. We might be interested in some kind of reliabilist justification: if some channel 
almost always outputs signals that do work well for CPK, but sometimes malfunctions and 





In explaining what it means for the inputs to a CPK process to be evidence, I first explain 
what it means for an agent to think that they are evidence / for the agent to treat them as 




who updates by CPK believes that the signals are evidence in the sense that she believes she 
will be better informed after making the recommended revisions to her current credences than 
she is at present; she expects decisions made on the basis of her revised credences to have 
higher expected utility than facing the same decisions with her current credences. Second, I 
consider a worry that the kinds of signals that serve as the inputs to CPK cannot actually be 
evidence, because that would require them to have propositional content. I examine Timothy 
Williamson’s arguments that evidence must be propositional. My first impulse in responding to 
this worry is to disagree with the idea that evidence must have propositional content; the most 
fundamental role of the kind of evidence with which I am concerned is to require credal 
change. What the agent regards as evidence depends very simply on what credences she 
believes she should adopt in response to various pieces of information she might acquire. 
When she thinks that, upon receipt of some information, increasing her confidence in some 
hypothesis will lead to more accurate beliefs and better-informed decisions, that is constitutive 
of believing that the information is (incremental) evidence for the hypothesis. Whether she is 
correct about this evidential relation depends on facts about things like accuracy and objective 
chance; this, of course, is an external matter. But I think that there are no special structural 
characteristics that the representational content of this information needs to have. I think 
Williamson’s arguments that evidence must be propositional are imposing a stricter standard of 
evidence that is rooted in the representational features that something must have not merely 
to be evidence, but that are features necessary to discuss and analyze whether and why certain 
pieces of information are or are not evidence. It is this kind of analysis that might plausibly 
require an agent to be able to represent certain kinds of logical connections between 
propositions, etc. I argue this point because I think it is true, but I proceed under the 
assumption that I have not convinced the reader to adopt my position.  
So, next I assume that evidence must be propositional – in the very weak sense that, in 
any case of supposed evidence acquisition, an external theorist should be able to come up with 
some proposition that is the “real” evidence. I first provide a (trivial) proof showing that any 
CPK shift defined over finitely many propositions can be obtained through superconditioning on 




identifying what kind of propositional content we might think of as the evidence that could be 
learned in a CPK experience. The first strategy is deeply analogous to some of Richard Jeffrey’s 
comments on how to understand the non-propositional character of his Probability Kinematics: 
we can assume that CPK is just an alternative way of characterizing how an agent responds to 
learning some content that could, in principle, be represented by propositions. So, I sketch an 
example of how we might relate propositional characterizations of what the agent learns in a 
continuous serious of visual perceptions to the characterization of that experience provided by 
CPK. There at least three virtues of choosing to represent the experience in terms of directed 
rates of change instead of learning various propositions that are very similar to the virtues of 
Jeffrey’s approach: (1) it is a useful abstraction, which allows us to characterize the learning 
experience in terms of its effects without having to characterize the content of input in, e.g., 
precise psychological terms; (2) it is more plausible that an agent could have access to 
(approximate, discretized) CPK inputs than to the “underlying” propositions that characterize 
the sensory content; and (3) this way of characterizing the learning experience requires 
assuming the agent has priors over the outcomes of the learning experience that are much 
more manageable than the kinds of priors we would need to model them as having to update 
on the propositional content of the sensory experiences. As I quote Jeffrey explaining, it is really 
quite difficult to imagine that an agent could have priors defined over all of the sensory 
experiences they think they might undergo. There is an additional virtue of my CPK updating 
approach, which is a significant focus of the second chapter of this dissertation: CPK gives a 
much more intuitive gloss on combining learning experiences that are directly about different 
propositions than the standard Jeffrey approach does.  
The second strategy is the constructive proof of a superconditioning procedure that 
involves modelling the agent as if they were updating by Bayesian conditionalization on 
propositions with the content that they received certain values of signals. Once again, if all we 
want is a post hoc superconditioning result of dubious relation to the agent’s actual beliefs, the 
proof in this section provides an exact recipe for constructing a suitably expanded algebra to 
supercondition on after receiving whatever values of signals they happen to receive; and this 




However, such a small grid will obviously not actually capture the agent’s prior beliefs about 
what signals they might receive. If we choose a much finer grid, we can begin to actually 
approximate the agent’s (presumed) continuous prior distribution over the signals they might 
receive; or it might model the actual credal distribution that a real agent physically incapable of 
storing a truly continuous distribution has. In either case, we can think of this version of the 
superconditioning result as genuinely reflective (by either representation or approximation) of 
commitments that the agent really has, and so looking at the properties of the credence 
function on this refined algebra sheds genuine light on what an agent who updates by CPK 
should believe about the source generating the signals to think of them as that kind of 
evidence. We see that, for it to be reasonable for the agent to think that the signals she is 
receiving are indicative of credal derivatives that she should adopt, the agent must have certain 
particular beliefs about how the probability of receiving various signals varies both with the 
truth of the learned-about proposition and with her current credence in said proposition. And 
this sheds significant light on what to say about the question of the factivity of CPK signals as 
evidence.  
When epistemologists discuss the factivity of evidence, there are really two related 
ways in which evidence is usually assumed/argued to be factive: (1) evidence must have the 
kind of representational content which allows it to be either true or false and, (2) evidence 
must be true.69 Although I have suggested two ways in which we might be able to relate CPK 
signals to the kinds of objects that can be true or false, I regard this mostly as a formal 
maneuver that is not indicative of the actual conceptual features that make CPK signals viable 
as evidence. My suggestion is to replace these conditions with the following: (1) for an agent to 
treat some signals as CPK evidence is for the agent to believe, or to behave as if, there is a 
certain kind of specific correlation between the truth of the proposition learned about, their 
current credences, and what signals they receive. It is these beliefs, or beliefs as if, that 
underwrite why it makes sense for the agent to treat the signals as indications of how their 
confidence in the proposition should change. (2) for an agent to be correct in treating these 
 
69 Thanks to Sarah Moss for emphasizing this point in a meeting of Michigan’s Epistemology Work in Progress (E-




signals as evidence in this way is then a question about whether these beliefs, or beliefs as if, 
are accurate. We can treat this as a binary (their beliefs about the correlation are correct or 
incorrect), but it is probably usually more useful to treat it is a matter of degree: how close to 
the true correlation are their conditional probabilities? Additionally, many epistemologists 
demand that evidence is not merely true, but that the evidence has some kind of epistemically 
“creditable standing” (Williamson, p. 187). (For Williamson, it turns out that evidence must be 
known. Other epistemologists may desire evidential beliefs to be well-justified, or safe, or etc.) 
In the CPK framework, much as what is interesting to say about whether the agent is correct in 
treating the signals as evidence is not really about the content of the signals themselves (whose 
content is really merely picking certain real numbers), the question of this kind of creditability is 
also not primarily about the agent’s belief in the content of the signals. The interesting 
questions are whether the agent’s beliefs about, or beliefs as of, the correlations between the 
signals and propositions learned about are creditable. Does the agent have evidence that 
supports what they take the correlation to be? Are these beliefs about the correlations reliable, 
safe, etc.? (We could even ask if the agent knows these correlations.) Through this lens, the 
agent’s conditional probabilities concerning the signals they might receive are the nexus of all 
of the questions about the evidential status of the signals: a certain pattern of conditional 
probabilities is constitutive of taking the signals to be the particular kind of evidence with which 
CPK is concerned, the accuracy of these conditional probabilities determines whether the agent 
is – or, rather, to what degree they are – correct in treating them as this kind of evidence, and 
the creditability of these conditional probabilities is the key to evaluating the praiseworthiness 
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